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Δ Ά 
The recent upturn in economic activity should not divert attention from the fun­
damental questions that will determine Europe's long-run economic perfor­
mance. Though the Unions economic base is strong, rigidities and distortions 
still remain that prevent Europe from fully exploiting its potential for growth and 
employment creation. 
It is vital that European society be open to change and innovation. Policy­
makers can assist by creating a favourable environment for innovation and 
growth, through market-based policies that encourage investment in human cap­
ital and knowledge, promote the exchange of information and remove obstacles 
to change. 
The Commission has been diligent in responding to this challenge. Its strategy 
for industry is market-based and horizontal in approach, focusing on providing 
coordination and support while leaving to the private sector the responsibility for 
identifying technological and market trends. 
This report on the competitiveness of European industry provides an up-to-date 
analytical foundation for. the examination of key issues, based on existing 
research and on further analysis of key data. It has been produced at the request 
of the Council by its resolution of 21 November 1994 on strengthening the com­
petitiveness of European industry. 
The report seeks to establish the extent to which European industry has been 
successful in adapting to the requirements for change induced by greater com­
petition at home and abroad. It also seeks to identify factors which hinder 
European industry from realizing its full potential for growth and employment 
in the light of the Commission's proposals for a confidence pact for employment. 
The Competitiveness Advisory Group on its part has also addressed these issues 
in its reports to the Commission and to the European Council. 
The report is complemented by a Commission communication on the same sub­
ject which lays out the operational conclusions drawn by the Commission from 
the analytical report. The importance of benchmarking as a tool for improving 
the performance of enterprises, sectors and policies is stressed. 
I hope that this publication will prove to be a vital tool for analysts and policy­
makers, and indeed anyone who needs accurate, up-to-date and detailed infor­
mation on the competitive performance of European industry. 
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Introduction 
Competitiveness does not concern industry alone. It 
touches every citizen in the European Union. A 
strong economy is an efficient economy that creares 
jobs and raises standards of living. Productivity, 
employment, and living standards are all linked 
together. High productivity provides the basis for 
raising living standards. However, increases in labour 
productivity should not be achieved at the expense of 
job creation. The ability to achieve high rates of 
employment also affects living standards directly by 
generating income from a larger proportion of the 
population. When both productivity and employ-
ment rise together, strong growth can ensue. 
The competitiveness pyramid 
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Many interlinked factors affect the performance of 
the European economy. Some of these relationships 
are illustrated in the competitiveness pyramid. 
Europe continues to lag 20% behind the United 
States in terms of both productivity levels and the 
employment rate (proportion of the working age 
population that is employed). It also lags behind the 
Japanese employment rate by a similar margin. The 
result is a level of GDP per capita nearly one third 
below rhat of the United States and one sixth below 
that of Japan. Such a result is by no means inevitable 
and should not be considered as acceptable. Europe's 
human resources, capital base, infrastructure, and 
the size and development of its home market provide 
the foundation for both high productivity and high 
employment rates. 
Although the EU closed the major part of its pro-
ductivity gap with the US between I960 and 1990, 8  INTRODUCTION 
European labour productivity is currently stuck on a 
plateau. Moreover, the remarkable increase in pro-
ductivity between those years was mainly achieved 
through the rapid increase in rhe capital stock and 
the significant substitution of labour by capital. 
Since I960, the EU has managed to create 10 mil-
lion new jobs — half those of Japan and less than a 
fifth of those in the US. A very high rate of job cre-
ation enabled the US to increase its employment rate 
significantly from 63% in 1960 to 72% in 1995, 
when it came close to the consistently high Japanese 
rate of 74%. In the EU, the employment rate 
declined from 67 to 60% over the same period. High 
labour costs, along with capital/labour substitution, 
is surely an important reason for the EU's poor 
employment record. 
Growth and jobs are produced by enterprises operat-
ing on competitive markets. Therefore, if competi-
tiveness is to be improved, the focus must be on how 
to improve the performance of enterprises. Though 
enterprises themselves are primarily responsible for 
ensuring their competitiveness, many factors influ-
encing their performance are affected by framework 
conditions set by policy makers at national or 
European level. 
The first three chapters of the report examine the 
competitive performance of the European economy 
in general, of European industry in particular and 
with regard to trade and foreign direct investment. 
They provide an overview of key elements that are 
required to make an assessment of competitiveness. 
The next three chapters examine the extent to which 
European performance can be ascribed to the opera-
tion of markets. The chapter on labour markets and 
corporate finance addresses factors of production. 
The chapter on competition and operation of mar-
kets for services deals with the operation of certain 
product markets. 
The final three chapters address issues related to 
non-price competition. They cover specific areas 
including the level of skills, research, innovation and 
protection of the environment. CHAPTER 1 
Chapter 1 
Competitive performance of the European economy 
Competitive performance may be assessed at both 
the level of enterprises and the level of the economy 
as a whole. High levels and rapid growth of produc-
tivity, along with high levels of employment, drive 
competitive performance of an economy. This chap-
ter examines the extent to which the European econ-
omy achieves high productivity and employment 
compared with other developed countries and with 
irs potential. The link between investment and levels 
of public expenditure and economic performance is 
then investigated. 
1. Performance of the European 
economy 
In 1995 the 15-member European Union generated 
a GDP of almost ECU 6 500 billion, or in other 
words 20% more rhan rhat of the United States and 
70% more than that of Japan. The four largest 
Member States generate almost three-quarters of 
Europe's GDP, almost 30% being accounted for by 
Germany. 
Up to 1990 Europe's economy grew at the same rate 
as that of the United States, but considerably less 
than that of Japan. In the early 1990s Europe weath-
ered a longer and deeper recession than the United 
States which is clearly leaving Europe behind, while 
Japan has not regained irs earlier growth rares (Table 
1.1.). 
Table 1.1. Economic growth 
Annual average — GDP growth in % 
1960-73 
1973-79 
1979-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
EUR 15 
4.7 
2.5 
2.3 
1.5 
1.0 
-0.6 
2.8 
2.7 
USA 
3.9 
2.5 
2.4 
-0.5 
2.5 
3.4 
4.1 
3.2 
Japan 
9.6 
3.6 
4.1 
4.5 
1.1 
-0.2 
0.5 
0.4 
Source: European Commission. 
2. Living standards in the European 
Union 
Living standards are the ultimate yardstick of com-
petitiveness in that they reflect the economy's ability 
to generate, for the factors of production (and the 
rest of the population), a relatively high income on a 
long-term basis. The standard of living is evaluated 
by the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) — 
measured in purchasing power parities (PPP). 
Despite significant progress since 1960, the standard 
of living in the European Union in 1995 was lower 
than that in the United States by more than a quar-
ter and that of Japan by almost one sixth . 10  CHAPTER 1 
Fig. 1.1. Living standards 
GDP per capita — USA=100 
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This convergence is due to a sharper rise in living 
standards than the Community average in those 
Member States whose living standard was the low-
est and also in France, combined with a slower 
rate of growth in living standards in those 
Member States which were advanced in 1960. 
Thus Sweden and the United Kingdom, whose 
living standard counted among the highest in 
1960, had a lower standard of living than the 
Community average by 1995 (Fig· 1.3.). 
Source: European Commission. 
Growth in European standards of living initially 
enabled it to converge on those of the United States 
in relative terms, before peaking in rhe early 1980s 
and even falling back since the early 1990s (Fig. 
1.1.). 
The shift in Japan was similar bur decidedly more 
rapid. Starting from a level half of that in Europe, 
the standard of living grew very quickly and over-
took its European counterpart at the end of the 
1970s and only peaked in the early 1990s. 
Although convergence within the European 
Union has enabled the disparities in living stan-
dards between the Member States to be reduced, 
the spread between the Member States is still 
between 1 and almost 3 in 1995 (Fig. 1.2). That 
spread was between 1 and more rhan 4 in 1960. 
Fig. 1.2. Living standards 
GDP per capita — EUR 15=100 
Fig. 1.3. Living standards 
GDP PPP/ per capita nominal growth 1960-1995 
Source: European Commission. 
Changes in living standards result from a combina-
tion of growth in productivity and job creation. 
Productivity expresses the efficiency with which 
goods and services are supplied. A rise in the pro-
portion of the total population which is employed 
represents enhanced productive use of human 
resources. 
Thus in 1995 the European Union's standard of liv-
ing was 30% lower than that in the United States. 
This can be attributed to a combination of lower 
employment and productivity rates. Concerning 
Japan, the standard of living is lower than that in the 
United States because of relatively low productivity. 
110 130 150 170 
Source: European Commission. CHAPTER 1 I 11 
3. Productivity 
While all forms of productivity are important, 
labour productivity has a direct impact on living 
standards (Fig. 1.4). 
Fig. 1.4. Labour productivity 
GDP/employee — USA=100 
1970  1980  1990 
Source: European Commission. 
Between 1960 and 1990, the European Union and 
Japan largely made up their productivity gap with 
the United States. Nevertheless, that period of con­
vergence seems to have come to an end in both cases. 
A European GDP per person employed — i.e. labour 
productivity — which peaks at four fifths of that in 
the United States points to an unexploited margin of 
efficiency in the European economy. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, Japan is still producing 
behind the European Union and United States in 
terms of productivity, particularly as a result of the 
very low level of labour productivity in agriculture 
and services. 
There are considerable differences within the 
European Union (Fig. 1.5). However, the maxi­
mum ratio between the Member States of 1 to 5 
in 1960 became 1 to 2 in 1995 owing to the very 
sharp rise in productivity in Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland. 
Fig. 1.5. Labour productivity 
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Box 1.1. Measuring productivity 
T
he traditional way of analysing productivity is 
based on the accumulation of physical capital, but 
this process, which is subject to diminishing returns, 
is unable to explain a sustained improvement to 
labour productivity. Indeed the accumulation of physi-
cal capital only explains part of the growth in produc-
tivity. 
In order to explain the growth in productivity, econom-
ic theory now invokes four major factors: technical 
progress, the accumulation of physical capital, higher 
skills and economic integration, 
Although technical progress is the essential factor in 
improving productivity, it is not measured directly. 
However, statistical techniques have been developed 
to estimate the impact of those other causal factors 
on productivity which might be closely correlated with 
technical progress. 
Labour productivity — GDP/per person employed — 
is still an effective means of measuring performance. 
Measuring the quantity of labour used remains, 
however, subject to a wide margin of error, even in 
the advanced economies, and is inevitably imprecise 
in the rest of the world owing to a lack of reliable sta-
tistics. Use must also be made of more complex con-
cepts which take account of both labour and the con-
tribution of capital. 
The accumulation of physical capital is a prime yard-
stick of technical progress. The principal incentive to 
accumulate physical capital is the fact that new tech-
niques generate new products and more efficient pro-
duction methods. Measuring and analysing this is 
however a problem since the national estimates of 
capital stock are conceptually close but difficult to 
compare owing to widely differing calculation hypothe-
ses. 
By measuring labour and physical capital, it is also 
possible to measure total factor productivity i.e. the 
ratio of production to the utilization of the factors of 
labour and capital. This formula explains the basics 
of productivity growth, with technical progress as a 
residual factor (Table 1.2.). 
Table 1.2. Annual productivity growth 
1973-92 
France 
Germany 
UK 
USA 
Japan 
Source: OECD 
Labour 
product. 
2.73 
2.69 
2.18 
1.11 
3.13 
Maddison. 
Capital 
product. 
-1.96 
-1.04 
-1.67 
-0.72 
-2.85 
Factors of 
product. 
0.73 
1.54 
0.69 
0.18 
1.04 
A third factor helping to turn technical progress to 
practical account - the accumulation of human capi-
tal by raising the level of education - has been incor-
porated into an 'augmented' version of the formula 
for the total productivity of the factors, which has 
given rise to far fewer statistical measurements in 
practice. 
Other aspects such as the ever greater openness of 
economies, economies of scale, structural change 
and access to natural resources help to improve pro-
ductivity, but it is difficult to measure the impact of 
these. 
In attempting to close the productivity gap, the con-
tribution of capital has been more imporrant in the 
European Union and Japan than in the United 
States. 
Between 1960 and 1995, the European Union more 
than tripled its capital stock and Japan multiplied its 
own eight times, whereas investment in the United 
States barely doubled (Fig. 1.6.). CHAPTER 1  13 
Fig. 1.6. Net capital stock 
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Source: European Commission. 
The rapid increase in capital stock in the European 
Union and in Japan led to a relative fall in capital 
productivity — measured in terms of GDP per unit of 
capital stock— between 1960 and 1995. At the same 
time capital productivity rose in the United States 
(Fig. 1.6.). 
Fig. 1.7. Capital productivity 
GDP/capital stock 
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capital was not significant, the changes within the 
European Union and even more strikingly in Japan 
were marked by a sharp rise in capital intensity as a 
result of a more rapid increase in capital stock and of 
a replacement of labour by capital (Fig. 1.8.). 
Fig. 1.8. Capital/Labour substitution 
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Source: European Commission. 
Despite a relative drop in the productivity of capital, 
total factor productivity almost doubled in the 
European Union, and almost trebled in Japan, 
between 1960 and 1995, whereas it increased by less 
than a half in the United States. 
However, productivity growth in the European 
Union and Japan has begun to peak (Fig. 1.9.). 
Fig. 1.9. Total factor productivity 
EUR 15 
USA 
Japan 
Source: European Commission. 
When account is taken of growth in employment, 
capital intensity — the amount of capital per person 
employed — better reflects the boost given by techni-
cal progress to productivity. 
In contrast to the United States where, between 
I960 and 1995, capital intensity only rose slightly 
and the phenomenon of substitution of labour by 
1970  1980  1990 
Source: European Commission. 14  CHAPTER 1 
In the long term, the boost to total factor productiv­
ity is due to that of the rapid rise in labour produc­
tivity and to the relative stagnation in capital pro­
ductivity (Fig. 1.10.). 
Fig. 1.10. Labour and capital productivity 
EUR 15  r 2 
labour  capital  total 
Source: European Commission. 
4. Employment rate 
The employment/population ratio is an essential 
determinant of living standards: any increase has a 
positive effect on living standards. 
In 1995 this rario was clearly lower in the European 
Union (40%) than in the United States (48%) and 
in Japan (52%). Although the rate increased in the 
United States after 1960 (+11 points) and in Japan 
(+4 points), it decreased by 4 points in the European 
Union. 
Between 1990 and 1995 the employment/popula­
tion ratio fell by 2% in the European Union where­
as ir rose by 0.3% in the United States and 0.9% in 
Japan (Fig. 1.11.). 
Fig. 1.11. Employment as % of population 
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The employment/population rario is itself deter­
mined by demographic structure and the employ­
ment situation. 
The population of working age is customarily 
defined as the population between 15 and 64 years 
of age. 
In 1995, the working-age population represented 
two-thirds of the total population of the European 
Union, or in other words a proportion comparable 
to that of the United States and Japan. The differ­
ence in the employment/population ratio can thus 
not be attributed to demographic structure (Fig. 
1.12.). 
Fig. 1.12. Demographic structure (1992) 
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Source: Eurostat. Basic statistics. 
Source: European Commission. 
The demographic structure of the European Union, 
and in particular the increasing population of over 
64-year olds in the total population, nevertheless 
points to future problems, faced by all of the devel­
oped countries. 
This situation contrasts wirh that of developing 
countries, for example the Philippines, where the rel­
ative proportion of under 15-year olds in the popu­
lation is twice as high as in the European Union and 
there is virtually no-one over rhe age of 64. 
The employment rare, which reflects the proportion 
of the working-age population that is utilized, is 
clearly lower in the European Union (59% in 1995) 
than in the United States and Japan (73% and 74% 
respectively) (Fig. 1.13.). This difference of almost 
15% in the employment rate is equivalent to 37 mil-CHAPTER 1 I 15 
lion jobs in the European Union, more than double 
the currenr number of unemployed in Europe. 
Fig. 1.13. Employment rate 
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Source: European Commission. 
The employment rate, which has declined by 8% 
since 1960 in the European Union, is one of the 
most significant signs of the lack of efficiency of the 
European economy. In the European economic sys-
tem this decline illustrates the facr rhar rhe number 
of jobs in the European Union has grown less quick-
ly rhan the population of working age. 
The employment rate varies widely between the 
Member States: from 46% in Spain to 75% in 
Luxembourg. However, two Member States, 
Denmark and Luxembourg, have higher employ-
ment rates than the United States and Japan (Fig. 
1.14.). 
Fig. 1.14. Employment rate (1995) 
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Source: European Commission. 
Behind this poor performance lies the fact that with 
only 10 million new jobs, the European Union has 
created only half as many jobs as Japan and five and 
a half times less than the United States (Fig. 1.15.). 
In relative terms, the difference is still more signifi-
cant: between 1960 and 1995 the number of jobs 
increased by barely 8% in the European Union as 
opposed to 84% in the United States and 44% in 
Japan. 
Fig. 1.15. Employment creation 
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Source: European Commission. 
There have been 50% more new entrants on the job 
market in the United States than in Europe (Fig. 
1.16.). 
Fig. 1.16. New entrants on the job market 
increase in population in working age (millions) 
1970  1980  1990 
Source: European Commission. 
It thus emerges that, in contrast with the United 
States where job creation has kept pace with the 
increased supply of labour, the European Union is 
facing relative employment stagnation despite less 
demographic pressure. 16  CHAPTER 1 
5. Investment 
Improvements to productivity largely depend upon 
investment, and more particularly investment in 
plant and equipment which rapidly incorporates 
technical progress. 
For rhe pasr 20 years rhe European Union has clear-
ly invested less than Japan and even the United 
States, where investment has risen very fast since 
1990 (Fig. 1.17.). 
Fig. 1.17. Investment in plant and equipment 
at constant prices (1977=100) 
USA 
Japan 
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the United States, which divert a significant propor-
tion of savings away from investment (Fig. 1.19.). 
Fig. 1.19. Savings rate (1993) 
as % of GDP 
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Source: European Commission. 
6. Public expenditure 
1980  1990  1995 
The structure of public spending in the European 
Union is characterized by the predominance of 
spending on consumption and transfers instead of 
investment (Fig. 1.20.). 
Source: European Commission. 
The savings rate is also much lower in the European 
Union than in Japan, which devotes twice as large a 
part of GDP to savings and this difference is rela-
tively stable over time (Fig. 1.20.). 
In addition to the handicap arising from rhe chronic 
public deficits in the European Union, the relatively 
low level of public investment in the European 
Union serves to widen the gap. 
Fig. 1.20. Public spending (1993) 
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Source: European Commission. 
This difference can be explained by the public sav-
ings rate, which is positive in Japan in contrast to the 
chronic public deficits in the European Union and 
Increasing public expenditure derives mainly from 
the massive increase in public transfers which, with-
in the European economy, increased from 15 to 23% CHAPTER 1 I 17 
of GDP between 1970 and 1995. At the same time 
public transfers increased from 9 to 15% of GDP in 
the United States and 6 to 14% in Japan (Fig. 1.21.). 
Support for enterprises has remained relatively stable 
not only in Europe, but also in the United States and 
Japan (Fig. 1.23.). 
Fig. 1.21. Public transfers 
as % of GDP 
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Source: European Commission. 
The rise in public transfers basically corresponds to 
that of public transfers to households, where the 
increase has been from 12 to 20% of European GDP, 
8 to 14% of US GDP and 5 to 13% of Japanese 
GDP. (Fig. 1.22.) 
Fig. 1.22. Public transfers to households 
as % of GDP 
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EUR 15 
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Source: European Commission. 
The extent of public subsidies to enterprises, which 
- despite significant cutbacks - is twice as great in 
the European Union as in the United States and 
Japan, is nevertheless lower by far than that of trans-
fers to households: in 1995 subsidies to enterprises 
represented no more than one tenth of transfers to 
households. 
Fig. 1.23. Public subsidies to enterprises 
as % of GDP 
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Source: European Commission. 
7. Taxation 
In 1995, after several decades of constantly heavier 
tax burdens, the share of the European economy 
taken by the State is 50% higher than in the United 
States and Japan. 
Between 1970 and 1995, fiscal pressure increased by 
some 10% in the 15-nation EU and in Japan. This 
increased from 34 to 43% of GDP in EU-15 and 
from 20 to 30% in Japan, while it barely increased at 
all in the United States by a mere 2%, from 28 to 
30% (Fig. 1.24). 
Fig. 1.24. Fiscal pressure 
tax burden (as % of GDP) 
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Source: European Commission. 18  CHAPTER 1 
Trends in the structure of taxation according to eco-
nomic function show that, over the period 1980-94, 
the effective tax rare on labour employed increased 
steadily on average from 34 to 40% in Europe, 
whereas the effective tax rate on other factors of pro-
duction decreased from 44 to 35%. Taxation of con-
sumption has remained broadly stable at around 
13% (Fig. 1.25.). 
Fig. 1.25. Structure of taxation 
EU 1980-94 
50% 
40% 
30°/ 
20% 
Consumption 
— — Labour employed 
" " " " Other factors 
10% -i 
1980  1985  1990 
Fig. 1.26. Taxation 
as % of GDP 
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Source: European Commission. 
There are considerable differences in the relative 
importance of direct and indirect taxes and social 
security contributions between Member States: indi-
rect taxes represent between one-quarter and half of 
taxation depending on the Member Srare (Fig. 
1.27.). 
Direct-tax rates (i.e. income taxes) in Europe have 
converged towards those in the United States but 
levels of indirect taxation and social security contri-
butions are significantly higher in Europe than in the 
United States and Japan. After moving closer to the 
American level, the relarive weight of direct taxation 
in Japan has fallen drastically since 1992. 
Direct taxation is the principal form of Taxation in 
the United States and Japan, followed by indirect 
taxation and, finally, social security contributions. In 
Europe, however, direct and indirect taxation and 
social security contributions are equally important. 
Because indirect taxes and social security contribu-
tions are regressive, they weigh more heavily on the 
cost of unskilled labour (Fig. 1.26.). 
The higher level of social security contributions in 
Europe as compared with the United States and 
Japan corresponds to the particularly high level of 
transfers to households. 
Fig. 1.27. Structure of taxation 
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In Europe, the substantial increase in public spend-
ing over the last two decades has led to a combina-
tion of high taxation and high deficits. These have 
led to higher cosrs for enterprises and lower invest-
ment through the siphoning off of available savings. CHAPTER 2  21 
Chapter 2 
Competitive performance of European industry 
Even though the debate on competitiveness is often 
conducted in terms of the competitiveness of indus-
tries and of national economies, competitiveness is a 
concept that applies primarily to enterprises. 
Competitive enterprises develop and achieve high 
profitability in the market as a result of the greater 
efficiency of rheir producrion chain and their capa-
city for innovation. Identifying the mechanisms by 
which enterprise performance is converted into high 
growth, improved productivity and job creation is 
essential in establishing the link between business 
competitiveness and economic performance. 
1. European enterprises 
There are some 16 million enterprises in Europe, 
employing more than 100 million people. 
Employment is equally divided between micro-
enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and 
large businesses (Fig. 2.1.). 
Fig. 2.1. Employment in relation to enterprise 
size in Europe 
number of employees (millions) by size group 
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The average size of an enterprise varies widely from 
one Member State to another: from an average pay-
roll of three in Greece to 13 in Sweden (Fig. 2.2.). As 
a general rule enterprise size increases the further 
north you go in Europe. In fact there is a correlation 
between living standards and enterprise size. This 
can, on the one hand, be explained by the predomi-
nance of the retail sector in southern Europe and, on 
the other hand, the presence of capital intensive 
industries in the north. 
Fig. 2.2. Average enterprise size 
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Average enterprise size also varies widely according to 
economic sector (Fig. 2.3.). Manufacturing enter­
prises are on average distinctly larger than the rest of 
the economy. There is a correlation between the cap­
ital intensity of economic activity and average enter­
prise size. 
Fig. 2.3. Average enterprise size 
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Source: EIM Small Business Research and Consultancy. 
In certain Member States the creation ol new enter­
prises is not sufficient to compensate for rhe disap­
pearance of existing enterprises (Fig. 2.5.). 
Fig. 2.5. Creation of enterprises 
% change from 1988 to 1993 
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Source: EIM Small Business Research and Consultancy. 
Between 1988 and 1993 the rate at which new enter­
prises were created slowed down slightly in Europe 
(Fig. 2.4.). 
Relatively more new enterprises are created in the 
service sector than in manufacturing and construc­
tion (Fig. 2.6.). 
Fig. 2.4. Change in number of enterprises 
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More than half of the new enterprises created in 
Europe survive more than five years (Fig. 2.7.). 
Fig. 2.7. Creation of enterprises in the EU 
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Source: EIM Small Business Research and Consultancy. 
economy benefits from a high level of integration. 
Weakness in one of rhe links in the production and 
marketing chain may constitute a significant handi-
cap for the entire sector. In this connection, supplier 
and subcontractor quality is a decisive factor for 
manufacturing industry. 
It is difficult to estimate the precise extent of subcon-
tracting in the European economy. The purchase of 
goods and services is an imperfect yardstick since it 
also includes purchases of raw materials and energy. 
However, that measure shows rhat subcontracting is 
widespread in manufacturing and construction. The 
purchase of goods and services is equivalent to more 
than two thirds of turnover in manufacturing indus-
try and some three fifths of that of the construcrion 
industry (Fig. 2.9). 
Between 1988 and 1995 small and medium-sized 
enterprises performed better than larger enterprises 
in terms of both job creation and growth in turnover 
(Fig. 2.8.). 
Fig. 2.8. Enterprise size and performance 
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Fig. 2.9. Subcontracting in the EU 
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In manufacturing industry, subcontracting is partic-
ularly developed in aerospace, motor vehicles, elec-
tronics, metal products, textiles, clothing and 
footwear. 
Large and small firms are complementary. Current 
forms of industrial organization are leading to an 
increased recourse to outsourcing and much greater 
integration between firms at different stages of the 
production chain. The more links between enterpris-
es are well developed and equitable, the more the 
In response to stiffer competition and shorter prod-
uct lives, the major motor vehicle, aircraft and elec-
tronics manufacrurers are tending to refocus their 
activities, reduce the number of their subcontractors. 
They subcontract an increasing proportion of the 
actual design of their products. 24  CHAPTER 2 
This process leads to the development of partner-
ships between customers and subcontractors. These 
partnerships are most advanced in the high technol-
ogy sectors and in the most industrialized countries. 
They involve first-level subcontractors i.e. rarely 
SMEs. However, not all subcontracting operations 
are partnerships: in many cases the customers induce 
subcontractors to take responsibility for certain 
activities (development, cerrification). 
Increased subcontracting of design activities and the 
shrinking number of subcontractors make their prin-
cipal cusromers more dependent. Subcontractors for 
their part must constantly develop new skills. 
In order to produce 'just-in-time', guarantee product 
quality and meet increasingly stringent environmen-
tal standards, subcontracrors must bear an increasing 
proportion of the costs and risks which in turn 
affects their profitability. 
2. Sectoral aspects 
Industry (manufacturing industry, construction and 
energy) accounts for nearly one third of the value 
added and jobs within the European economy, while 
services account for most of the remaining two 
thirds. Contrary to popular belief there is no 
dichotomy between industry and services in the 
European economy: their levels of competitiveness 
depend closely on one another. 
Box 2.1. 
T
he role of industry in the economy appears more 
clearly if the various sectors of the economy are 
grouped together according to their place within the 
production process (Fig. 2.10.): 
depending on whether they produce more from their 
own resources (capital and labour) or from resources 
supplied by other sectors (intermediate consumption 
and investment goods); 
Fig. 2.10. Sectors of economy  depending upon whether they essentially sell to other 
enterprises or for final consumption (households plus 
exports): 
Exchange of products between these major economic 
sectors is clearly greater than consumption and 
exports, and their competitiveness depends largely 
upon inputs from the other major economic sectors. 
Source: Eurostat 1985. Input-output tables. CHAPTER 2  25 
One fifth of industry's inputs come from services 
and, conversely, rhree fifths of the inputs of services 
are supplied by industry, the balance corresponding 
to trade between industrial sectors and between ser-
vice sectors (Fig. 2.11.). 
Fig. 2.11. Origin of inputs 
cessing, electrical engineering and office machinery. 
Conversely the transport equipment sector, other 
than motor vehicles, is diminishing (Fig. 2.12.). 
Fig. 2.12. Manufacturing sectors 
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3. Performance by sector 
During the 1980s the significance of services within 
the European economy increased significantly, from 
58% to 64% of value added. This increase is essen-
tially due to the growth in market services, whose 
share increased from 43% to 49% between 1980 and 
1991, whereas the share of non-market services 
remained stable. 
At the same time the shares of agriculrure, energy, 
construction and above all manufacturing industry 
diminished. The share of manufacturing industry fell 
from 26% to 23% between 1980 and 1991. 
Between 1984 and 1994 European manufacturing 
industry, wirh a real annual growth in value added of 
2.2%, has not been performing as well as its Japanese 
(4.1%) and American (3.0%) competitors. 
The main European manufacturing sectors achieved 
rather unequal levels of performance between 1985 
and 1995. The sectors that have most quickly -
measured in terms of changes in value added — are 
those of rubber and plastics, chemicals, food pro-
chemicals 
food,drink & 
tobacco 
electrical 
engineering 
office machines 
paper 
wood & furniture 
metal 
production 
total 
manufacturing 
non-metal 
minerals 
automobile 
iron & steel  O 
footwear & clothing 
Π mechanical engineering 
J other transport 
-1%  1%  3%  5%  7% 
Source: Eurostat. 
In relative terms, as compared with their American 
and Japanese competitors, most European indusrrial 
sectors have performed less well. All of the low-
growth sectors, namely transport equipment, 
mechanical engineering, footwear and clothing, and 
steel are developing less quickly in Europe than in 
America or Japan. The majority of the medium or 
fast-growth sectors, including paper, office machin-
ery, electrical engineering and chemicals are also 
expanding less quickly in Europe than in America or 
Japan. Only the wood, furniture and food processing 
industries are expanding more quickly in Europe. 26  CHAPTER 2 
The European sectors recording the best relative per-
formance in terms of growth are also those whose 
production performance is equivalent to or better 
than that of their competitors. The sectors where rel-
ative growth is equivalent to or higher than that of its 
competitors — food processing, wood and furniture, 
non-metallic minerals, metal products, plastics and 
rubber — have seen their relative productivity 
improve. Conversely, the European secrors growing 
more slowly than those of their competitors — 
mechanical and electrical engineering, office 
machinery and other means of transport — have seen 
their relative productivity deteriorate. 
All of the medium or fast growth sectors in Europe 
are characterized by a higher level of investment — 
measured in relation to value added — than that of 
their competitors. Conversely most of the European 
sectors where relative growth is lower than that of 
their American and Japanese competitors — footwear 
and clothing, other means of transport, mechanical 
and electrical engineering and office machinery — 
have lower relative rates of investment. 
4. Technological performance 
Economic growth cannot be solely attributed to 
input growth, but also depends on other factors. 
Technical progress is one of the main sources of 
long-term productivity growth. In turn, ir is closely 
determined by the level of intangible investment. 
Certain industrial sectors diffuse technological in-
novation while others use it. The more a sector dif-
fuses innovation through the economy, the more ir 
contributes to growth. The high-technology sector is 
characterized by a high level of innovation diffusion, 
or in other words by high R&D efficiency, rather 
than by a high level of spending on R&D (Table 
2.1.). ' 
Between 1984 and 1993, the European Union lost 
patent share in all sectors apart from aerospace and 
transport equipment. These two R&D-using sectors 
are, however, relatively minor as regards the number 
of patents granted or lodged. The losses are limited 
in the following R&D diffusing sectors: chemical 
and pharmaceutical products and engineering (Table 
2.2.). 
The decline in the already weak position of the 
European Union is continuing rapidly in electronics, 
an R&D diffusing sector, in which research and 
development are more important at world level, and 
which exerts a strong influence on innovation 
throughout industry. 
Table 2.2. EU share of total patents by sector 
Share of patents granted in 
Aerospace 
Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Engineering 
Electronics 
Transport equipment 
Other 
Total 
Share of patent applications 
Aerospace 
Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Engineering 
Electronics 
Transport equipment 
Other 
Total 
the US 
1993 
29.2 
21.1 
22.9 
19 
10.9 
24.6 
17.8 
16.7 
in Europe 
60.8 
41.4 
38.8 
50.3 
30.8 
59.7 
50.9 
42.6 
% change 
1984-93 
0.5 
-1.4 
-3.1 
-3.9 
-6.8 
-3.9 
-4.5 
-4.9 
8.3 
-0.7 
-3.2 
-0.6 
-8.3 
5.4 
-1.8 
-3.9 
Source: European Commission. 
5. Enterprise profitability 
Table 2.1. R&D diffusing and using sectors 
Diffusing sectors 
computers 
machinery 
instruments 
electronics 
chemicals 
components 
telecom equipment 
Source: Soete. 1987. 
Using sectors 
aeronautics 
automobile 
iron & steel 
food & drink 
textile 
Together with growth, profit is one of the yardsticks 
of the competitiveness of an enterprise. It illustrates 
an enterprise's ability to combine efficiently the fac-
tors of production. 
Following a period of decline between 1989 and 
1993 and during an upswing of economic activity, 
industrial enrerprises in Europe clearly improved 
their financial performance in 1994 with rises of 
respecrively 1.2 and 1.8 points in their gross and net CHAPTER 2  27 
margins - i.e. annual rises that were greater than 
throughout the period 1984-94 (+0.8 and 1.3 poinrs 
respectively). 
Although the gross margin of European enterprises 
has generally been higher than that of American and 
Japanese enterprises, the recent improvement in 
financial performance of American enterprises 
enabled these to catch up in 1994. Conversely the 
net margin lead held by American enterprises 
increased in 1994. 
resented by high rates of Japanese investment, and by 
the relative lag of Japan compared to the United 
States and Europe in coming out of recession during 
the current business cycle (Fig. 2.14.). 
Fig. 2.14. Return on investment 
(net result / company equity) 
The financial performance of Japanese enterprises 
lags behind that of their European and American 
comperitors (Fig. 2.13.). 
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The return on investment of European enterprises — 
i.e. the ratio of the net result to the enterprise's own 
equity — improved in 1994, but more slowly than in 
the United States. In addition it is lower than the 
nominal interest rates on the long-term public sector 
debt. Rates of return in Japan are to a certain extent 
depressed by the very large depreciation charges Γερ­
ο
 J 
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
(profitability vs long term interest rate %) 
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Source: European Commission. 
While long-term interest rates are on average 1% 
higher than returns on investment in the EU, signif­
icant differences arise between Member States. The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom generated 
returns on investment substantially in excess of long-
term interest rates in 1994, while Spain and Italy 
generated returns which, compared with interest 
rates, can be described as particularly inadequate 
(Fig. 2.15.). 28  CHAPTER 2 
Fig. 2.15. Return on investment in the EU 
(profitability vs long term interest rate % -1994) 
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Improvements in the financial performance of 
European enterprises enabled these to improve their 
financial structure between 1984 and 1994: the 
share of equity in the balance sheet rose by 3.8 
points, whereas that of debt fell by 13.2 points. 
The share of equity in industrial-enterprise balance 
sheets is similar in Europe, the United States and 
Japan. The rate of indebtedness of European coun­
tries is now lower than that of American and 
Japanese enterprises (Fig. 2.16.). 
Fig. 2.16. Financial structure 
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Against a competitive background where enterprises' 
sales prices rose only slightly, the improvement in 
financial performance by European enterprises in 
1994 can mainly be explained by the relative fall in 
labour costs (-1.5 points) and the significant lighten­
ing of financial burdens (-0.7 points). Financial 
charges represent no more than 30% of gross profits 
for enterprises in 1994, mainly owing to a fall in 
short-term interest rates (Fig. 2.17.). 
Fig. 2.17. Labour and capital costs 
(labour and capital cost / turnover) 
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6. Enterprise competitiveness 
A competitive enterprise may be defined as an enter­
prise which succeeds in maintaining or increasing its 
market share, while remaining profitable. Such an 
enterprise is capable of financing its growth and 
improving its position for the goods and services that 
it sells. 
Enterprise profitability is closely correlated with 
market share: a high marker share yields high prof­
itability whatever the type of market in which an CHAPTER 2  29 
enterprise operates. However, maximum profitabili­
ty is associated with a large share of expanding mar­
kets. On average, product quality significantly influ­
ences the profitability of enterprises having an equal 
market share (Fig. 2.18.). 
Fig. 2.18. Profitability, quality and market share 
(return on capital % 1990-94) 
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The comperitiveness of an enterprise depends simul­
taneously on its economic environment (allocation 
of factors and their relative cost) and on intangible 
factors such as the quality of goods and services, 
innovation, marketing activity, investment in R&D 
and intellectual property. 
Enterprises possessing know-how, i.e. branded or 
patented products, clearly manage better to gain or 
retain their market share than others. The impact on 
market share of process patents is comparable to that 
of product patents (Fig. 2.20.). (It must also be taken 
into account here that defending a strong marker 
position is more difficult than growth from a weaker 
position). 
The most productive enterprises are also those that 
are the most profitable. This link shows itself to be as 
important for the productivity of capital as it is for 
the productivity of labour. The substitution of capi­
tal for labour without growth of the enterprise has a 
negative effect on its profitability (Fig. 2.19.). 30  CHAPTER 2 
ro 
Fig. 2.20. Intellectual property and 
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Innovation, measured via the share oi turnover gen-
erared by new products, also leads to a perceptible 
increase in marker share (Fig. 2.21.). 
The impact ol other intangible factors such as mar-
keting and the quality of goods and services is less 
significant than that of intellectual property (patents 
and trade marks) and of innovation (Fig. 2.22.). 
Fig. 2.22. Intangible factors and competitiveness 
annual growth in market share, 1990-94 
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A selection of 500 of Europe's most dynamic enter-
prises shows rhat the majority of dynamic enter-
prises base their growth strategy on product differen-
tiation rather than on cost (Fig. 2.23.). 
Fig. 2.23. Strategies of dynamic enterprises 
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Source: EIM Small Business Research and Consultancy. 
Acquiring a bigger market share reflects the compet-
itiveness of enterprises bur, in order to measure the 
contribution made by a enterprise to overall eco-
nomic growrh, its added value must be examined. 
The growth in added value is, in general, determined 
by the same factors as for market share. Thus intel-
lectual property is closely linked with growth. 
These same growth factors also play a decisive part in 
job creation. However, in comparison with the 
United States, European growth clearly creates far 
fewer jobs. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the means used by enterprises in order to boost their 
productivity. Jobs are directly affected in traditional 
sectors when enterprises replace labour by capital in 
order to improve their productivity. Only rapidly-
growing enterprises manage to create jobs while at 
the same time increasing their capital/labour ratio. CHAPTER 3  33 
Chapter 3 
Internationalization 
The openness of the European economy means that 
performance in international markets constitutes an 
important element in industrial performance. This 
chapter examines the way in which trade and foreign 
direct investment have developed over rhe preceding 
decade with a view to identifying strengths and 
weaknesses in the performance of European indus-
try. The extent to which foreign direct investment 
has led to a loss of jobs and output in Europe is also 
examined. 
1. Internationalization: the stakes 
Open markets drive productivity gains through the 
response of enterprises to increased competition. 
They make cost-effective and innovative compo-
nents and other inputs available and enable the 
exploitation.of economies of scale. Performance on 
international markets also serves as an indicator of 
competitiveness to the extent that the ability to 
maintain and expand international market share 
reveals an ability by enterprises to meet competition 
on open markets. 
A major development over the last two decades has 
been the continuous trend rowards the opening of 
markets. Progress in this area can be attributed to 
several factors. The successful outcome of the 
Uruguay Round has led to the setting-up of the 
World Trade Organization and to the opening-up of 
new areas, including services, agriculture and intel-
lectual property rights. Economic integration at the 
regional level (European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN, 
Mercosur, APEC, etc.) has also led to improved mar-
ket access. Finally, recent developments towards mar-
ket-oriented reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Latin America and East Asia have led to the entry of 
these economies into world trade and investment. 
Internationalization derives from market stimuli and 
results in improvements of allocative efficiency. The 
degree of internationalization of European enterpris-
es can be considered as an indicator of their compet-
itiveness. Trade and investment by European compa-
nies in third country markets reflects the capacity of 
European firms to penetrate foreign markets. 
One of the major determinants of Europe's ability to 
sustain its competitiveness is linked to the presence 
of its enterprises on fast growing markets. 
2. Trade performance 
Over the period 1982-94 the European Union sus-
tained a continuous surplus in both goods and ser-
vices (Fig. 3.1.). This surplus decreased between 
1986 and 1989 and then grew quickly to reach 3.4% 
of GDP in 1994. Despite the reunification of 
Germany, the European Union's balance has 
improved to a significantly degree since the begin-
ning of the 1990s. 
Fig. 3.1. Balance in goods and services 
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Up until 1991, the overall balance of goods and ser-
vices for the European Union and Japan was of the 
same order and followed a parallel development. 
Since then the European Union's balance has 
improved substantially while that of Japan has 
remained stable. The United States was in deficit 
throughout the 1980s and the size of the deficit gen-
erally mirrors the surplus of the European Union 
and Japan. 
The European Union has traditionally had a trade 
surplus in services (Fig. 3.2.). This surplus has repre-
sented a relarively srable share of GDP, although it 
decreased in the beginning of the 1990s to reach 
1.1% in 1994. 
The trade balance in raw materials (energy, agricul-
tural products and other raw materials) has con-
stantly been in deficit. The deficit declined substan-
tially in 1986 following the collapse of the price of 
oil and has remained relatively stable since then at 
around 1.4% of GDP. 
Fig. 3.2. Balance of raw materials, manufactured 
products and services 
(EUR 12) 
Exchange rate movements observed over the period 
are, however, difficult to relate to manufacturing 
trade performance. The dollar has continued to 
depreciate against the ecu since the Plaza agreements 
of 1985, although by 1995 the dollar had not yet 
fallen to its level of 1980 prior ro the big apprecia-
tion of the early 1980s. Since 1987, the yen has 
appreciated against the ecu at three times the rate of 
the dollar's depreciation (Fig. 3.3.). 
Fig. 3.3. Exchange rates 
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The trade surplus in manufactured goods has con-
stantly decreased since the mid 1980s although it 
recovered parrly between 1992 and 1994. The posi-
tive performance in the latter period could, ro a cer-
tain extent, be related to lags in the business cycle. 
The observed deterioration of the manufacturing 
trade balance can be analysed in the light of other 
macroeconomic factors such as the exchange rate. 
In the short term, exchange rate volatility can influ-
ence developments for sectors which compete pri-
marily on price. For these sectors, increases in unit 
labour cost relarive to other industrialized regions 
have a significant effect on their competitiveness. 
Non-wage cost (i.e. material input cost, cost of cap-
ital) are, of course, also relevant factors. However, 
even if over the short term, depreciation of a curren-
cy provides a boost to price competitiveness, experi-
ence shows that this advantage can quickly be erod-
ed by higher costs of imported raw materials and 
components and by an increase in inflationary pres-
sures. Over the medium term, exchange rate appre-
ciation can be taken as an indicator of competitive-
ness, providing that it is not the product of system-
atically higher interest rates. 
However, currency misalignments (i.e. prolonged 
divergences between the real exchange rate and the 
longer term equilibrium value) do have an impact on 
the volume and composition of trade. The observed 
appreciation of the ecu against the dollar over the 
period does not seem to respond to a persistent CHAPTER 3  35 
currency misalignment. Therefore, even if the appre­
ciation could have had an effect on the European 
Union's trade flows over the short term, exchange 
rare movements do not explain the evolution of the 
manufacturing trade balance. Furthermore, as 
manufactured goods increasingly interact with ser­
vices, the trade balance of manufactured goods gives 
only a partial picture of competitiveness in manufac-
A more derailed picture of the trade competitiveness 
of European Union manufacturing is given by the 
analysis of the export structure of the European 
Union in terms of sectoral and geographical special-
izarion. The relevant factors determining EU trade 
competitiveness are twofold: 
• firstly, whether Europe enjoys and is capable of 
increasing its comparative advantage in high value 
added sectors; 
• secondly, whether Europe is present in the fastest 
growing sectoral and geographical markets and is 
capable of adapting its manufacturing structure to 
changes in world trade and to the pace of global 
integration. 
In order to evaluate these factors, European Union 
competitiveness can be examined in the light of its 
trade specialization relative to other OECD coun­
tries and the impact that this specialization has on its 
share of OECD exports. 
Constant share analysis, in order ro show the initial 
export structure of the European Union and its pat­
tern of adaptation, decomposes changes in exports 
over several years according to products and destina­
tions. Three separate effects (Table 3.1.) can be iden­
tified as contributing to the changes in share: 
• the effect of the initial specialization; 
• the effect of changes in the sectoral and geograph­
ical composition of exports; 
• the 'elementary competitiveness' effect, which 
measures the European Union's intrinsic compet­
itiveness relarive to the rest of the OECD, and 
which is heavily influenced by developments in 
costs and exchange rates. 
In overall terms, the European Union's manufactur­
ing trade competitiveness has deteriorated in relation 
to other industrialized countries. The share of the 
EU 12 (excluding intra-EU trade) in OECD exports 
has decreased by 2.5% between 1987 and 1993 
(from 41.3% to 38.8%). At the same time, the share 
of North America increased by 3.7% and that of 
Japan decreased by 1%. 
Table 3.1. Analysis of changes in shares 
in OECD exports (1987-93) 
Effects 
Initial 
specialization 
of exports 
Adaptation of 
export 
specialization 
Elementary 
competitiveness 
residual 
Total 
EUR 12 
-2.4 
-0.8 
0.7 
-2.5 
North 
America 
1.9 
0.6 
1.2 
3.7 
Japan 
1.Γ, 
0.4 
-3.0 
-1.0 
Source: DRI. 
A decomposition of the total changes in shares in 
OECD exports into the three different factors gives a 
more detailed picture of the decline in EU export 
share. The initial specialization effect (-2.4%) and the 
subsequent poor adaptation (-0.8%) berween 1987 
and 1993 would have accounted for a 3.2 % loss in 
market share. This potential loss was compensated in 
part through the elementary competiveness effect 
(+0.7%), which resulted in a total loss of 2.5%. It is 
worth noting that the European Union improved its 
intrinsic competitiveness despite the appreciation of 
the ecu against the dollar over the period. 
The decline in exporr share relative to other OECD 
countries is thus not due to a lack of performance of 
manufacturing industry itself, but to poor initial spe­
cialization and adaptation of EU exports to changes 
in world trade. A further decomposition of these two 
effects into sectors and destinations can help to iden­
tify the main factors behind the decline in export 
share (Table 3.2.). 
The initial geographical specialization of exports on 
parts of the world of low growth potential in relation 
to other OECD countries is the main factor behind 
the initial unfavourable position (-3.0). In terms of 
sectors, the initial specialization of the European 
Union was better than the OECD average (0.8). 36  CHAPTER 3 
Problems in terms of the European Union's capacity 
to adapt to changes in world trade, can be attributed 
to a lack of dynamism in changing patterns of both 
geographical (-0.6) and sectoral (-0.2) specialization. 
Table 3.2. Analysis of change in EUR 12's share in 
OECD exports (1987-93) 
Effects 
Sectoral 
Geographical 
Total 
Initial 
specialization 
0.8 
-3.0 
-2.4 
Adaptation 
-0.2 
-0.6 
-0.8 
Source: DRI. 
The decline in the European Union's export perfor-
mance is thus mainly due to poor geographical spe-
cialization. The destination of the European Union's 
exports has been oriented to regions with slow grow-
ing imports and has therefore not benefited as much 
as the other OECD countries from the overall 
growth in world trade. 
However, since 1993 positive signs of a European 
Union recovery have emerged. A new wave of trade 
relationships with emerging economies is building a 
base for subsequent improvement. 
A good sectoral performance measured at aggregate 
level can hide substantial differences between sectors. 
Similarly a poor geographical specialization in gener-
al does not reveal in which specific markets the 
European Union is performing less well. Individual 
sectors and markets can be related to EU average per-
formance to establish areas of strength or weakness. 
The major exporting sectors at EU level are mechan-
ical engineering, which accounts for 16% of total 
EU manufacturing exports in 1994, motor vehicles 
(close to 9%), food, drink and tobacco (6.5%), basic 
chemicals (5.5%) and electrical equipment for 
industry (4.8%). 
These rankings are, however, somewhat arbitrary as 
they depend largely on the type and level of aggrega-
tion of the sectoral classification adopted. As a result, 
the share of a given sector in total EU exports does 
not in itself say much about the relative specializa-
tion of EU trade. Furthermore, specialization in 
itself does not imply a comparative advantage. On 
the contrary, it could happen that being specialized 
in labour or resource intensive sectors is a source of 
comparative disadvantage. 
In order to establish the sectoral strengths and weak-
nesses of the European Union's exports, it is necessary 
to measure the comparative advantage of EU exports 
relative to other developed countries. For that pur-
pose, EU exports and imports are analysed on the 
basis of two indicators. The first one is the export spe-
cialization indicator, which reveals whether a sector 
reports a share in its total exports greater (indicator 
exceeding 1) or lower (indicator below 1) than other 
OECD countries. The second indicator is the adjust-
ed cover ratio indicator, which measures the sector's 
trade balance (surplus if indicator exceeds 1, deficit if 
it is below 1) adjusted for the overall manufacturing 
trade balance in order to eliminate the structural sur-
plus or deficit in manufacturing as a whole. 
Table 3.3 presenrs the breakdown of EU exports in 
1994 according to whether both indicators exceed 
one, thus revealing a comparative advantage, or are 
below one, thus signalling a comparative disadvan-
tage. The third category includes sectors for which 
the two indicators do not point in the same direction. 
In overall terms, sectors which enjoy a comparative 
advantage represent 57% of total EU exports and 
38% of total EU imports. Sectors with a comparative 
disadvantage account for 12% of exports, but 29% 
of imports. Export and import shares in an interme-
diate position are roughly balanced at 31% and 33% 
respectively. 
Table 3.3. Sectoral breakdown of EU exports 
(1994) 
Share Share Export Adjusted 
in total in total specialization cover 
exports imports ratio 
(%) (%) (1) (2) 
Sectors with a 
comparative 
advantage 
Sectors in an 
intermediate 
situation 
Sectors with a 
comparative 
disadvantage 
57.1 
30.7 
12.2 
37.6 
33.3 
29.1 
1.19 1.52 
0.98 0.92 
0.59 0.42 
(1) Share of sector in total EU manufacturing exports divided by the 
same share calculated for the 0ECD. 
(2) Sectoral cover ratio (exports divided by imports) adjusted for the 
overall cover ratio of manufacturing Industry. 
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The European Union's strong export sectors cover 
three broad clusters: engineering and metal sectors, 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors and other unre-
lated sectors (Table 3.4.). The last five sectors of the 
group demonstrate a comparative advantage which is 
somewhat weaker (these include food, drink and 
tobacco, basic chemicals, aerospace equipment as 
well as rubber and plastics). 
Table 3.4. Sectoral breakdown of EU exports, 
(1994) 
Sectors with comparative advantage 
Mechanical 
engineering 
Ferrous metals 
Metal articles 
Pharmaceutical 
Speciality 
chemicals 
Non-metalic 
mineral products 
Household 
appliances 
Other 
manufactures 
Printing and . 
publishing 
Food, drink, 
tobacco 
Aerospace 
equipment 
Rubber and 
plastics 
Basic chemicals 
Share 
in total 
exports 
(%) 
16.0 
3.1 
3.3 
2.8 
4.7 
Ì 2.0 
0.9 
4.4 
0.9 
6.5 
4.3 
2.7 
5.5 
Share 
in total 
imports 
(%) 
7.5 
1.5 
2.5 
1.6 
2.8 
1.1 
0.7 
2.8 
0.5 
5.3 
4.1 
2.3 
4.9 
Export 
specialization 
1.14 
1.12 
1.36 
1.70 
1.22 
1.46 
1.51 
1.26 
1.42 
1.13 
1.19 
1.11 
1.03 
Adjusted 
cover 
ratio 
2.13 
2.06 
1.34 
1.73 
1.69 
1.83 
1.25 
1.59 
1.97 
1.22 
1.07 
1.15 
1.13 
Source: DRI. 
Table 3.5. Sectors with a comparative 
disadvantage 
Share Share Export Adjusted 
in total in total specialization cover 
exports imports ratio 
(%) (%) 
Office and 
eqp-machinery 
Consumer 
electronics 
Instrument 
engineering 
Timber 
and wooden 
furniture 
Non-ferrous 
metals 
Pulp, paper 
& paperboard 
2.8 
2.6 
2.3 
1.4 
1.6 
1.5 
6.7 
6.1 
3.2 
3.7 
5.3 
4.1 
0.60 
0.52 
0.73 
0.73 
0.57 
0.47 
0.42 
0.42 
0.73 
0.38 
0.30 
0.36 
The comparative disadvantage category is concen-
trated in some electronics related sectors and a num-
ber of resource based sectors (Table 3.5.) 
Source: DRI. 
The third category groups all those sectors where the 
indicators point in different directions. It contains 
two different cases (Table 3.6.). The first case con-
cerns the sectors which have a trade deficit although 
they perform better rhan the OECD average. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the OECD as a whole 
reports a trade deficit in that sector, in part because 
the industrialized countries have transferred the 
intermediary activities into low wage countries. This 
is, for example, the case of the textile cluster where 
the European Union has specialized in the valued 
added part of the textile and clothing sector which 
gives a comparative advantage and reports a good 
trade performance compared with the OECD, but 
suffers from increasing competitive pressure from 
non-OECD countries for lower value added prod-
ucts. 
The second case concerns those sectors which report 
a trade surplus although they perform worse than the 
OECD average. The situation in these sectors is due 
to an inability to capture a part of the overall trade 
surplus of the OECD as a whole. Telecommuni-
cations and electrical equipment are examples of 
such sectors. 38  CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.6. Sectors in intermediate situation 
Share Share Export Adjusted 
in total in total specialization cover 
exports imports ratio 
(%) (%) 
Textile 
Leather/ 
leather goods 
Footwear/ 
clothing 
Manufacture 
of jewellery 
Mineral oil 
refining 
Motor vehicles 
and parts 
Telecom 
equip. & other 
prof, electro. 
Electrical 
equip, for 
industry 
Other means 
of transport 
3.9 
0.9 
2.7 
3.2 
1.9 
3.2 
4.8 
1.4 
5.4 
1.0 
6.0 
4.2 
2.2 
6.0 
3.0 
4.4 
1.1 
1.46 
1.97 
1.89 
1.58 
1.40 
0.70 
0.72 
0.81 
0.44 
0.77 
0.87 
1.46 
0.85 
0.89 
0.76 
1.07 
1.08 
1.30 
Source: DRI. 
Although no categoric conclusions can be drawn 
from the above analysis, the European Union seems 
to enjoy more sectors with trade related comparative 
advantages than disadvantages, including several of 
high growth potential. The level of aggregation of 
the analysis can distorr the conclusions reached, 
because a country can be ranked highly because it is 
specialized in a fast growing sector even though it 
may be strongly specialized in the slow part of that 
fast growing sector, and vice versa. Conclusions 
about trade specialization at a high level of aggrega-
tion can also give an erroneous picture, particularly 
in the case of the European Union which is more 
specialized within sectors than between sectors. 
Despite recent positive developments, the geograph-
ical structure of European exports in 1993 showed 
that nearly all markets, with the exception of Central 
and Eastern Europe, in which the European Union 
posted a relative geographical specialization, had 
been characterized by slower than average trade 
growth at the OECD level between 1987-93 (Table 
3.7.). 
Table 3.7. Geographical composition of EU 
manufacturing exports, 1993 
EFTA 
Central Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
Mediterranean Basin 
Rest of the world 
Other Asia 
Japan 
China 
Australia and New Zealand 
North America 
Latin America 
NICs Asia 
OECD 
Exports 
% Growth 
1987-93 
24.3 
123.0 
42.5 
36.7 
22.1 
27.1 
78.2 
124.3 
38.3 
42.0 
112.4 
162.8 
Relative EU 
specialization 
2.1 
2.0 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.3 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
Source: DRI. 
The European Union's manufacturing trade 
performance has suffered from limited presence in 
the fastest growing markets. Clearly, the European 
Union is not taking full advantage of the most 
dynamic international markets. However, recent 
trade with emerging economies shows an improve-
ment in the European Union's trade patterns. 
Some elements can nevertheless be highlighted, such 
as the EU's particularly poor trade performance in 
certain fast growing sectors such as office and elec-
tronic data processing, consumer electronics and 
instrument engineering. Similarly, some of the 
European Union's srrong sectors are facing competi-
tive pressures from the non-OECD countries. The 
capacity of industry in the European Union to adapt 
its means of production to growth sectors in order to 
match the changing patterns of demand is a crucial 
element in achieving success in exporr growth and 
thereby for its sustained competitiveness. 
Over the last decade, the relative standing of emerg-
ing Asia in the world economy has improved signif-
icantly. The share of Asian world exports increased 
from 16% to 26% between 1980 and 1993. In the 
same period, the share of Asian intra-regional trade 
increased from 39% to 47%. In 1993, 83% of 
OECD imports from non-OECD Asia were manu-
factured goods, against 51% in 1980. Prospecrs for 
further growth are even more encouraging, as in the 
next decade 400 million Asians are expected to pos-
sess a purchasing power equivalent to that of 
Europeans today. CHAPTER 3  39 
As a result, the European Union's presence in the 
growing markets of Asia is of paramount import­
ance. Europe's share of Asian imports accounted for 
only 15% in 1992, while it represented 25% in 
1970. However, since 1992 Europe's presence in Asia 
has been strengthened and the total EU two-way 
trade with emerging Asia more than doubled in 
1994. 
The European Union accounts for approximately 
20% of Latin America's imports and exporrs. In con­
trast, Latin America represents only 5% of total 
European Union exports. Since Latin America 
embraced market liberalization and economic 
reforms, EU exports to Latin America have increased 
significantly, with a growth rate of 41% from 1990. 
This makes the region the world's fastest growing 
continental market for the European Union. 
The European Union has now consolidated its posi­
tion as the most important trade partner for most of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Overall, in 1994, trade 
with these countries accounted for 6% of total extra-
EU exports, increasing by 56% over 1993. EU 
imports accounted for 5% of total imports, with a 
growth rate of 71% from the previous year. Inter­
industry trade is mainly concentrated in resource­
and labour-intensive product from Central Europe 
in exchange for investment and high value added 
goods from the Union. However, intra-industry has 
been expanding faster, demonstrating a higher 
degree of integration with the EU economy, mainly 
through the supply of components (Fig. 3.4.). 
A common denominator for the majority of coun­
tries in the Mediterranean Basin is their dependence 
on the European Union for exports. In 1994, the 
region absorbed 10% of EU exports (increase of 4% 
from 1993) and accounted for 8% of EU imports (a 
growth of 11%). In the past, cultural differences, 
political and economic insrabiliry and competition 
with products from the southern members of the 
European Union, in textile, food and low-technolo­
gy products, have prevented the development of 
trade-flows and industrial cooperarion. The region 
has, however, the potential to become an important 
trade and indusrrial partner for the European Union. 
3. Foreign direct investment 
The capacity to attract inward foreign direct invest­
ment enables Europe to benefit from the transfer of 
knowledge and technology, in addition to that of 
capital and the jobs which are creared as a result of 
the investment. Experience with American invest­
ment in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s and with 
Japanese investment, particularly in the United 
States and the United Kingdom since the 1980s, has 
shown that for organizarional innovation, in which it 
is difficult to disentangle country-specific and firm 
specific elements, the demonstration effect of having 
functioning examples of best practice in the local 
economy can lead to significant improvements in the 
performance of domestic firms. The impact on qual­
ity of componenr suppliers has been particularly 
important leading to substantial gains in competi­
tiveness for the overall economy. 
Fig. 3.4. EU trade with Central Europe 
by sector, 1994 
Other manufactured 
products 
Transport equipment 
Machinery-
Manufactured 
products 
Agricultural products 
and mining 
1 
1 
-r-i 
_l 
1 
ι 1 
D Export billion ECU 
D Imports billion ECU 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10  15  20  30 
Source: Eurostat. 
Foreign direct investment also acts as an indicator of 
Europe's attractiveness as a place in which to do busi­
ness. Europe's large and sophisticated home market, 
infrasrructure endowment and high level of human 
resources and technology all represent powerful 
sources of competitive advantage that attract invest­
ment. However, high costs and insufficient 
dynamism of the local economy can reduce Europe's 
attractiveness and lead investors to prefer to supply 
that market from other more favourable locations. 
Recent developments as well as the level of absolute 
investment therefore need to be monitored closely. 
Over the past decade, investment flows into Europe 
have been heavily influenced by the internal market 
programme. Member States redirected their outflows 40  CHAPTER 3 
towards other members in anticipation of comple-
tion of the internal market, so that over the period 
1988-92 intra-EU flows amounted to 31 billion per 
year compared with ECU 25 billion of extra-EU 
investments. Third countries also stepped up their 
investments in order to take advantage of market 
integration and to ensure a more active local pres-
ence. At its peak in 1989-91, the European Union 
succeeded in attracting 47% of world foreign direct 
investment, and still accounts for one third of all 
such invesrment (Table 3.8.). 
% 
Table 3.8. Share of world FDI inflows
1 
1983-88 1989-91 1992-93 1994 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries
1' 
EUR 15 
Rest of 
W. Europe 
United States 
Japan 
EU as % of 
developed 
countries 
78.4  81.2  63.4  59.8 
21.6 
30.0 
1.6 
37.6 
0.4 
18.8 
47.0 
2.4 
24.1 
0.7 
36.6 
40.1 
1.2 
15.5 
0.7 
40.2 
31.5 
1.1 
21.9 
0.4 
38.2  57.8  63.2  52.7 
1 Including intra-region flows. 
2 Including the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Source: UNCATD 1995 data. 
Growth in foreign direcr investment over recent 
years has paralleled that of trade in the sense that 
developing countries, overwhelmingly the newly 
industrialized ones, have dramatically increased their 
share of the total from 19% in 1989-91 to 40% in 
1994. As with trade, this development can be con-
sidered as positive since foreign direct investment 
encourages the world development process and 
enables access to these markets for developed coun-
tries' goods and services. The ability of the European 
Union to attract investment should be measured 
against that of other developed countries rather than 
as a share of the world total. At 53%, the European 
Union share of developed countries' inward invest-
ment remains well above the 38% achieved in 1983-
88 before the surge of internal market related invest-
ment, but has nevertheless declined from the peak of 
63% achieved as recently as 1992-93. It still exceeds 
the United States share of these investments by 16%. 
The low level of inward investment to Japan can be 
considered as a product of both restrictive policy in 
the past and substantial domestic barriers. 
Developed countries have seen a significant shift in 
their inward investment towards service sectors 
directly related to industry, with two-thirds of this 
concentrated in finance and trade related services. 
For the European Union, the service sector account-
ed for less than a quarter of total inward investment 
in 1970, while today this has risen to around 70% 
(Table 3.9.). Over the last decade, financial services 
wirh 30% and trade/tourism with 10% have been 
among the major recipients of inward investment. 
This contrasts with manufacturing, where only food-
related activities show any marked specialization 
(8%). 
Table 3.9. EU's sectoral shares of inward FDI 
% of intra 
EU 12 flows to  1984-86 1987-89 1990-92 
Industry (excluding energy) 22.9 
Building & construction 2.5 
Services 74.6 
32.0 
2.5 
65.5 
28.9 
0.6 
70.5 
Source: UNCATD 1995 data. 
Market access to third countries increasingly requires 
sustained direct investment. Such investment in 
both manufacturing and services related to industry 
constitutes a necessary complement to direct trade. 
Many services, which are growing more rapidly than 
industry, also require a local presence. In this case, 
direct investment is required to exploit new growth 
possibilities. Achieving a high level of investment, 
particularly in fast growing economies, should con-
stitute an important objective for European enter-
prises, and an indicator of external competitiveness 
of European industry. 
The European Union has consistently been a leading 
investor worldwide. This performance has been 
mainrained over the last decade in contrast to the 
United States, which recovered a significant place as 
a foreign investor in the 1990s, and Japan, for which 
outward investment has recently halved after the 
very rapid build up in the 1980s. As a result, out-
ward stocks of foreign investmenr by the European 
Union exceed those of the United States and are 
more than double those of Japan (Table 3.10.). CHAPTER 3 I 41 
Table 3.10. Distribution of global outward stock of FDI 
% 
EU 15 estimate 
(excl. intra-EU) 
USA 
Japan 
Other developed 
countries 
Other Asia 
Rest of world 
TOTAL WORLD 
(USD billion) 
1980 
37.6 
45.6 
4.1 
11.4 
0.4 
0.8 
482 
1990 
37.7 
30.4 
14.0 
13.9 
2.7 
1.4 
1 433 
1994 
33.1 
31.3 
14.2 
13.8 
6.0 
1.6 
1 948 
European investments in these growth markets. Asia 
represents the most important region amongst the 
developing countries with some USD 59 billion in 
inflows in 1994 compared with USD 32 billion in 
1992. The region now accounts for more than 70% 
of the total of developing countries inward stock of 
foreign direct investment. China alone accounted for 
USD 34 billion or 40% of all flows into developing 
countries in 1994. Asian countries experienced a 
near doubling of total world inflows in 1993/94 
compared with the previous year, from 16% ro 25% 
(Table 3.12.). 
Source: Based on UNCTAD 95 data. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a number of coun-
tries in Asia (particularly Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea and Malaysia) have become sizeable outward 
investors, predominantly in other countries in the 
region. Total outflows reached USD 30 billion in 
1994. 
Most European foreign investment is directed 
towards developed countries just as most inflows 
come from that source. The United States and EFTA 
countries have accounted for 60% or more of total 
investments over the past decade. As a result US/EU 
bilateral stocks of investment are quite balanced. The 
very low levels of EU investment in Japan can be 
seen in large part as a product of the barriers men-
tioned above. It can hinder effective access to the 
Japanese market (Table 3.11.). 
Table 3.11. Extra-EUR 12 FDI outflows (m/7//on ECU) 
Table 3.12. FDI inflows to developing and transition 
economies (USD billion) 
average/year 
USA 
Japan 
EFTA 
OPEC 
Ex-Comecon 
Latin America 
Asean 
Australia 
Other 
Total 
1984-88 
17 075 
138 
1 243 
244 
20 
4 638 
23 358 
1989-91 
13 480 
644 
2 563 
1.125 
553 
13 153 
26 880 
1992-93 
8 345 
800 
3 378 
802 
843 
855 
528 
4 258 
19 809 
Source: Eurostat. 
Since newly industrializing countries are accounting 
for a much greater share of world trade and invest-
ment, it is important to analyse in more detail 
average/year 
East, Sth & 
Sth East Asia* 
China 
Latin America 
Central & 
Eastern Europe 
Africa 
1983-88 
6.1 
1.8 
7.4 
-
2.1 
1989-91 
15.0 
3.7 
10.6 
1.0 
3.3 
1992-94 
22.2 
24.2 
19.3 
5.5 
3.1 
* Excluding China. 
Source: UNCTAD 95 including ¡ntra-region inflows. 
Compared wirh the United States and Japan, Europe 
is not investing enough in strongly growing 
economies. For instance, in 1992/93 the ASEAN 
countries and Latin America each took only 4% of 
European outward invesrment. Only in Central 
Europe has the European Union maintained consist-
ent flows into developing economies. Association 
Agreements between the European Union and these 
countries have assisted in putting in place a 
favourable environment for investors in Central 
Europe. Remaining impediments to investment con-
cern inadequate progress towards structural reforms, 
and in particular slow privatization, as well as the yet 
unstable macro-economic environmenr in some of 
these countries. 
While in the second half of the 1980s and early 
1990s the European Union was mainly investing its 
foreign direct investment internally and to the 
United States, as well as increasingly focusing its 
efforts on Central and Eastern Europe, the United 
States was sharply increasing its foreign direct 
investmenr in Latin America, as was Japan in Asia. 42  CHAPTER 3 
As a result, the European Union has clearly lost 
ground as compared with its main competitors in the 
fastest growing markets, in particular in East Asia. 
With an annual growth rate of about 8% as a whole, 
and an estimated demand of ECU 1 500 billion for 
infrastructures in the next 10 years, emerging Asian 
economies are the fastest growing economies in the 
world. Yet over the period 1986-92 only 10% of for-
eign direct investment in Asia originated from the 
European Union. As a comparison, Japan has on 
average invested four times more and the United 
States two to three times more in these countries, 
according to Unctad estimates. Although, on aggreg-
ate, the volume of European Union FDI in develop-
ing Asia lags behind its main competitors, there are 
large variations between individual recipient coun-
tries. Furthermore, since 1992, an overall increase of 
European investment has been noted in this region. 
In 1993/94 European investment in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand (combined) 
increased by 87%, against an increase of 12% from 
Japan, according to a study from the World Bank. 
This shows that European Union corporate strategies 
have begun to demonstrate stronger commitment to 
East Asia. 
However, there are clear signs that European Union 
investment in Asia is less integrated in the local and 
regional fabric. Investments are heavily concentrated 
in the chemical sector (one half of the stock) and 
appear to be mainly of an import-substitution and 
'stand alone' nature. The European Union's compet-
itors (United States, Japan and increasingly intra-
Asian foreign direct investment) concentrate more 
on network-type industries, related to a growing sup-
plier chain of affiliated or local companies which 
they help upgrade. 
Sustained growth rates in recent years have shown 
Latin America's potential for expansion, in particular 
for the biggest countries. The region is rhus becom-
ing a strategic area for investment and trade. For 
example, in 1992, 35% of USD 10 billion invested 
in privatization in Argentina was from Spanish and 
French companies. In Mexico, German companies 
have invested heavily in the petrochemicals, automo-
bile and tourism industries. Also, European firms 
have played an important role in some key industrial 
sectors in large, fast growing markets such as Brazil 
(in auromobiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
mechanical engineering). 
A region of particular importance is the southern 
Mediterranean, where FDI is crucial to help mod-
ernize the countries' economies, and thus to improve 
regional prosperity and socio-economic stability. The 
European Union is already rhe region's principal eco-
nomic partner, and in November 1995 the Barcelona 
Conference launched a plurilateral Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, which should lead to 
much better long-term investor confidence in the 
region. Some countries — such as Morocco, Tunisia 
and Israel — have already experienced a virtuous cir-
cle of greater stability, foreign investment and high 
rates of economic growth. 
Central and East European countries have a good 
potential to attract FDI. Many countries are middle-
income economies with sizeable domestic markets 
and pent-up consumer demand and a large industrial 
base; others are rich in natural resources and have 
considerable human resource endowments and rela-
tively low labour costs. Although the relative import-
ance of foreign direct investment to these regions has 
been modest, its growth since 1989 is remarkable. In 
addition, the transfer of modern technology and 
management practices to foreign affiliates and sup-
plier firms and the provision of previously unavail-
able services assist in speeding the transition to a 
market economy and fostering economic develop-
ment. Foreign direct investment helps the transition 
process by exerting pressure for institution building, 
resrructuring and privatization as well as competi-
tion. 
Box 3.1 illustrates a case of a successful, low invest-
ment strategy developed in this region. CHAPTER 3  43 
Box 3.1. Example of Asea Brown Boveri's expansion into the former 
communist bloc 
O
ver the last five years, the Swiss-Swedish engin-
eering conglomerate ABB, has built a network of 
60 companies in the former communist bloc, estab-
lishing one of the largest manufacturing presences 
there of any Western group. Covering 13 countries and 
employing about 30 000 people, ABB has seen its 
orders in the region leap from USD 225 million in 
1990 to USD 1.7 billion in 1994, with expectations of 
reaching between USD 3 and 4 billion by the year 
2000. Exports from the region have also grown (from 
USD 25 million in 1990 to USD 220 million in 1994), 
which clearly indicates the local market potential. 
Expansion has been made primarily through acquisi-
tions, rarely in excess of USD 20 million each, totalling 
about USD 300 billion. Financial risks were therefore 
limited. The main objectives pursued by ABB were to 
anticipate the growing needs of these regions for mod-
ern energy equipment, and secure favourable cost 
sources for components (such as turbines and switch-
gears which are claimed to be up to 40% cheaper than 
from Western suppliers). The strategy developed has 
been accompanied by ambitious programmes meant 
to enhance the internal potential of the local units. 
Following sizeable cuts in local staff, huge training pro-
grammes were put in place for managers and techni-
cians together with transfers of technology and sophis-
ticated production equipment. This strategy is claimed 
to have allowed transformation of many near-bankrupt 
State-owned companies into profitable units. 
The emerging global picture indicates that outside 
Europe, EU investors seem to prefer lower equity, 
less risky and conservative forms of transnational 
involvement. EuropeanTJnion investment abroad is 
also still somewhat conservative in form and appears 
to concentrate on mature sectors and in countries 
with which the European Union Member States 
have historic ties. 
Although evidence on the relationship between for-
eign direct investment and employment is limited, 
what is available does not reveal a negative impact on 
employment (Box 3.2.). The widespread view that 
foreign direct investment is essentially motivated by 
the search for lower labour costs is not substantiated, 
given that in most sectors low-skilled labour costs 
now account for only 5% ro 10% of total production 
costs, as against 25% in the 1970s." 
Decisions to invest abroad are in fact influenced by a 
wide range of factors such as closeness to markets, 
security of supply, diversification of risk and the 
spreading of investment costs. Moreover, most for-
eign direct investment occurs in sectors with rela-
tively low labour content and, within the European 
Union, countries such as Germany, the Benelux and 
France (known for their high labour costs) continue 
to be amongst the major recipients of FDI. In any 
case, when considering the labour component, 
investors do not react to nominal wages but to unit 
labour costs (i.e. wages adjusted for productivity lev-
els). 
Box 3.2. Derealization - Example of the Belgian diamond industry 
T
he Belgian diamond industry constitutes an inter-
esting example of the overall employment effects 
of derealization. Known as one of the world's major 
trade centres for jewellery diamonds, the Antwerp area 
employed about 12 000 people in this sector at the 
beginning of the 1980s: 8 000 in cutting and setting 
operations and the remaining 4 000 in service and 
trade activities. In spite of a major relocation during 
the 1980s of the cutting and setting operations to 
India and Thailand, it is estimated that there are still 
about 15 000 people employed in Antwerp. 
Derealization resulted in a reduction of about 4 000 
manufacturing jobs in Europe, but Antwerp has, in the 
meantime, substantially invested in the development 
of trade logistics, marketing, financing, certification 
and R&D in cutting and setting machinery, which, 
together, have more than offset the negative impact 
on the jobs transferred abroad. 
Source: Bureau du Plan - Brussels 1994. 44  CHAPTER 3 
Research in various Member States indicates that, 
whenever hard derealizations to non-EU countries 
have occurred, the immediate losses of low-skilled jobs 
to the developing countries have broadly been offset 
by increases in higher-skilled jobs in supporting activi-
ties in the country of origin. This general conclusion 
is also supported by OECD research that has found 
that the net effect of FDI on employment in the host 
and home economies is neutral (i.e. FDI destroys, but 
also creates employment in both countries). 
Behind the relatively unsatisfactory trade perfor-
mance of European industry lies a geographical spe-
cialization on mature or slow growing markets. Only 
recently has European industry begun to take a more 
active interesr in strongly growing parts of the world 
such as East Asia. A similar absence of specialization 
on growth markets compared to the United States 
and Japan can also be observed in European foreign 
direct investment. 
After examining the main characteristics of Europe's 
competitive performance, the report now tuns to 
certain underlying factors that might help to explain 
the trends identified. CHAPTER 4  45 
Chapter 4 
Labour market 
European labour markets persistently suffer from 
low rates of net job creation and low rates of employ-
ment. This chapter examines to what extent the 
functioning of the labour market itself can be con-
sidered a major contributor to the outcome. It also 
examines to what extent regulation affects the cost 
and flexibility with which industry uses labour. An 
improved functioning of the European labour mar-
ket is vital for competitiveness, just as competitive-
ness is a determining factor for the level of employ-
ment. 
Europe has a specific social model characterized by 
solidarity, public responsibility for social protection, 
fundamental social rights and the role of social part-
ners. High productivity levels are required to sustain 
the costs incurred in maintaining this system, but 
the system itself provides incentives for high levels of 
skill formation (the issue on human resources and 
skills is dealt with in the chapter on intangible 
investments). Systems which put excessive emphasis 
on income maintenance will necessarily have a worse 
performance, in terms of the employment rate, than 
systems geared to promoting the adaptability of 
workers to the labour market. 
1. Employment composition and 
development 
Over time, the rate of net job creation in the 
European Union has closely mirrored the rate of 
change in GDP. An increase in growth of GDP has 
tended to be followed after a period of time by a rise 
in the rate of growth of employment. 
There are considerable differences among EU coun-
tries in terms of the degree to which output growth 
is translated into jobs, which implies that the func-
tioning of labour markets also affects employment 
creation (Fig. 4.1). 
Fig. 4.1. Growth of GDP and employment in Member 
States 1990-94 
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Despite recent methodological criticism of studies 
alleging a dominant role for SMEs in the job-gener-
ating process, prevailing evidence shows that SMEs 
still outperform large firms with regard to job cre-
ation. It appears that micro firms (1 to 9 employees) 
make an overwhelming contribution to total net job 
growth. Between 1988 and 1995 employment in 
micro-size firms increased at an annual average rate 
of 0.75% compared with no increase in small firms 
and a decrease of 0.5% in both medium and large 
firms (Fig. 4.2.). Micro firms operate primarily with-
in local markets. Medium and large firms are more 
likely to be exposed to international competition. 46  CHAPTER 4 
Fig. 4.2. EEA employment performance 
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Source: The European Observatory for SMEs, 1995. 
Table 4.2. Employment growth 1979-93 
(Annual percentage change) 
EUR 15  US  Japan 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
Total 
-3.6 
-1.4 
1.6 
0.3 
-0.4 
-0.7 
2.2 
1.4 
-2.6 
0.9 
2.0 
1.1 
Source: Eurostat, 1995. 
In all three cases, services have shown considerable 
employment growth. Equally, more jobs have been 
created in market services than in non-market ser-
vices. Moreover, the kinds of service activity in 
which the most jobs were created were also much the 
same. In all three economies, personal and commu-
nal service (like health care, social service and educa-
tion as well as public administration) were the lead-
ing growth sectors (Table 4.3). 
Industry accounts for one third of employment in 
Europe and Japan compared with one quarter in the 
USA. In all three cases, services constitute the main 
source of employment, but more so in the USA 
(Table 4.1.). 
Table 4.1. Employment by sectors 
(in % of total 1993) 
EUR 15  USA  Japan 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
5.1 
29.6 
65.3 
2.6 
22.2 
75.2 
8.0 
33.4 
58.5 
Source: Eurostat. 
Employment growth in the European Union has 
consistently lagged behind that of the USA and 
Japan. US total annual job creation has been 0.8 % 
higher than that of the European Union. 
Europe's weaker employment performance masks 
considerable sectoral differences in generating jobs. 
For instance, jobs in European industry have been 
lost at twice the US rate, while Japan has been one of 
the few OECD countries to register growth in indus-
try employment over the 1980s. Similarly, in agri-
culture, EU job losses have been greater than in the 
USA and Japan (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.3. Change in employment by ISIC 
sectors, 1980-93 
(Average change as % of total employment in 1980) 
EUR  USA  Japan 
Agriculture 
Mining, energy 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Distribution, 
hotels 
Transport 
Banking, 
insurance 
Other services 
-0.29 
-0.03 
- 0,35 
-0.08 
0.23 
0.01 
0.28 
0.52 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.18 
0.08 
0.38 
0.07 
0.36 
0.89 
-0.27 
0.00 
0.23 
0.13 
0.28 
0.06 
0.32 
0.51 
Source: OECD labour force statistics. 
The reasons behind the better US and Japanese 
employment performance are different. Services 
account for two thirds of the difference in perform-
ance between the European Union and the USA, 
while more than four fifths of the difference between 
the European Union and Japan is accounted for by 
industry 
Industry in Europe is unlikely to be a significant 
source of new jobs except for SMEs. Nevertheless, a 
cut in job losses in industry can have a considerable 
impact on the overall employment situation. CHAPTER 4  47 
The sectoral performance of European industry 
varies widely in terms of change in employment. 
Over the period 1985-94, the heaviest job losses 
occurred in five industries: textiles, footwear and 
clothing; transport equipment; electrical goods; 
mechanical engineering; and metal ores (Fig. 4.3.). 
These industries account for 72% of total job losses 
within industry during the period. Only the rubber 
and plastics industry recorded modest growth. 
Fig. 4.3. EUR 12 employment performance 
(% total loss in industry 1985-94) 
Other industries 
Office machinery 
Timber, wood, paper 
Food,tobacco, sugar 
Metal articles 
Build/civil engineenng 
Non-metal products 
Chemicals, fibres 
Metal ores and products 
Mechanical engineering 
Electrical goods 
Transport equipment 
Textile, footwear, clothing  -18.6 
1-0.75 
1 -2 
1 -2.3 
1 -3.4 
1 -3.5 
1-4.9 
| -5.4 
| -6.1 
-11.6 
-11.9 
1 -13 
Source: Eurostat. 
In contrast to industry, service sectors have generally 
displayed strong growth (Fig. 4.4). Over the period 
1982-94 by far the strongest growth in employment 
was enjoyed by other market services. This category 
regroups three rather different types of service: busi-
ness services (including professional, technical and 
information services), household services (including 
audio-visual services as well as many proximity ser-
vices) and market services of education and health. 
Available information points to strong growth in 
each of these categories. Non-market services also 
showed strong growth, particularly in the fields of 
education and health. Transport has contributed 
comparatively little to employment growth in ser-
vices. 
Fig. 4.4. EUR 12 employment performance 
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While these relative changes meant that the sectoral 
division of employment in Europe became more 
similar to that in the United States over the period, 
significant differences, nevertheless remain. In par-
ticular, the share of employment in agriculture in 
Europe was still around twice that in the United 
States, despite the large scale falls which occurred in 
preceding years, while the share of manufacturing 
was almost 40% higher (but lower than that in 
Japan). This was mirrored in higher shares of 
employment in all service sectors in the United 
States than in Europe, apart from transport and 
communications. 
Over the long term in the European Union there has 
been a gradual shift in the structure of occupations 
away from manual jobs, skilled as well as unskilled, 
towards non-manual jobs, especially those with a 
high skill content requiring extensive education and 
training. 
High-skilled jobs are also more stable over the busi-
ness cycle. For instance, in the two years 1992 to 
1994, when the total numbers in work declined by 
2% in the European Union as a whole, the number 
of managers, professionals and technicians in 48  CHAPTER 4 
employment expanded by 3.5%. At the same time, 
the numbers employed in low- skilled, manual jobs 
and as agricultural or fishery workers fell by 10%. 
2. LABOUR COSTS 
Labour costs influence competitiveness in two sepa-
rate ways. The first, and most direct way, is through 
the effect on prices. As a cost of production, labour 
enters into the final production price. For manufac-
turing industry, labour costs represent approximate-
ly 30% of total costs (and 70% of value added) com-
pared with 60% for purchases of goods and services 
and finance the remainder (see Chapter 2). The sec-
ond way concerns the way labour costs affect job cre-
ation and therefore employment. 
In order to measure the price of labour that is signif-
icant for competition on international markets, unit 
labour costs are the relevant indicator. They combine 
three elements: the total cost of labour to the 
employer, including social security and other non-
wage costs, productivity and the current rate of 
exchange. When analysing levels and developments 
in unit labour costs it is important to clearly identi-
fy the role played by each of these elements. 
Since unit labour costs are an element of price com-
petitiveness on international markets, they affect 
directly the tradable part of the economy. Nearly all 
manufacturing industry can be considered as trad-
able. Construction has a very low degree of tradabil-
ity, and only half of services can be considered as 
directly tradable in the same way as goods. 
Altogether, the tradable part now exceeds half of the 
economy. If the development of manufacturing unit 
labour costs is a major concern of industry, develop-
ments in the economy as a whole cannot be ignored. 
The importance of services both as a key input to 
industry and for the distribution of goods means 
that price developments in these sectors are also 
important for industry (see Chapter 6). Unit labour 
costs are not an appropriate measure for examining 
developments in the non-tradable parts of the econ-
omy such as proximity and welfare services. 
Developments in labour costs 
Developments in total labour costs since 1980 have 
followed a similar path in Europe as in the United 
States. A strong deceleration in the rate of growth of 
labour costs as measured by the compensation per 
employee is evident (Table 4.4.). The rate of growth 
in Europe remains higher than that in the United 
States although on present trends this difference is 
likely to disappear, as has already occurred in the 
lower inflation parts of Europe. The lowest growth of 
labour costs has been consistently recorded in Japan, 
where labour costs are now growing at only half the 
rate of those in the United States or Europe. 
When turning to the causes of the higher rate of 
increase of labour costs in Europe, it is clear that an 
expansion in real wages is not the answer. After 
adjusting for inflation (Table 4.5·), European real 
labour costs are not rising faster than those in the 
United States. Japanese real labour costs rose strong-
ly in the 1980s during the period of rapid growth, 
but have since slowed down substantially. In Europe, 
real labour costs rose more strongly in the latter part 
of the 1980s, while US real labour costs have been 
rising faster during the 1990s. 
Table 4.4. Nominal compensation per employee 
(annual average growth rate) 
1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1980-95 
EUR 15 
EUR 10* 
USA 
Japan 
9.1 
7.7 
6.1 
3.8 
6.2 
5.1 
4.4 
4.1 
4.8 
3.5 
3.7 
1.8 
6.8 
5.4 
4.7 
3,3 
1990-94, 1980-1994. 
* B. DK, WD, F, I, L, NL, UK, S, FIN. 
Source: European Commission. 
Table 4.5. Real compensation per employee 
(annual average growth rate) 
1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1980-95 
EUR 15 
EUR 10* 
USA 
Japan 
0.6 
0.9 
0.7 
1.7 
1.2 
1.4 
0.8 
2.7 
0.7 
1.1 
1.2 
0.9 
0.9 
1.1 
0.9 
1.7 
1990-94, 1980-94. 
* B. DK, WD, F, I, L. NL, UK, S, FIN. 
Source: European Commission. 
Whatever the cause of the increase, labour costs that 
are rising faster than amongst competitors must be 
compensated for by an increase in productivity or a 
fall in the exchange rate if price competitiveness is 
not to deteriorate. Table 4.6 sets out for the econo-CHAPTER 4  49 
my as a whole the major developments in the differ-
enr elements that make up unit labour costs for the 
period 1980-95 and for the more recent sub-period 
1990-95. 
Table 4.6. Development in unit labour costs — Total 
economy 
(annual average growth rate) 
1990-95  EUR 10* 
Nominal 
compensation 
per employee 
Productivity 
Nominal unit 
labour costs in 
national currency 
Exchange rate 
Nominal unit 
labour costs 
in USD 
5.4 
1.9 
3.5 
-0.4 
3.1 
1990-95  EUR 10* 
USA 
4.7 
0.9 
3.8 
0 
3.8 
USA 
Japan 
3.3 
2.2 
1.0 
6.0 
7.1 
Japan 
Nominal 
compensation 
per employee 
Productivity 
Nominal unit 
labour costs in 
national currency 
Exchange rate 
Nominal unit 
labour costs 
in USD 
3.5 
1.9
 
V
 
1.5 
0.5 
2.1 
3.7 
1.1 
2.6 
0 
2.6 
1.8 
0.6 
1.3 
9.0 
10.4 
Over the most recent period, increases in European 
unit labour costs have been subdued with lower rates 
of increase of labour costs, productivity continuing 
to increase at its trend rate and relative stability of 
the exchange rate in 1995 compared with 1990. The 
increase in national currency is now substantially 
below that of the United States and close to that of 
Japan. For Japan, the effect of the rise of the yen on 
unit labour costs has meant that they rose four times 
as fast as in the United States or Europe (Figures 4.5. 
and 4.6.). 
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For the economy as a whole over the period 1980-
95, the rise in labour productivity was sufficient to 
more than compensate for the higher level of 
increase in labour costs so that in national currency 
terms unit labour costs in the European Union 
increased less than in the United States. In Japan, a 
lower increase in labour costs and a higher increase 
in productivity meant that unit labour costs 
increased very little over the same period. In spite of 
major swings in exchange rates in the 1980s (see 
Chapter 3), the exchange rate between the ecu and 
the USD in 1995 was not substantially different 
from that in the 1980s so that over the period as a 
whole Europe improved its price competitiveness. 
The revaluation of the yen however was strong 
enough to produce a marked increase in Japanese 
unit labour costs. 
Fig. 4.6. Unit labour costs in USD, 1980 = 100 
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Table 4.7. Development in unit labour costs 
Manufacturing industry 
(annual average growth rate) 
1980-95  EUR 10*  USA  Japan 
Nominal 
compensation 
per employee 
Productivity 
Nominal unit 
labour costs in 
national currency 
Exchange rate 
Nominal unit 
labour costs 
in USD 
6.1 
3.1 
2.9 
-0.4 
2.5 
4.8 
3.3 
1.5 
0 
1.5 
3.5 
2.8 
0.7 
6.0 
6.7 
1990-95  EUR 10*  USA  Japan 
Nominal 
compensation 
per employee 
Productivity 
Nominal unit 
labour costs in 
national currency 
Exchange rate 
Nominal unit 
labour costs 
in USD 
4.3 
3.1 
1.1 
0.5 
1.7 
3.9 
3.6 
0.4 
0 
1.4 
2.0 
0.7 
1.3 
9.0 
10.4 
* B, DK, WD, F. i, L, NL, UK, S, FIN. 
Source: Commission services (DGII). 
For manufacturing industry, the development of 
European unit labour costs over the last 15 years 
have been less satisfactory (Table 4.7.). Contrary to 
the United States and Japan, labour costs have 
increased faster for manufacturing industry than for 
the economy as a whole. Productivity increased sub-
stantially more than for the economy as whole, but 
less than in the United States. The result has been an 
increase in unit labour costs in national currency 
terms of 1.4% a year more in the European Union. 
For the most recent period the increase has been 
0.7% a year more than in the United States. These 
differences have not been compensated for by a fall 
in the exchange rate. For Japan, the marked decrease 
in the growth of productivity during the current 
recession has meant that the very low rate of increase 
in unit labour costs in national currency has not 
been sustained over the recent period. Combined 
with the revaluation of the yen, this has led to a 
severe increase in Japanese unit labour costs relative 
to those in the European Union and the United 
States (Figures 4.7. and 4.8.). 
Fig. 4.7. Manufacturing unit labour costs 
(national currency, 1980 = 100) 
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Levels of labour costs 
The data presented for developments in unit labour 
costs are highly aggregated but reasonably robust. 
However, absolute levels of unit labour costs are 
much more difficult to measure, because they 
require adequate measurement of levels of produc-
tivity in real terms across countries. For this reason, 
such data are not compiled by international institu-
tions. From the point of view of price competitive-
ness, the absolute level of unit labour costs com-
pared to their competitors is of concern to enterpris-
es operating on international markets. In order to 
exercise a significant influence on competitive per-CHAPTER 4  51 
formance, differences in unit labour costs need to be 
both sufficiently large and sufficiently persistent over 
time. Factors other than price competitiveness play a 
significant rôle and can, to a certain extent, be used 
to compensate a lack of competitiveness in this area. 
Swings in exchange rates also mean that it is impos-
sible for firms to adjust rapidly to changes in their 
domestic cost base. When differences are both suffi-
ciently large and persist over time, enterprises are 
obliged to bring their cost basis into line. If they do 
not do so, the result is a loss of output and employ-
ment, beginning in those sectors most affected by 
international price competition and then feeding 
through to other sectors of the economy which 
depend on them. 
Because they do not require a measurement of 
absolute productivity, figures on total labour costs 
are more generally available. Those established by the 
US Bureau for Labour Statistics for hourly labour 
costs are the most widely adopted. Industrialized 
countries are characterized by labour cost levels far 
above those of the less developed countries (Fig. 4.9). 
The European Union is not attempting to compete 
on low wages. High levels of productivity and spe-
cialization in high quality products allow developed 
countries to compensate for high wages. 
Average hourly labour costs for the economy as a 
whole in the European Union were 8% below those 
of the United States in 1994. The 9% fall in the 
value of the USD in 1995 means that there are now 
no substantial differences in hourly labour costs 
between the European Union and the United States. 
However, certain Member States and Japan already 
had substantially higher labour costs than the United 
States in 1994. 
Fig. 4.9. Nominal hourly labour costs In total economy 
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For manufacturing industry, average hourly labour 
costs in industry in 1994 were 10% higher in the 
European Union than in the United States, and the 
subsequent fall in the value of the US dollar means 
that differences in labour costs are sufficiently 
important to affect competitiveness negatively. Again 
substantial differences are concentrated in a certain 
number of Member States as well as Japan (Fig. 
4.10). 52  CHAPTER 4 
Fig. 4.10. Nominal hourly labour costs in industry 
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Since there are no major differences in hourly labour 
costs between the European Union and the United 
States for the economy as a whole, any differences in 
unit labour costs can be attributed entirely to differ-
ences in productivity. Estimates for real output are 
produced by the international programme establish-
ing purchasing power parities. Combined with mea-
sures of labour input, they allow absolute levels of 
labour productivity to be calculated. Chapter 1 pre-
sented the data for GDP per person employed, 
which demonstrated that European labour produc-
tivity is 20% below that of the United States, but 
above that of Japan. Since the measure of labour 
input is not the same as that for labour costs (persons 
employed versus hours worked), it is not possible to 
use these estimates to calculate absolute unit labour 
costs for the economy as a whole. However, were the 
relationship between relative productivities on the 
basis of hours worked to be similar to that on the 
basis of persons employed, this would point to a sub-
stantially higher level of unit labour costs in the 
European Union compared with the United States, 
but a very low level of unit labour costs compared 
with Japan. 
Analysis of industrial competitiveness needs also to 
take into account absolute levels of unit labour costs 
in manufacturing industry. There is at present no 
official data that would allow such an analysis to be 
made and the information available is very limited. 
Studies' indicate that there was a gap at the begin-
ning of the 1980s in manufacturing absolute unit 
labour costs and there is no indication that this has 
been closed since then, rather the contrary. 
Differences in unit labour costs between the 
European Union and the United States for the econ-
omy as a whole over the last 15 years can be attrib-
uted essentially to differences in the absolute level of 
productivity, with the exception of the early 1980s 
when the sharp appreciation then depreciation of the 
US dollar played the major role. With regard to 
Japan, the steady revaluation of the yen has been the 
decisive factor in increasing Japanese unit labour 
costs. 
For manufacturing industry, the situation has been 
less favourable. Available evidence points to a wider 
gap between European Union and US manufactur-
ing productivity along with a deterioration in 
European unit labour costs. The relative level and 
performance of Japanese manufacruring unit labour 
costs are comparable to those of its economy as a 
whole. 
Conclusions 
Many different factors play an important role in 
explaining trends in output and employment, 
among them the level and development of costs of all 
factors of production, including unit labour costs 
(nominal and real). If levels and developments of 
labour costs for the economy as a whole appear in 
line with those of major competitors, manufacturing 
industry still seems to be a problem, which can con-
stitute part of the explanation for the poor perfor-
mance of European industry. 
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International Comparison of Real Product and Productivity, 
Institute of Economic Research; McKinsey Global Institute: 
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Hooper, Peter and Vrankovitch, Mary for the US Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, international dis-
cussion paper No 527, October 1995. CHAPTER 4  53 
Non-wage costs 
The crucial relationship as regards employment cre­
ation is that between marginal cost and marginal 
product of labour. Employers will take on addition­
al labour only in so far as the additional output pro­
duced exceeds the costs of doing so. In industries 
such as proximity services, high labour costs can 
impede employment creation because the low-skilled 
labour used in these industries does not achieve suf­
ficient levels of productivity to compensate for the 
relatively high costs associated with employing it. 
Since most of the employment creating potential of 
the economy lies in the service sector, the issue of 
labour costs is also very important for services. In 
contrast to industry, where goods incorporating low-
skilled labour can be imported from low-cost coun­
tries, the service sector holds large employment 
potential for low-skilled as well as high-skilled 
labour. The cost problem in services is concentrated 
in the low-skill segment where productivity is not 
sufficiently high to compensate for the costs imposed 
by the high wage floor of European labour markers. 
This translates into unfulfilled demand particularly 
for proximity services, loss of output and less jobs. 
If total labour costs are the important indicator for 
competitiveness, the structure of labour costs is also 
important for employment, parricular at the low 
end. As indicated in the White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment, non-wage costs 
make up 44% of labour costs in the European Union 
compared to 28% in the United States and 24% in 
Japan. This demonstrates a key difference in the 
structure of labour costs which reflect the extent to 
which certain services — health, pensions, etc. — 
are funded through taxation or take home pay. 
Employers' social contributions in most Member 
States are regressive, that is to say they do not 
increase in line with wages (Fig. 4.11). This effec­
tively sets a floor on labour costs in most European 
countries. 
Fig. 4.11. Employers' social contributions 
at different wage levels 
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Thus, the structure of taxes and social contributions 
in most Member States is such that their relative bur­
den is generally heavier on low-paid workers. This 
category of workers, where unemployment is dispro­
portionately high, is also that for which the price 
variable tends to play a greater role in hiring de­
cisions. 
Box 4.1. Labour cost components and the tax wedge 
T
otal labour costs consist of a wage element and a 
non-wage element. The wage element includes all 
payments made to the employee, whether in the form 
of direct wages or salaries, payment in kind, bonuses, 
etc. The non-wage element consists of social securi­
ty contributions and other indirect costs. 
A good measure of the tax burden which is likely to 
influence the labour market is the Overall tax wedge' 
between the cost of employing someone and the take-
home pay. The demand-side is determined by those 
non-wage costs paid by the employer, whereas the 
supply-side is determined by the difference in gross 
and net earnings. 
The overall tax wedge comprises: (i) non-wage costs 
paid by the employer; (ii) social contributions and 
taxes on pay levied on employees. 
It should be noted that the level of non-wage costs 
varies markedly across the Union, as do statutory 
charges on employees. 54  CHAPTER 4 
High non-wage costs are reflected in the scale of the 
tax wedge within Europe. A comparison between 
Europe and its main competitors demonstrates a 
wide difference in the level of the tax burden. In 
Europe, more than 60% of any increase in the 
employers' payroll is paid in taxes, compared with 
less than 40% in the USA and less than one quarter 
in Japan (Fig. 4.12.). 
Fig. 4.12. Overall marginal tax wedges 
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Thus, only 40% of any increase in labour costs trans-
lates into higher incomes for European workers. The 
high level of the overall tax wedge discotirages 
employment of labour-intensive activities for which 
labour costs represent a high proportion of total costs. 
The problem of 'implicit' wage floors is closely 
linked to the degree of protection provided through 
income support. The entitlement to such support 
combined with taxes on otherwise earned income 
may result in high net income replacement ratios, in 
particular at the low end of the wage scale. Where 
such replacemenr ratios coincide with a long maxi-
mum duration on benefit the incentive to accept a 
job offer is weakened, leading to long-term unem-
ployment (the 'unemployment trap'). 
3. Flexibility 
The efficiency with which labour markets work 
depend on systems of legal regulation and collective 
negotiation, as well as on the general organization of 
the economy. Different systems affect the flexibility 
with which labour is used both internally in the firm 
and externally through the capacity of individuals to 
change employer and region. Internal flexibility 
encompasses training, the organization of work and 
working time and the system of industrial relations. 
Training is dealt with in the chapter on intangible 
investment, and the organization of work in the 
chapter on innovation. External flexibility covers hir-
ing and firing rules, as well as geographical mobility 
and occupational mobility. 
The degree of labour market flexibility does not only 
stem from labour market regulation. In fact, the 
main limitations on growth and employment appear 
to come from the limitations placed on access to key 
product markets (see also Chapter 6, on services). 
Other inflexibilities stem from factors not linked to 
the rules and conditions governing employment, 
such as company pension schemes, which may act as 
a disincentive to change firm. Rigidities in the hous-
ing market must also be seen as potential barriers to 
mobility. Lack of rented accommodation and differ-
ences in house prices both limit the capacity to 
change regions. 
It should be emphasized that increased flexibility 
needs to be combined with sufficient levels of stabil-
ity in order to ensure employee motivation. Effective 
use of human resources remains a key element in 
ensuring gains in productivity and also for internal 
flexibility. An increasing turnover of employment 
bears the risk rhat the investment in human capital, 
notably through training, required for long-term 
growth and competitiveness will not take place. 
The recent Third report of the Competitiveness 
Advisory Group (1996) gives interesting examples of 
enterprises which have improved their productivity, 
and have maintained or created jobs. The examples 
mirror the new approach to the way that work is 
organized within firms, characterized by complex 
jobs and a simple organization rather than a complex 
organization and simple jobs inspired by Taylorism. 
The new, flatter and more decentralized organization 
structures have ensured a higher degree of internal 
flexibility. New working practices have been imple-
mented such as multi-skilling, group working and 
problem-solving, leading to more devolved responsi-
bility and empowerment. The upshot is greater job 
satisfaction and improved security of employment as 
a result of companies becoming more competitive. CHAPTER 4  55 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, European labour 
markets are as dynamic as that of the USA (Fig. 
4.13.). The high levels of job turnover, however, do 
not mean that Europe enjoys high levels of net job 
creation. European countries perform less well than 
the USA and Japan because job destruction in the 
European Union represents a higher proportion of 
total job turnover. 
Simply looking at the net result may give a mislead-
ing picture as the period covers a recession. However, 
the total flow of job turnover will remain the same 
within an upturn or downturn of rhe business cycle, 
it is usually only the allocation to creation and 
destruction that differs. Marginal changes in these 
flows can therefore significantly affect the net out-
come. 
Fig. 4.13. Employment growth and its components 
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Source: Research and progress study, 1995. 
Inflexibilities as to job creation may take many 
forms, of which the most significant concern wage 
bargaining, working times and employment protec-
tion. 
Over the 1980s and into the 1990s there has been a 
shift towards decentralized bargaining. The USA and 
Japan are characterized by enterprise or plant level 
bargaining. Such lower-level bargaining has also 
assumed greater importance in the United Kingdom 
in the 1980s. Sectorwide bargaining has been the 
predominant mode of bargaining in Continental 
Europe, and some of the Nordic countries by and 
large shifted to sectoral bargaining in the 1980s 
(Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8. The degree of centralization in 
bargaining (1970s and 1980s) 
The level of bargaining in the 1970s and 1980s 
Central 
Sectoral 
Enterprise/ 
plant 
Predominant bargaining level in the 1980s 
Central 
Finland 
Norway 
Australia 
Belgium 
Sectoral 
Austria 
Denmark 
Sweden 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
New Zealand 
Enterprise/plant 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Sources: Based on OECD, Employment outlook, 1994, Chapter 5, 
and K. P. Windmuller (ed.), Collective bargaining in industrialized 
market economies: A reappraisal, ILO, 1987; OECD jobs study. 
Different forms of wage bargaining each have their 
advantages and disadvantages and it is not possible 
to conclude at the present time that any particular 
form is inherently superior to another. On the one 
hand, for example, centralized or sector-wide bar-
gaining has been used to introduce successfully wage 
moderation in certain countries, with significant 
impact on inflation as well as costs. It also con-
tributes, to transparency of wages and to social and 
regional cohesion. On the other hand, however, sec-
tor bargaining also leads to comparable rates of pay 
between enterprises irrespective of levels of produc-
tivity and across regions in the same country irre-
spective of differences in the availability of labour. 
Working hours are either governed by legislation or 
by collective agreements, and in some cases by both. 
Average working hours are higher in Japan and the 
United States than in Europe (Fig. 4.14). 
The important inflexibility, however, lies not so 
much in the number of hours worked, but rather in 
when work is carried out. In this way, the ability to 
run a plant in the optimal fashion to make best use 
of existing or future investmenrs may be impeded. 
The level of capital utilization is thereby reduced. 
Certain services, such as the possibility for shops to 56  CHAPTER 4 
Fig. 4.14. Average annual working hours in 
industry 1992 
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Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics, Office of Productivity and 
Technology. Washington, DC. 
stay open to meet the requirements of those at work 
during normal hours, are also prevented from devel-
oping as they might. Innovative uses of flexible 
working time arrangements can also lead to the sig-
nificant creation of new jobs. 
Inflexibilities stem not only from regtilation, bur also 
from attitudes. Recent surveys' conchide that 38% 
of firms surveyed in five European counrries have 
experienced difficulties in finding workers for 
Saturday work. Also, despire high levels of Linem-
ployment in some areas, 68% expected to face such 
difficLilties in the future. 
Employment protection legislation concerns hiring 
and firing rules governing unfair dismissal, lay-offs 
for economic reasons, severance payments, mini-
mum notice periods, administrative authorization 
for dismissals and prior disctission with labour repre-
sentatives. 
Levels of labour market regulation vary considerably 
within the European Union. In general, the regions 
of the European Union which have higher levels of 
employment have also a more highly educated and 
trained laboLir force and a more developed system of 
labour relations. Member States with more regulated 
labour markets have somewhat lower levels of 
employment than countries with less regulated mar-
kets. More advanced labour market systems can also 
lead to a better market performance. 
Table 4.9 from OECD shows legislated maximum 
severance pay and notice periods for lay offs in 
selected countries within the European Union and in 
Japan and the United States. It shows that levels of 
protection tend to be higher everywhere in Europe 
than in Japan and the United States. An excessively 
high level of protection against dismissal can be seen 
as a significant obstacle to new recruitment. On the 
one hand, opponents of dismissal protection regLila-
tions point out that, when (anticipated) employment 
costs are high, willingness to recruit new workers 
falls. With general upward pressure being exerted on 
labour costs, firms will tend to adopt a cautious 
recruitment policy. Apart from the effect on the level 
of employment, this can affect the speed with which 
companies adjust their labour forces. On the other 
hand, this impact has been weakened by the increas-
ing frequency of fixed term contracts, which have 
considerably lower severance costs. 
Evidence suggests that, while employment perfor-
mance is determined primarily by the performance 
of the economy as a whole, labour market regulation 
may affect the level of employment creation or, ar 
least, the speed with which firms adjust their labour 
force in response to change. Restrictions on the 
capacity of enterprises to adjust their labour forces in 
the form of regulations or in terms of the cost of tak-
ing on and laying off workers are likely, when exces-
sive or outdated, to affect economic performance of 
companies, although, in practice, enterprises often 
find ways to circumvent some of these effects 
through an increased use of temporary and other 
atypical working arrangements. 
Table 4.9. Comparison of severance pay and notice 
period for OECD countries 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Japan 
Severance pay 
(Months) 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
13.25 
12.0 
1.5 
12.0 
13.0 
0.0 
15.0 
6.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Notice period 
(Months) 
S.5 
3.0 
4.5 
0.0 
3.0 
2.0 
2.0 
0.0 
4.0 
2.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.0 
Source: OECD jobs study, 1995. CHAPTER 4  57 
Static comparisons do not tell the whole story, how-
ever. The dynamic capacity of firms to adjust to 
structural change also needs to be considered. Out-
dated regulations can reduce efficiency by limiting 
the flexibility of enterprises to adjust to changes, but 
short-run flexibility may not necessarily improve 
long-run flexibility. The internal organisation of 
firms, and the «trust» factor, needs to be considered 
alongside the regularion of the external labour mar-
ket. Moreover, the deregulation of labour markets 
may lead not to more regulation by the market, but 
to alternative modes of legal regulation through the 
courts, which may increase uncertainties, and costs, 
rather than reduce them. 
When analysing flexibility, a distinction must be 
made between levels of flexibility and developments 
over time. As for the latter, clear changes toward 
greater flexibility have taken place in recent years. 
Virtually all Member States have seen a significant 
reduction in working time regulations, and recruit-
ment restrictions have been relaxed. It has become 
easier for employers to take on part-time as well as 
temporary workers, and the possibilities for self-
employment have increased considerably. Finally, 
with regard to dismissals, a third of the Member 
States have reduced restrictions, althoLigh these 
reductions have been less significant than those of 
other areas. CHAPTER 5  59 
Chapter 5 
Corporate finance 
The cost and availability of capital influences the 
nature, type and size of investment projects. The way 
a company is financed and the way its management 
and employees interact with third party investors can 
have a profound effect on its performance. Public 
policy matters because it provides the regulatory 
framework under which corporate financing takes 
place. Policy can also help to overcome important 
market failures that could, otherwise, cause deficient 
investment levels. 
1. Sources of funds 
There are a number of striking characteristics about 
international financing patterns: 
• retained earnings and debt finance are the most 
important sources of finance; 
• debt finance can be a more important source of 
finance than retained earnings (internal finance) 
and is the most important source of external 
finance; 
• most debt finance is provided by banks and not by 
securities markets; 
• the importance of debt finance varies over the 
business cycle. In recessions the importance of 
bank finance increases; 
• despite the media attention it receives, new equi-
ty finance only plays a minor role as a source of 
finance. 
There are large differences in corporate financing 
patterns across EU Member states. The variation 
within the European Union is larger than the differ-
ences between the European Union, the United 
States and Japan (Fig. 5.1.)· 
Fig. 5.1. Sources of funds % 
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Source: 0ECD (1993), Taxing profits in a global economy. 
Shareholders are the owners of a corporation. Equity 
represents a claim on the stream of a company's cur-
rent and future income and, in the case of ordinary 
shares, gives shareholders the right to vote at annual 
general meetings. The total return from equity is any 
dividend paid plus capital gains. 
Internal financing via retained earnings is the most 
important form of equity financing. Instead of 60  CHAPTER 5 
paying out the earnings to shareholders, the manage-
ment invests the additional capital on their behalf. 
Table 5.1. Market size 
Exchange 
A (Vienna) 
D 
E 
F 
FIN 
I 
S 
UK 
USA 
JP (Tokyo) 
Market 
capitalization/ 
GNP 
0.18 
0.29 
0.24 
0.39 
0.29 
0.15 
0.70 
1.12 
0.76 
1.25 
Debt/equity 
ratio for 
1991 
1.00 
0.75 
1.44 
0.75 
0.20 
0.69 
1.17 
Outstanding 
amount of 
corporate 
bonds /GDP 
1.6 
0.1 
4.4 
8. G 
6.9 
0.2 
5.0 
2.7 
26.9 
7.5 
Source: Edey and Hviding (1995), 'An Assessment of Financial 
Reform in OECD Countries', OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper No 154, Paris.; Coopers & Lybrand. 
NB: Market capitalization for domestic equities for 1991-94: 
outstanding amounts of corporate bonds as per cent of GDP for 
1993. 
In Europe, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, companies do not have access to well cap-
italized local equity markets. Market capitalization as 
a fraction of GNP in continental Europe is lower 
than in the United States or Japan (Table 5.1.). 
Although share issues net of repurchases in the 
United States were zero in 1991 and only 4% of total 
financing in Japan (Fig. 5.1.), there was significant 
net issuing in the past. 
External equity financing takes the form of initial 
public offerings (IPOs), cash offers and rights issues. 
Initial public offerings occur when a company sells 
shares that are traded on the market for the first 
time. A traded company can raise additional equity 
capital by selling shares to all investors (cash offer) or 
to the existing shareholders (rights issue). 
Along with retained earnings, debt is the most 
important source of finance. In addition to the inter-
est rate, there are a number of other factors that are 
important for debt financing. It is of great impor-
tance for a firm when a loan has to be paid back. 
Longer maturities give companies more room to 
manoeuvre. Lenders often require that a loan is 
secured, for example through collateral. If a compa-
ny is unable to provide collateral it might find it dif-
ficult to obtain debt finance. 
Companies might not be able to meet their interest 
payments and repay the principal out of current 
income or reserves. In such a case the company 
might be placed into default and Liltimately liqtiida-
tion. With equity financing there is no risk of 
default. Companies that experience difficulties can 
pass the dividend and their share-price can diminish 
without risk of default. 
The choice between different sources of finance 
depends on the relationship between cost and risk. 
The lower cost of debt is offset by the higher risk 
attached to it. Corporate and personal taxes affect 
the underlying relationship, because they infkience 
the cost of the various sources of finance different-
ly. Considering corporate taxes alone, retained earn-
ings attract the highest effective tax rare. The effec-
tive tax rate on external sources of funds is much 
lower (Fig. 5.2a.). The impacr of corporare taxes is 
directly visible for finance officers and can be incor-
porated easily into post-tax cost of financing calcti-
lations. 
Fig. 5.2a. Corporate tax wedges (%) 
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Source: 0ECD (1993), Taxing profits in a global economy. 
NB: No personal taxes, Inflation at 4.5%, average weights. 
The cost of capital to a company also depends on 
the willingness of investors to supply it with 
funds. Personal tax wedges and inflation matter 
because they influence investors' net return. 
Taking into account personal taxes and inflation, 
the average tax wedge on retained earnings 
remains high, while with new equity it is even 
higher (Fig. 5.2b.). CHAPTER 5  61 
Fig. 5.2b. Corporate and personal income tax wedges 
with country specific inflation rates 
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other than debt. There are other reasons why com­
panies make extensive use of internal equity. 
Financing investment from current cash flow is easy 
and involves few risks. The company does not have 
to engage in complicated negotiations with outside 
investors. 
Retained earnings are financed out of past profits. 
Hence, only those firms that have been successful in 
the past have access to large amounts of retained 
earnings. Past success might be a good indicator for 
the ability of a company to seek out profitable 
investment projecrs again. Retained earnings reward 
success. 
Source: OECD (1993), Taxing profits in a global economy. 
NB: Top marginal rate of personal taxes, country specific inflation, 
average weights. 
Tax systems in the European Union, on average, 
strongly discriminate against new share issues (Figs 
5.2a. & 5.2b.). Marginal effective tax rates in some 
countries are very high: 93.1% in France, 81.4% in 
Italy and 50.6% in Germany.
1 
In some extreme cases, tax wedges provide compa­
nies with very strong incentives for using retained 
earnings. For example, the marginal effective tax rate 
for an investment in the Mezzogiorno region of Italy 
was 9.9% for debt, 12.5% for new equity and 37.7% 
for retentions at 0% inflation in 1985. With 10% 
inflation, the subsidy for retained earnings rose to 
134.7% for rerained earnings, 19.1% for debt and 
14.6% for new equity issues.
2 Overall, the tax system 
heavily favours debt and thereby increases financial 
risk for enterprises. 
2. Internal equity 
Internal equity is the only source of equity for most 
companies. It is the most common form of financing 
The dominance of internal finance can also be a 
problem for industrial performance. Retentions lock 
profits in to existing companies and product mar­
kets. Retentions might also cause incentive prob­
lems. Financing investment internally reduces the 
influence outside investors have on decisions that are 
taken inside the firm. A lack of external control 
might allow managers to invest in projects that will 
give them prestige and influence, not necessarily the 
most profitable ones. 
3. External equity 
The cost of equity is the real after-tax expected rate 
of return by invesrors who hold an equity stake in 
the company that wants to undertake a project. The 
cost of equity is hard to measure because it is diffi­
cult to obtain a reliable estimate of the expected 
equity risk premium. 
The available cost of equity figures show that the real 
cost of equity in Europe is generally higher than in 
the United States or Japan (Fig. 5.3.). The high cost 
of external equity could explain why new share issues 
play such a minor role in financing investment. 
However, there are other cost and non-cost factors 
that discourage companies from using equity. 
1 Jorgenson and Landau, (editors), Tax Reform and the Cost of 
Capital Brookings, 1993. 
2 Alworth and Castellucci (1993), 'Italy', in Jorgenson and 
Landau (editors), Tax Reform and the Cost of Capital, Table 6-
20, Brookings, 1993. 62  CHAPTER 5 
Box 5.1. Measuring the cost of equity 
E
mpirical estimates of the cost of equity are unreli­
able. Different empirical methodologies give very 
different results. Estimates of the cost of equity based 
on price-earnings ratios or real holding period returns 
are too volatile, even when smoothed out over 
decades. Earnings figures depend on accounting rules 
which differ across countries and time. Estimates of 
the risk premium that are based on a capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) are also problematic. High price-
earnings ratios, high period returns and high estimat­
ed betas (from the CAPM) can be due to high expect­
ed future returns and might have nothing to do with 
low required rates of return. All estimates of the cost 
of equity are based on share prices. Such estimates 
might not reflect the cost of equity for unlisted public 
companies which are the most common form of com­
pany in most Member States. 
Fig. 5.3. Real cost of equity (%) 
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NB: For the smaller countries at the bottom the figures are unreliable. 
There are relatively few initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in continental Europe. IPOs are expensive. 
There are substantial administrative fixed costs asso­
ciated with issuing equity that are proportionally 
more imporrant for small and medium-sized compa­
nies. There are also indirect costs included. It is well 
documented that IPOs are often 'underpriced'. The 
price at which the equity is sold is lower than the first 
market trading price. The cost of underpricing can 
be 10% of the value of the issue and represents a sub­
stantial cost for the company. 
The scope for equity finance is limited and loans are 
difficult to securitize. SMEs are forced to rely on 
bank finance or on retained earnings. In Europe, 
the main attraction of issuing equity is that it can 
provide an alternative to retentions and bank 
finance. 
The absence of deep pools of easily accessible capital 
in Europe is a problem, particularly for SMEs. If the 
pools of European equity capital were deepened, 
external equity finance would be more attractive. 
Pension funds should play a vital role in making 
European equity markets more liquid. In many 
Member States the pan-European activities of pen­
sion funds and insurance companies are seriously 
hampered by outdated regulatory practices. 
The degree of international diversification of the 
pension fund portfolios is an indicator of the restric-
tiveness of national regulation. The relarively large 
share of foreign assets for funds based in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands stems from the fact 
that these are the only two countries, together with 
Ireland, where pension fund investment is unre­
stricted (Table 5.2.). There has been little progress 
on liberalization within the European Union. CHAPTER 5  63 
Table 5.2. Assets of pension funds 
Country 
D 
DK 
NL 
S 
UK 
AU 
CA 
CH 
JP 
USA 
Stock of 
assets 
(billion 
USD) 
59 
22 
145 
87 
643 
62 
187 
173 
182 
2 915 
% 
Personal 
sector 
savings 
3 
-
26 
-
27 
19 
17 
-
2 
22 
% of GDP 
3 
70 
46 
16 
60 
22 
32 
70 
5 
51 
Foreign 
assets 
as % of 
total 
assets 
0.6 
2.6 
19.1 
5.9 
20.8 
14.9 
7.6 
5.9 
7.0 
4.6 
Fig. 5.4. Long-term real interest rates (%) 
1977-95 
Source: Davies (1995), OECD 
NB: data for end-1991; includes only independent occupational 
pension schemes. 
Equity finance is linked to the concentration of own-
ership and control more generally. In Europe, exter-
nal equity finance is usually provided by large insti-
tutions with considerable influence over company 
behaviour. In the United States, ownership and con-
trol are more dispersed.» However, in the United 
States pension funds are beginning to play a role that 
is very similar to that of banks and insurance com-
panies in Europe. Here, too, pension funds are like-
ly to play a larger role. Their interests are potentially 
different to those of banks, insurance companies and 
other large shareholders that dominate European 
equity finance at the moment. 
4. Debt 
Since 1977 ex post real interest rates in the EUR 15 
have been rising. In 1995 they were higher than the 
ex post real interest rates in the United States and 
Japan (Fig. 5-4.). The ex ante real interest rate is the 
interest rate that influences investment and savings 
decisions. The ex ante rate is not observable directly 
because it is difficult to measure inflationary expec-
tations. The ex post rate, provides an approximation. 
In June 1996, the European Union fluctuated 
between some of the lowest and highest yields on 
government bonds in the OECD (Table 5.3, 
Column 1). The rate banks charge their best clients 
(prime rate) varies substantially across countries. In 
some countries, the banks' most favoured clients pay 
less for their debts than the government: the United 
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Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Japan. Corporate bond yields are usually 
higher than the prime rate, but there are exceptions. 
In Belgium, Italy and the United States corporate 
bond yields are lower than the banks' prime rate. In 
the Italian case the corporate bond yield is even 
lower than the yield on government bonds. 
Table 5.3. Nominal interest rates 
Country ' 
A 
Β 
UK 
DK 
F 
D 
I 
NL 
E 
S 
USA 
JP 
Govt, bond 
yield 
6.0 
6.6 
8.1 
7.3 
6.4 
6.4 
9.6 
6.3 
9.0 
8.4 
6.8 
3.2 
Banks' prime 
rate 
8.3 
7.3 
6.8 
6.0 
7.0 
6.1 
11.5 
4.3 
9.3 
7.3 
8.3 
1.6 
Corp. bond 
yield 
n.a. 
7.0 
8.9 
8.5 
7.9 
6.3 
8.2 
6.5 
9.4 
8.8 
7.8 
3.2 
Source: The Economist. 
NB: data for 5 June 1996, some entries 4 or 6 June. 
The cost of bank lending is affected by liberalization 
in the banking industry. It is generally thought that 
liberalization in the banking industry should make 
bank debt cheaper. This is not necessarily the case. 64  CHAPTER 5 
For the borrower, the cost of bank debt is the cost of 
funds (attracting deposits) plus the banks' margin. 
Liberalization has three effects: 
• competitive forces (the single market) and tech-
nological progress exert downward pressure on 
margins and the cost of bank debt; 
• the same competitive forces raise the cost of funds 
for banks; households benefit from higher returns 
but there is upward pressure on the cost of bank 
debt; 
• the new capital adequacy requirements have put 
upward pressure on the cost of bank finance 
throughout the OECD. 
The total net effect of deregulation and increased 
competition in the banking sector can be a rise in the 
cost of bank debt. 
Financing investment through bank debt can be 
advantageous for a company because the effective 
cost of bank debt is lower than would first appear. 
Banks are often better equipped than capital markets 
in assessing the creditworthiness of a company. 
There is some evidence rhat banks are more willing 
to provide emergency financing than other types of 
investors. Bank loans, even when they are syndicat-
ed, can be renegotiated much more easily than com-
pany bonds. 
On the other hand, banks might be too willing to 
bail out troubled companies, especially when the 
amounts involved are large. Very often the banks 
successfully use financial stability arguments to 
ensure that the government bails them out. In the 
end it is the taxpayer who pays for management 
errors or inattentive monitoring of the borrower's 
status. Such bailouts also increase the cost of capital 
for good companies. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises do not have the 
same possibilities as large enterprises. Usually, they 
are confined to their national systems and their abil-
ity to take advantage of the international market for 
debt or syndicated loans is limited. For them, 
national governments' policies have an important 
role to play. The capital base of SMEs is usually 
weak. Most of their external financing is provided by 
banks. To secure their loans, banks require collateral. 
Since SMEs often lack collateral they may not be 
able to obtain all the external financing they need 
(credit rationing). 
For SMEs, the capital adequacy rules can also pre-
sent a problem. In times of a cyclical downturn, 
banks are tempred to switch to governmenr loans 
(0% capital requirement), or mortgages (4% cap-
ital requirement). Moreover, in anticipating future 
recessions, they might want to concentrate their 
other lending (8% capital requirement) on loans 
that can be securitized (sold off) as a way to meet 
capital requirements in bad times — car loans and 
corporate lending to companies with a credir rat-
ing. 
In the United States, the most significant develop-
ment in debt finance has been an accelerating trend 
toward new forms of securitized debt finance. A loan 
that originates with a bank or finance house is sold 
to a specialized company or trust that pools such 
loans. The company, maybe with the help of an 
investment bank, resells the pooled loans to institu-
tional investors — pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance companies or banks. Very often the 
reselling process is supported by a credit rating or a 
bank guarantee. 
There are many reasons why this 'unbundling' of 
lending has not taken place to the same extent in 
Europe. ELirope lacks institutional investors who 
would buy securitized loans. European pension 
funds and other potential investors continue to be 
restricted in their activities and do not benefit from 
a single licence or other European-wide regulation. 
Europe also lacks large finance houses that would 
start the process by selling off loans. The sub-
sidiaries of large US corporarions play a very 
important role in originating securitized loans. In 
Europe, finance houses and finance companies face 
regulatory barriers. For example, they do not bene-
fit from a single licence in the same way that banks 
do. 
Debt financing and bank loans in particular are a 
vital source of financing for SMEs. The develop-
ments surrounding debt financing could danger-
ously increase the cost of bank loans for SMEs. 
With deposits, banks are faced with increased com-
petition that forces them to pay depositors higher 
rates of return. On the lending side, securitization CHAPTER 5  65 
and globalization is taking away the banks' largest 
industrial clients who are known to be good risks. 
Some large corporations have a better credit rating 
than their banks. The remaining borrowers, mostly 
SMEs, are faced with higher interest rates or credit 
rationing. SMEs depend on local sources of 
finance. They can find it more difficult to obtain 
the external financing they need and at a reasonable 
price. 
5. Cost of capital 
The weighted cost of capital combines the different 
sources of financing and represents the minimum 
return an investment project must make. A compre-
hensive study on the cost of capital in Europe, the 
United States and Japan was carried out for the 
European Commission. 
Box 5.2. Measuring the cost of 
capital , 
T
he cost of debt is the weighted average of the inter-
est rate for 'riskless' debt plus the bank lending 
risk premium and the riskless rate plus the corporate 
bonds risk premium. The cost of equity is the rate of 
return investors require for a 'riskless' share plus an 
equity-risk premium. The two costs are weighted by the 
debt-equity ratio to give the pre-tax cost of capital. 
Fig. 5.5. Cost of capital and the tax wedge 
under uncertainty (%) 
The cost of capital measures was computed for a 
world with uncertainty and includes risk premiums. 
The results seem to confirm that the cost of capital is 
higher in Europe than in the United States and Japan 
(Fig. 5.5.). The cost of capital is higher for smaller 
countries, but the reliability of the data is least good 
for small countries as well. 
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the figures are not very reliable. 
Methodologically somewhat inferior time-series evi-
dence shows that the cost of capital in the United 
States, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom 
has been converging over time (Figures 5.6a and 
5.6b.). However, the extent of the convergence is 
overstated by the figures. Business cycle induced 
swings in corporate earnings explain much of the 
apparent convergence around 1990. 66  CHAPTER 5 
Fig. 5.6a. Cost of capital for R&D project with 10-year 
payoff lag (%) 
Fig. 5.6b. Cost of capital for equipment and 
machinery with physical life of 20 years (%) 
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Source: McCauley and Zimmer, 'Exchange Rates and International 
Differences in the Cost of Capital', in Yakov and Levich (editors). 
Exchange Rates and Corporate Performance, Irwin Ridge, 1993. 
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Chapter 6 
Competition and operation of markets for services 
Liberalization in the markets for goods has pro-
gressed rapidly over the last decades, while market 
opening in services is more recent. A single market 
for products is emerging in the majority of manufac-
turing sectors, with the exception of some industrial 
sectors where oligopolist structures prevent a full 
competitive outcome. Liberalization of services is 
more complex, as competition needs to be associated 
with regulatory reforms. This chapter focuses on the 
service sector to illustrate how market restrictions 
affect the competitiveness of European industry. 
Many of the conclusions relared to the services mar-
kets apply to manufacturing sectors, whenever a low 
degree of market access prevents new entries. 
Fig. 6.1. Key service inputs to main sectors of the economy in the EU 
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1. The significance of markets 
for services 
European industry is dependent on the efficiency of 
a number of other sectors, which provide key inputs 
for the productive process. All structural elemenrs 
that restrict competition in the value-chain (State 
aids to industrial sectors, market dominance or bar-
riers to entry) increase factor prices, thus limiting the 
attractiveness of European products in global mar-
kets. For most manufacturing inputs, the process of 
substitution of suppliers within the single market 
and from third countries acts as a discipline for low-
cost performers. Conversely, as many services are 
non-tradable, imports from low cost suppliers are 
limited. As a result, many of the cost pressures affect-
ing European industry are currently generated with-
in the service sector. 
The presence of market restrictions to the supply of 
efficient services affects negatively operating condi-
tions at national level, and reduces significantly mar-
ket opportunities. In today's markets, the capability 
to offer variety is a key element of growth in market 
shares. There is thus a strong linkage between the 
availability of competitive services and industrial 
performance, as customer-oriented goods embody 
an increasing service component. 
Markets for services include network-based services, 
such as energy, water, communications, transport, 
and other sectors, such as financial and business ser-
vices. Altogether, more than ECU 20 of these services 
are required directly or indirectly to produce ECU 
100 of manufacturing output (Fig. 6.1.). Services are 
not only inputs to industry, they are also outputs, 
constituting 63% of the total EU value added. Their 
significance goes beyond the cost-side, making the 
overall functioning of the economy conditional upon 
well-developed and integrated services. 
There are different reasons why competitive indus-
trial systems imply increased demand for services. 
For example, industry requires sophisticated infor-
mation technologies to obtain information on world 
market developments, and to establish efficient rela-
tionships with suppliers, customers and subsidiaries. 
In the European Union, data network services 
increased by 13.6 % and voice network services by 
8% in 1995. Cross-border inter-modal transportser-
vices are prerequisites for production systems based 
on just-in-time delivery. Moreover, market research 
and markering constitute an inseparable part of 
product development to meet differentiated con-
sumer needs on a global scale. This increased inte-
gration between goods and services makes the avail-
ability of efficient services a key factor for the com-
petitive position of the European Union. 
Typically, services such as telecommunications, 
roads, railways and energy distribution are associated 
with network operation, which need to be intercon-
nected at cross-national level for market integration 
to proceed smoothly. Infrastructure may either be 
sited at specific points, such as ports or airports, or 
take the form of a network linking many different 
cross-border points. Even point infrastructure usual-
ly relies on network infrastructure for access and effi-
cient operation. 
In the European Union, missing links and incom-
patible technical solutions at or around borders 
abound and cause delay and higher costs. For certain 
networks, such as telecommunications, railways and 
energy, interconnectability across Member States 
requires significant investments, the lack of which 
will jeopardize the full potential of the single market. 
It has been estimated that the total cost of providing 
the infrasrructure needed to overcome constraints in 
the creation of a pan-European infrastructure 
amounts to 0.5% of EU GDP over a 10-year period.' 
Public ownership and operation of infrastructure is 
widespread in Europe, but the pressure of public 
deficits has led public authorities to reduce public 
investment. As a result, serious problems in financ-
ing infrastructure have arisen in several countries. 
Even priority projects related to the trans-European 
networks are facing financial constraints. 
Since infrastructure is a very capital-intensive opera-
tion, ensuring adequate financing constitutes an 
important part of the efficiency of the overall service, 
otherwise the quality of provision will suffer. 
Financing may either be based on the cash flows asso-
ciated with the services provided or on collective pro-
vision. For private operators to participate in the sup-
ply of tomorrow's infrastructures, market incentives 
to attract new capital formation are therefore 
European Investment Bank Forum (1995), 'The provision of 
infrastructures. The role of the private sector.' CHAPTER 6  69 
essential, together with a well-defined regulatory 
framework, which will guarantee sufficient stability 
for private operators to accept the risk of such invest-
menrs. 
2. Service markets are still fragmented 
Competitiveness and competition are two interrelat-
ed concepts. More competitive markets create the 
right environmenr for efficiency, technological inno-
vation and growth. This is the assumption at the 
heart of the single market. Thereby, competitiveness 
of EU industry is strictly related to competition in 
service markets. 
Table 6.1. Market structure of services in the EU 
Sector 
Banking 
Insurance 
Road transport 
Airlines 
Telecoms 
Electricity 
Distribution 
Construction 
Hotels 
Business 
services 
Regulatory 
measures 
High 
High 
Medium 
High 
High 
High j 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Type of market 
structure 
Oligopolist competition 
Oligopolist competition 
Pure competition 
Oligopolist competition 
Regulated monopoly 
Regulated monopoly 
Monopolist competition 
Pure competition 
Monopolistic competition 
Monopolist competition 
Source: European Economy. 
Despite Community efforts to end national frag-
mentation in services, monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market structures still tend to prevail (Table 6.1.). In 
manufacturing sectors, liberalization has progressed 
fast in the majority of product markets thanks to the 
removal of non-tariffs barriers and open trade meas-
ures. Thus, the persistence of some forms of oligo-
polist control in some industrial sectors results more 
from structural factors, rather than regulatory 
regimes. Conversely, competition in services, for 
their nature of non-rradables, requires appropriate 
regulatory reforms. Difficulties in implementing 
these reforms at national level have led to obstacles to 
market access and in turn to high prices, low levels of 
productivity and lower market development. 
Significant disparities in the degree of liberalization 
apply across European countries. 
The nature of competition differs between heteroge-
neous service sectors. Different forms of self-regula-
tion govern certain business services. In these sectors, 
exisring obstacles to market integration arise mainly 
from delays in the implementation at national level 
of Community Directives setting mutual recognition 
and minimum harmonization rules, while lack of 
internal competition may result from anti-competi-
tive practices applied by national governing bodies. 
A more complex issue is the liberalization of infra-
structure-based services (energy, telecommunications 
and transport), which gives rise to a number of pub-
lic policy concerns. For public services, characterized 
by natural monopolies or oligopolistic markets, there 
is a need to reconcile universal service obligations 
with liberalization measures. 
The European Union has initiated a liberalization 
process by setting common rules at EU-level to 
guarantee the right of establishment and to open the 
market to competition. A number of Community 
Directives set the regulatory framework for a single 
market of network-based services. Measures of mar-
ket opening have been approved ro a different 
degree for all sectors with public utilities. However, 
in network-based services, effective implementation 
at national level of competitive principles requires 
additional regulatory reforms in the home market. 
These should be aimed at supporting integration of 
services at European level through higher intercon-
nection and new cross-border entries. These regula-
tory measures at national level are fundamental to 
ensure effective market opening in energy, telecom-
munications, and transports markets to prevent dis-
tortions in favour of incumbents. A single market 
for infrastructures is therefore conditional upon the 
effort of Member States in setting a stable and 
favourable regulatory enviroment for new integrat-
ed services. 
Currently, incomplete liberalization of the service 
sector represents a critical weakness for the competi-
tiveness of EU industry. Market restrictions in ser-
vices lead not only to low industrial performance, 
but also to lower levels of innovation and growth. 
Comparison between best industrial practices in the 
United States and in the European Union suggests 
that inefficiencies in services, transmitted along the 
value-chain, hinder the development of new process-
es and products. Flexible production capabilities 
require well integrated services. Lack of such services 
penalizes European enterprises in new markets by 
reducing their responsiveness to customer demands. 70  CHAPTER 6 
Fig. 6.2. Growth in apparent labour productivity, 
1980-90 
EUR 10 
Source: Eurostat. 
Over the 1980s, productivity gains in services were 
lower than in manufacturing sectors, (Fig. 6.2.). 
Although this productivity differential is common to 
other developed economies, and might also reflect 
measurement problems (Box 6.1.), there is evidence 
that in many European service markets, restrictions 
are often associated with insufficient restructuring 
and a low level of internationalization. As a result, 
limited efficiency gains and a low degree of innova-
tion have reduced the development of market poten-
tial in key markets such as transport, telecommuni-
cations, business services and distribution. 
Box 6.1. Problems in accounting for productivity growth in the 
services market 
T
he main difficulty of measurement of productivity 
growth arises from the fact that services embody a 
large quality component, which renders the measure-
ment of output difficult. Therefore, the use of proxies, 
such as man-hours worked, is widespread in profes-
sional and collective services, and an underestima-
tion of the level of output takes place. National 
account classifications on services are generally 
incomplete, so that aggregation problems also occur. 
This implies that differences in aggregate productivity 
levels across countries should not necessarily be inter-
preted as a consequence of different levels of 
performance, because they may conceal different sec-
tor allocations of output, in particular when different 
subsectors are characterized by different skill intensi-
ty. 
Within the European Union, service prices have 
tended to increase more than manufacturing prices, 
especially in the 1990s (Fig. 6.3a.). The increase in 
service prices mirrors a decline in relative service pro-
ductivity, equal to the ratio between productivity in 
the service and non-service sectors (Fig. 6.3b.). In 
spite of difficulties with measuring the productivity 
of services, the different trend between manufactur-
ing and services clearly reveals that efforts in indus-
trial sectors to respond to external competition have 
not been matched by equal market discipline in ser-
vice markets. 
European Commission, have highlighted potential 
growth opportunities and a higher degree of product 
development for service markets if liberalizarion 
takes place. This is because without competition not 
only are costs of services higher, but the degree of 
service differentiation is lower. As a result new mar-
ket developments are limited by high prices, which 
in turn limit new investment. For example, 
European invesrment in information and communi-
cation technologies accounts for between 20 and 
30% of total fixed investments, compared with 50% 
in the US.
2 
The effect of this asymmetry represents one of the 
major constraints ro the European Union's ability to 
create jobs. Several studies, from the OECD and the 
Information Technologies, Productivity and Employment, 
DG III Industry, European Commission, (1996). CHAPTER 6 I 71 
Fig. 6.3a. Evolution of relative prices indices 
in key EU economies, 1980=100 
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Fig. 6.3b. Evolution of relative productivity indices 
in key EU economies, 1980=100 
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Source: Eurostat. 
For example, product market barriers in telecommu-
nications are identified in Europe as a major obstacle 
to the emergence ofinformation technologies, as the 
cost of setting-up and using new means of commu-
nication is still too high. Since there is evidence that 
a 10% increase in information technologies invest-
ment is associated with a 2-3% output increase, a 
link exists between high prices and lower growth 
potential.' Also, the rate of job creation in distribu-
tion is reduced by high levels of regulation. On the 
positive side, increased competition in some routes 
of air transport has increased the size of the market 
by 4%. 
In the European Union, services should become the 
new engines of development and job growth, with a 
multiplier effect. The lower growth in the 1980s of 
employment in services of most European countries 
compared to the United States points to a significant 
unrealized potential for job creation (see chapter on 
the labour market). The European Union is still 
locked within the first phase of industrial change, 
when restructuring has been associated with work-
force reduction to adjust to economic globalization, 
(Fig. 6.4.). Achieving market integration can foster 
economic dynamism. Evidence of success in some 
countries indicates that liberalization of services 
speeds up this process of economic transformation 
by providing incentives to create new markets and 
new forms of production. For example, in Denmark, 
the use of advanced communications service was 
responsible for 60% of new private-sector jobs cre-
ation.
4 Also, the incremental output growth of the 
GDP of the European Union due to the introduc-
tion of broadband communications from 1993 to 
2008 is estimated at 2.7% of GDP. · 
Fig. 6.4. Employment performance in 1980-90 
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There are several orher examples of the potential for 
growth and job creation. Liberalization in GSM 
telecommunications has created 30 000 jobs in 
European Information Technology Observatory, DG III, 
European Commission, (1996). 
4 Employment trends related to the use of advanced communica-
tions, DG XIII, European Commission. 72  CHAPTER 6 
Germany and a further 350 000 jobs relate to Minitel 
in France.
5 The air charter market, which is highly com-
petitive, has promoted tourism in several European 
regions thus improving growth and convergence. In 
some countries, such as the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, the business service market is growing at a 
rate of 7% per year, thanks to a high degree of internal 
and external competition. Also, many regions of 
Europe which have created a cluster of integrated ser-
vices are the most dynamic and competitive. 
Speeding up liberalization in markets for services is 
thus a priority for improving the competitiveness of 
EU industry. Only if each national market provides 
the context for industry to exploit emerging oppor-
tunities can EU enterprises perform well in global 
markets and guarantee sustainable growth. However, 
a set of conditions are fundamental for liberalization 
to deliver the expected gains: 
• adequate regulatory frameworks at national level 
which provide a stimulus for efficiency gains to be 
transferred to customers or to be invested in new 
developments; 
• interconnectivity of national infrastructures and 
progress in the setting up of private and public 
partnerships for new investments; 
• mutual recognition of business services for the 
creation of a single market for services and mini-
mum harmonization of professional standards; 
• enforcement of competition rules to avoid anti-
competitive behaviour; 
• ongoing monitoring of the progress to ensure that 
the gains are distributed ro all customers. 
In the rest of the chapter, key services for industry are 
examined to show the link between competition and 
productivity growth. These are telecommunications, 
airlines, energy and business services. The analysis 
focuses on existing impedimenrs to market access 
and on how they translate into lower performance. 
3. Telecommunications services 
The rapidly evolving telecommunications market 
represents an area of critical importance for the com-
petitiveness of the European Union, both for the 
direct impact on growth (the telecommunication 
equipment and service market is expected to expand 
by 9.8% in 1996''), and for the fact that communi-
cation highways represent a gateway for the emer-
gence of a European information society. 
Telecommunications are vital infrastructures for the 
value-chain of European businesses. For example, 
8% of financial sector expenditure is on telecommu-
nication services. This is only one of the many indus-
tries, whose efficiency depends on well-developed 
telecommunications, and which in turn affects the 
functioning of many other sectors. 
While consensus has been achieved in the European 
Union on the need for more competitive telecom-
munication services to realize the full potential of 
information and communication technologies, the 
speed of Community regulatory reforms has not 
matched the pace of liberalization in other devel-
oped countries. Delays in an agreement at World 
Trade Organization level on telecommunications lib-
eralization also contribute to a lower degree of com-
petition. As a result, in several EU counrries, 
telecommunications markets are still monopolies, 
(Table 6.2.). 
Table 6.2. Ownership and market structure 
in the telecommunications market in 1994 
Countries 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Italy 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
USA 
Japan 
Ownership 
Public 
Mixed 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Mixed 
Public 
Mixed 
Public 
Mixed 
Mixed 
Private 
Private 
Mixed 
Market 
structure of 
network 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Monopoly 
Competition 
Competition 
Competition 
Competition 
Competition 
Source: OECD (1995), Communication outlook. 
Teknibank, The impact of telecommunications infrastructure on 
economic growth and development, OECD, 1994.  ' European Information Technolog)'Observatory, 1996. CHAPTER 6  73 
Liberalization of telecommunications has been 
achieved for value added network services (fax, elec-
tronic mail and other low speed data services), and 
mobile communications. In basic telephony, public 
monopolies restrict access to new entrants in all cases 
except the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden 
until 1998. This is the date when a single market for 
basic telecommunication services will begin for all 
Member States except Ireland, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, which may defer until 2003 and Luxembourg 
until 2001. Moreover, in all European countries, 
except the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden, 
liberalization of leased lines is not yet adequate. 
The different degree of competition bears a clear 
connection with price performance also across key 
European countries. For example, international tele-
phone charges for a three minute call to New York 
and Canada are 50% cheaper from the United 
Kingdom than from any other EU country, with the 
exception of Sweden, which is the second most com-
petitive market (Fig. 6.6.). The presence of more 
than one operator explains the lower price perform-
ance. 
Fig. 6.6. Telephone charges of a three minute cal 
to/from US and Canada, USD 1995 
Fig. 6.5. The impact of competition on 
telecommunication charges 
110 
105 
100 " 
95 
90 
Competitive 
- Non-competitive 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Source: OECD (1995), Communication Outlook. 
A recent OECD study
7 indicates that countries 
which have successfully fostered competition (Fig. 
6.5.) have benefited from more efficient pricing with 
a move towards fixed charges, and lower marginal 
charges. Over the period 1990-94, in countries with 
competitive industries, the price of long distance 
calls declined from 18% to 35% (against 12% and 
16% in non-competitive telecommunication indus-
tries). Total business charges decreased by 8.6% 
(against a fall of 3.1%), and for residential charges, 
private users enjoyed a 3.1% reduction compared 
with a 8.7% increase in non-competitive countries. 
Canada 
USA 
UK* 
Sweden 
France 
Netherlands 
Italy 
Belgium 
Germany 
1.14 
1.41 
2.55 
* 
2.47 
3.03 
3.19 
3.20 
3.71 
4.26 
Source: Financial Times. 
* Average of Mercury and BT. 
Beyond the advantages of competition in terms of 
price levels, OECD studies indicate that improve-
ments in the quality of service have been observed in 
competitive telecommunication industries," even if 
the quality performance of monopolistic telephone 
operators in the European Union is generally quite 
high (Table 6.3.). 
Differences in performance across European countries 
indicate that a single market for Telecommunications 
Communication outlook, OECD, 1995. 
1 Les infrastructures de télécommunications, ¿es avantages 
de la concurrence, OECD, 1995. 74  CHAPTER 6 
Table 6.3. Quality of telecommunications services 
1992 
Countries 
Competition in 
infrastructure 
Sweden 
UK 
Australia 
Canada 
Japan 
Infrastructure under 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Faults dealt 
within 2 days 
94.0 
99.0 
78.9 
91.8 
monopoly 
77.5 
95.1 
77.1 
86.6 
85.0 
73.5 
7 5.0 
91.0 
93.0 
79.0 
69.0 
Faults for 
100 main lines 
10.0 
15.7 
21.6 
2.5 
8.0 
6.3 
8.3 
38.0 
16.9 
16.7 
3.7 
35.4 
52.0 
10.8 
Source: OECD (1995), Communication outlook. 
is slow to emerge. Excessive national regulations in the 
EU telecommunications industry and monopolistic 
structures act as a major constraint to the develop-
ment of services of electronic transfer. There are 
spillover effects on the information society, which is 
dependent on low costs of data transmission and on 
the availability of new information highways. 
Technological developments in the form of cellular 
technologies and digital systems are favouring the 
transition from one supplier to an integrated network 
including several suppliers both for local and long dis-
tances services. However, the setting-up of multiple 
information highways, based on an integrated, fully 
digital network capable of performing multiple ser-
vices, such as the combination of voice, video and 
data, known as multimedia, requires flexible pricing 
mechanisms that provide the incentives for operators 
to invest in the creation of infrastructures.'' 
Competition between different operators offering a 
variety of pricing options (for fixed charges and usage 
of services) constitutes a determinant of the future 
development of demand, enabling operators to invest 
in tomorrow's communication networks. 
9 Grout, P. (1996), 'Promoting the superhighways, 
Telecommunications regulation in Europe', Economic 
Policy, April. 
Currently, the fragmentation of the European Union 
telecommunications market, together with the 
resulting single pricing systems within the majority 
of EU countries (due to the presence of single oper-
ators) hinder the development of new on-line ser-
vices. As a result, information highways are still 
nationally based, do not cover the full territory and 
are generally very expensive for the general public. 
OECD studies indicate that countries where 
telecommunications networks have been opened to 
competition, such as the United States and Japan, are 
investing massively in the construction of tomor-
row's cross-country networks. 
For example, in the United States cable television 
has penetrated 60% of households providing a sub-
stantial network. In the European Union, cable pen-
etration is 16%, with wide discrepancies between 
countries (ranging from 80-90 % in the Benelux 
region to close to zero in Southern Europe). A more 
developed network means that the United States is 
capable of providing new services such as video-on-
demand and home shopping. The use of on-line 
information services in the United States is nearly 
four times higher per capita and costs are signifi-
cantly lower. With the exception of France 
(Minitel), there is little use made ofinformation ser-
vices in Europe as the market is fragmented by 
national boundaries. 
Although it is difficult to quantify the effect ofinfor-
mation infrastructures on competitiveness and 
growth, two examples are worth noting. Firstly, in 
the EU market (which accounts for 27.2% of the 
total information and communication technology 
market) the European Informarion and Tele-
communication Observatory estimates that the vol-
ume of potential business from telecommunications, 
content and computer hardware was in the order of 
ECU 743 billion in 1993 (Fig. 6.7.). Business poten-
tial was derived on the basis of a scenario of increased 
use of information services by various industries. 
This contrasts with a realized volume of business of 
only ECU 282 billion in 1994. The huge gap reveals 
that the lack of a competitive marker and an ade-
quate emerging information infrastructure is costing 
the European Union a significant share of the poten-
tial market. In the European Union, the rate of 
information technologies investment is 2.07 ratio of 
GDP, against a rate of investment of 3.05 in the 
United States. CHAPTER 6  75 
Secondly, the pricing structure affects the diffusion 
of Internet connections. For example, in rhe United 
States, where unlimited local calls are part of the 
(fixed) cost of the basic service, a low price for 
Internet connection has led to the explosion of per-
sonal computers sales to households, (which now 
absorb more than 50% of personal computers sold). 
Personal computers used with modems have become 
cheap means of communication. In the European 
Union, since Internet connections are paid at local 
rates and according to durarion, the diffusion of 
modems and personal computers is much reduced. 
Household penetration of personal computers with 
modems is 35% in the United States, but less than 
10% in the largesr European countries. 
In the United States, private alliances between tele-
phone and cable operators have resulted in attempts 
to integrate and upgrade their structure to support 
multi-media, particularly video-on-demand applica-
tions. In addition, US universities and research insti-
tutions are also involved in a number of high speed 
test beds. In Japan, the Ministry of Telecommu-
nications is promoting a plan to connect all business-
es and households to a nation-wide fibre-optic system 
by 2010, enabling broadband communications and 
interactive multi-channel digital video broadcasts. 
In the European Union, the slow pace of regulatory 
reforms in the telecommunication sector constitutes 
an impediment to the use and development of 
Fig. 6.7. The European information business arena 
ECU billion 
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Source: EITO 1995. 
advanced information technologies. Delays in set-
ting efficient pricing mechanisms negatively affect 
the application ofinformation technologies to exist-
ing sectors and limit the emergence of a new market 
where economies of scale apply. 
Opportunities for exploitation of information are 
potentially unlimited in developing new household 
(teleshopping, education, entertainment and leisure) 
and business services, (telebanking, telemarketing, 
teleworking). New patterns of organization fostered 
by information technologies will induce major chal-
lenges to many industries. Traditional methods of 
advertising, television and publishing will change, and 
ways of doing business will be significantly altered. 
Member States need to adopt effective regulatory 
measures as quickly as possible to facilitate mass dif-
fusion of information technologies solutions to pro-
mote this evolution. Implementation of clear, fair 
and stable regulatory reforms is the key to market 
development, as new entry is dependent on market 
incentives not distorted by the presence of national 
incumbents. 
Furthermore, a high level of intellectual property 
rights is of primary importance to the newly devel-
oping information markets. The emergence of in-
formation technologies and the global communica-
tion infrastrucrure require harmonized approaches to 
the security of information systems, protection of 
privacy and personal data, cryptography technolo-
gies and policies. 
4. Transport 
Industry has always depended on efficient transport 
systems. Currently, the integration of different forms 
of transport with telecommunications to form the 
discipline of logistics is transforming industry's way 
of doing business. Logistics track all flows of materi-
als and goods through the productive system and 
enable customer-driven ordering and manufacturing 
to demand to become effective. 
Ensuring that each delivery slot can be met with 
exactly the right quantity of each product is an exact-
ing task. For their part, manufacturing firms operate 
similar requirements towards their suppliers so that 
logistics cover plant movements both inwards and 
outwards. Lean production and distribution systems 76  CHAPTER 6 
depend upon the effective functioning of multi-
modal transport systems. 
Not all forms of transport have the same significance 
for industry, although combined forms of transport 
are becoming more important. External trade 
depends crucially on maritime transport as do 
peripheral and insular parts of the Union. The effi-
ciency of ports as well as shipping is a key determi-
nant of transport costs in this area, as studies for the 
Australian Bureau of Industry Economics have 
shown. Liberalization of much maritime shipping 
will depend on progress within the World Trade 
Organization, where the United States has been 
holding up the negotiation of an agreement in order 
to maintain the Jones Act, which restricts access to 
US ports. Liberalization of coastal shipping (cabo-
tage) is in the process of being achieved within the 
European Union. 
Road freight transport has benefited from significant 
internal market liberalization measures that have 
increased competition and brought down costs and 
delays for business in conjunction with the abolition 
of border controls. The road haulage secror has been 
very quick to implement in a flexible way structural 
changes, through increasing productivity raising 
quality and rationalizing capacity. Such liberalization 
has given a significant boost to cross-border pur-
chases of components which are strengthening the 
competitiveness of European industry by giving 
access to low-cost, high-quality sources of supply. 
In the last three decades, border crossing by roads 
has increased by 62%, and the share of road trans-
port represents four fifths of national transport mar-
kets. Congestion has resulted in many crucial nodes, 
as infrastructures have not always matched such 
developments. Responses to these problems have 
been different. Some countries have introduced 
domestic licensing, others have increased fuel and 
road taxation. However, the issue of how to reduce 
congestion and address the problem of a deteriorat-
ing road infrastructure is still open and appropriate 
solutions to pricing road transport have yet to be 
found. Proposals need to take into account the need 
to find a balance between environmental concerns 
and cost increases. 
A potential solution to road congestion and pollu-
tion could be an increase of transport by rail. Rail 
transport for both goods and passengers has signifi-
cant potential in Europe, bur problems with techni-
cal compatibility, underinvestment in track and lack 
of liberalization of services has held back the devel-
opment of this sector. The ability to separate the pro-
vision of services from network operation represents 
a key condition for successful liberalization. Already 
in the UK there are signs of major investments in 
rolling stock for freight in order to develop the trans-
porr of goods by rail following liberalization in ser-
vice provision. Liberalization provides incentives for 
operators to invest in upgrading existing infrastruc-
tures. 
Air transport constitutes an interesting case for 
demonstrating the connection between liberalization 
and efficiency in the provision of transport services. 
Significant measures have been adopted under the 
internal market programme, but third country liber-
alization depends on the negotiation of hundreds of 
bilateral agreements at Member State level. These 
bilateral agreements tend to be either very restrictive 
or, in the case of the United States, very unbalanced 
in the possibilities that they open up for European 
carriers. The interaction between internal regulatory 
measures and competition issues is symptomatic of 
the difficulties facing liberalization in the field of 
transport. 
External trade opportunities and the emergence of a 
pan-European market rely on well-functioning air 
transport for passengers and cargo services. It is esti-
mated that 10 million jobs in the European Union 
are indirectly related to a competitive air transport 
market, with a potential rate of annual growth of 
over 6%. The single market requires flexibility of 
cross-border travel services and price-reduction to 
facilitate economic integration between European 
countries. 
Three sets of liberalization packages approved by the 
European Union since 1987 have been aimed at pro-
gressively increasing internal competition in a mar-
ket traditionally characterized by a high degree of 
monopolistic or duopolist control (Table 6.4.). The 
effect of the third package, allowing progressive lib-
eralization leading to full access to international and 
domestic services by 1997, freedom to set price, and 
uniform conditions to start an airline across the 
European Union, has been to induce new market 
entries. As a result, the dominance of national CHAPTER 6  77 
carriers (the aggregate share of output on scheduled 
services within the European Union) declined from 
85% to about 79% by the beginning of 1994. Even 
if some routes are too weak to support greater com-
petition, initial positive signs indicate that liberaliza-
tion will increase the number of companies operat-
ing on the 25 to 50 densest international intra-
European routes and 35 domestic routes. 
While the third liberalization package has proved to 
be effective in introducing some dynamism in the 
market, a legacy of previous cooperative behaviour 
prevailing in the market, economic recession and 
remaining regulatory impediments explain why the 
full effects of the programme have yet to come. In 
addition, the removal of some regulatory constraints 
in the assignment of airporr slots and in the man-
agement of ground services, currently under discus-
sion, should speed up the process of new entry. 
Congestion in some key airports and traffic control 
difficulties have also prevented more competition. 
Table 6.4. Competition on European scheduled routes 
Monopoly  Two or more 
competitors 
Domesti 
Routes 
Routes 
Flights 
Flights 
c 
1992 
1994 
1992 
1994 
International 
Routes 
Routes 
Flights 
Flights 
1992 
1994 
1992 
1994 
90% 
87% 
74% 
64% 
One or two 
competitors 
95% 
93% 
81% 
75% 
10% 
13% 
26% 
36% 
Three or more 
competitors 
5% 
7% 
19% 
25% 
Source: The single aviation market: progress so far. Civil Aviation 
Authority London, 1995. 
The effect of liberalization has not been uniform 
across all Member States. The evolution towards a 
more competitive market reflects both different 
starting conditions in the regulatory environment 
and the degree of public participation as well as the 
prevailing economic climate. As a result, varying 
degrees of competition can be observed across 
Member States (Table 6.5.). The countries that have 
benefited most from liberalization are Spain and 
Germany, while the United Kingdom remains the 
most competitive market. In some countries, domi-
nance of established national carriers prior to liberal-
ization delayed or limited market liberalization on a 
number of domestic and intra-EU routes. On others, 
new entrants have significantly challenged incum-
bents. Overall, the increase in the number of new 
entrants has not been significant. Over the period 
1992-96, only three new major carriers (with a fleet 
of over 70 aircraft) and 20 small carriers entered the 
market successfully. The low rate of net entry con-
ceals the creation of more than 80 operators and the 
destruction or absorption of 60 small carriers. 
Table 6.5. Proportion of flights on routes with two 
or more competitors 
December 1994 
Carriers  %of 
domestic 
scheduled 
flights on 
routes with 
two or more 
competitors 
%of 
international 
scheduled 
flights on 
routes with 
three or more 
competitors 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Italy 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
n.a. 
4 
40 
0 
60 
9 
0 
n.a. 
0 
0 
26 
35 
19 
47 
56 
28 
11 
15 
16 
20 
35 
46 
0 
18 
12 
15 
20 
0 
12 
45 
Source: The single aviation market: progress so far. Civil Aviation 
Authority London, 1995. 
The most dramatic changes in market concentration 
have occurred in those markets where new entrants 
have challenged incumbents. Improvements in the 
quality of services, cost effectiveness and a reduction 
in air fares have been the benefits of increased com-
petition. For example, the business fare from 
London-Heathrow to Nice (1 032 kms), a route 
with more than two operators is 70% less than the 
the business fare from Paris to Madrid (1 043 Kms), 
where only national carriers serve the route. Where 
routes are served by more than two competitors, 
business fares per kilometre are on average 50% 
lower than those served by two or less competitors. 
Most importantly, competition leads to a lower 78  CHAPTER 6 
increase of fares over time. Since 1986, over the 40 
busiest European routes, the increase of business 
fares averaged 36% in routes with competition, and 
48% in routes without competition, while tourist 
fares increased by 28% against 46%. 
Discounts on economy fares have also been observed 
on routes where competition has intensified. The 
presence of a third operator has caused a significant 
reduction in fares. The overall impact of more com-
petition on some routes has also been seen in terms 
of a significant growth in passengers, thus implying 
that new entrants increase the size of the market. 
Routes with more than two carriers showed an 
increase of passengers of 9% against an increase of 
5.8% of routes with only one carrier. 
The liberalization packages and global competition 
have fostered a wave of restructuring and new strate-
gic responses from airlines. These are currently under 
way, even if they have yet to spread to the same 
degree to all airlines. Different strategic responses 
include differentiation of pricing policies, improved 
services and entering into new alliances. Many 
national carriers remain under public ownership, 
which provides them with a certain amount of insu-
lation from the market. 
In the past, the readiness of governments to intervene 
with State aid, when financial pressures threatened 
the existence of national carriers, (Fig. 6.8), has often 
delayed restructuring plans, thereby preventing 
national carriers from coming under the same market 
discipline as commercial competitors. Recently, 
stricter enforcemenr by the European Commission of 
the principle of 'one time, last time' is inducing 
national carriers to implement more effective restruc-
turing plans. Limiting the extent of State aid is a fun-
damental condition of the liberalization programme. 
Public intervention acts as a barrier to entry where the 
effects of market forces are distorted between nation-
al carriers and commercial operators. 
In the first phase of liberalization, a wave of nation-
al mergers, beginning with that of British Airways 
with British Caledonian and continuing with those 
of Air France and Air Inter and UTA, has also taken 
place (Fig 6.9.). These mergers reduced the number 
of potential competitors in national markets and 
increased the share of landing slots under the control 
of main carriers. Recently, the nature of mergers has 
become more international and global alliances tend 
to prevail. After the Merger Regulation introduced 
Fig. 
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Source: European Commission. 
in 1990, the Commission has also progressively 
attached stricter conditions to the merger approval. 
These include obligations to sign cooperation agree-
ments with new entrants. Franchising and code-
sharing agreements are also other forms by which air-
lines respond to more competition. 
Although it is difficult to judge the full long-term 
effects of these partnerships, and in some cases they 
might bring benefits to customers by allowing better 
services, it is fundamental to ensure that they do not 
translate into anti-competitive practices. Evidence 
from the market in which new competitors have 
challenged incumbents shows that the presence of 
commercially independent operators ensures higher 
customer value. A marker with high sunk costs for 
entry needs competition between existing operators 
as a yardstick for better performance. Newcomers 
can establish themselves only slowly by starting in 
niche markets. 
Fig. 6.9. Number of mergers in the EU airline industry 
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Source: European Commission. CHAPTER 6  79 
Europe is now in the paradoxical situation that a 
fragmented air transport market, with many carriers 
attempting to offer a full range of local, European 
and inter-continental services, is also characterized 
by a lack of effective competition within and 
between national markets. In the United States a 
much higher level of overall concentration, accom-
panied by effective competition both between major 
players on the same routes and between these players 
and regional or low cost airlines, has led to a very dif-
ferent outcome. Even if the model of US deregula-
tion cannot be applied in the European Union, effec-
tive competition between operators has to increase 
beyond the current 7% share of the scheduled city-
pairs routes. Consolidation of charter operators can 
contribute to this dynamic evolution. 
Significant differences in prices between the United 
States and the European Union and within the 
European Union still persist. Comparison of airline 
fares across different regions shows that European 
airfares are amongst the highest in the world. Data 
on average air fares per flight indicate an average 
price differential of around 40% on short-haul and 
on long-haul flights between the European Union 
and United States (Table 6.6.). 
Table 6.6. Comparison of EU and US 1995 
air fares in ECU 
Fig. 6.10. 1994 Business class fares for 500 miles 
Km  US airlines  European 
airlines 
400 
960 
1280 
152 
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288 
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Source: The Economist, 13 July 1996. 
However, as a result of increased competition a greater 
segmentation of the market is also emerging. 
Economy fares have been declining in many European 
markets, and on some national routes. But business 
fares have tended to increase if new operators do not 
compete with incumbents. Significant variations apply 
from country to country. Within the European 
Union, it has been estimated that for a businessman, 
the cost of a 500-mile (805 km) air journey differs 
according to the place of departure (Fig. 6.10.). 
In most countries, the high costs of air transport are a 
reflection of a lower performance by European airlines 
measured across a number of functions, but also of sig-
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Ecu per 
mile 
UK E I IR S NL FR D 
Source: Financial Times. 
nificant operational charges that are beyond the con-
trol of airlines. This reflects a significant cost and pro-
ductivity disadvantage in the past. In 1992, the overall 
productivity of European carriers was 28% lower than 
American carriers.'" European carriers suffered from 
specific handicaps in the global market, and lag far 
behind their competitors in adapting their cost struc-
tures. In 1992, overall operating costs of major 
European Airlines per available tonne kilometre were 
about 48% higher than the operating costs of major 
US airlines. Although significant efforts have been 
made to reduce this competitive disadvantage, (Table 
6.7.), European carriers still have a long way to go to 
achieve the operating performance of US competitors. 
Table 6.7. Total operating costs per available tonne km 
(ATK) in 1993 prices 
US Cents  1989  1993 
KLM 
British Airways 
Air France 
Lufthansa 
Alitalia 
Iberia 
TAP 
Sabena 
SAS 
Average 
59 
68 
56 
81 
63 
70 
82 
79 
.24 
77 
47 
48 
59 
60 
62 
65 
81 
92 
110 
69 
Source: ICAO, Financial Data (1983, 1988 and 1993). 
To bring airline costs into line with those of com-
petitors, costs beyond airlines' control also need to 
fall. In the European Union, fuel costs, airport 
Expanding horizons. A report by the Comité des Sages for Air 
Transport to the European Commission. 80  CHAPTER 6 
charges and en-route charges are significantly higher 
than in the United States. External costs represent a 
substantial burden to the airlines. Differences in 
costs arise for three main reasons: airport charges, air 
navigation charges and fuel costs. In 1992, airport 
charges for scheduled European airlines accounted 
for about 5% of operating costs, compared with less 
than 2% in the United States. This difference has 
even more impact on domestic costs where no en-
route charge exists for domestic US traffic. Average 
European airport charges amoLint to 
USD 1 539 (including security taxes), but only 
USD 505 in US airports. Charges at monopoly air-
ports are about 30% higher than in airports with 
competitive handlers. Recent increases in airport 
charges above inflation have added new problems to 
the efforts of airline management to improve internal 
cost-effectiveness. Fuel costs are also 15% higher for 
European airlines compared with the US industry. 
The current situation of high costs beyond manage-
ment control puts European carriers at a competitive 
disadvantage in the face of global competition. 
Liberalization of the air traffic market needs to be 
accompanied by other measures to enable more cost-
efficiency. Only significant restructuring associated 
with a reduction of operating charges will enable 
European airlines to restore their efficiency and pave 
the way for a single market for air transport. While 
the effects of liberalization will increase when restric-
tions in airport slot allocations and grotind service 
handling are removed, the airline sector will main-
tain a competitive position only if cost-effectiveness 
of other services increases in parallel. 
greater liberalization. In this section, the analysis 
concentrates on the electricity market to illustrate 
some of the issues in the completion of a single mar-
ket for energy. Most assessments on market restric-
tions will also apply to the gas sector. 
Fig. 6.11. Average energy cost shares (%) 
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Energy represents a primary input of all industries. 
Energy costs represent between 5% and 17% of 
direct costs of mamifacturing industries (Fig. 6.11.). 
Since energy constitutes a significant cost element 
mainly for intermediate producrs, the total impact 
on costs is much greater. 
Prices in the gas market have fallen in parallel to oil 
prices but, on average, remain 30% higher than US 
prices. As regards the electricity market, the differ-
ence is even bigger (50%). The recently agreed open-
ing to some competition of the European Union's 
electricity market should narrow the gap, although 
the US electricity market is also entering a stage of 
Competition is very limited in the electricity market, 
as markets are highly imperfect and in the majority 
of cases closed to competition. The energy market in 
Europe, and in particular the European electricity 
supply industry, have developed in the majority of 
European countries on the basis of monopoly sup-
pliers (Table 6.8.). In the past, this structure reflect-
ed the need to exploit economies of scale and guar-
antee a universal service, but today new technologies 
(such as information technology and combined cycle 
gas turbines) allow models other than monopoly of 
supply to fulfil public service obligations. CHAPTER 6  81 
Table 6.8. Market structure of electricity networks 
in the EU 
Countries 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
Source: OECD (1995). 
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The high costs of electricity penalize European pro­
ducers. For instance, the chemical sector suffers from 
a significant competitive disadvantage with regard to 
the United States (Fig. 6J2.). Even if part of the 
price difference is due ro different resource availabil­
ity rather than to competition factors, the divergence 
in the price levels across Member States (Fig. 6.13.) 
indicates scope for reducing inefficiencies, and thus 
prices. 
Since 1989, liberalization in the United Kingdom of 
electricity supply (but not distribution) has induced 
a significant restructuring of the electricity market. 
This has been reflected in a price reduction of 16% 
for a typical industrial customer and 8% for large 
industrial customers. Service quality has also 
improved. Preliminary studies on the impact of the 
single energy market, under the Negotiated Third 
Party Access, have estimated a potential reduction of 
prices of 8% in the European Union. This amounts 
to ECU 5.8 billion per annum, and covers only 
direct cost reduction arising from increased competi­
tion. 
Two systems of liberalization are under considera­
tion: the Negotiated Third Party Access and the sin­
gle buyer system. Experience in Norway, Australia, 
the United States, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland 
and the United Kingdom demonstrates that market 
access at supply and generation level is a key condi­
tion for competition, as control of the distribution 
Fig. 6.13. Energy prices in the EU for industrial 
consumers, tax excluded 
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network by one single operator reduces the degree of 
market access. 
On 20 June 1996, after long and difficult negotia­
tions, the Council adopted a common position on 
the proposal for a directive concerning common 
rules for an internal market for electricity. The major 
issue for the creation of the internal electricity mar­
ket has been the conciliation of competition and 
public service obligations — mainly long-term plan­
ning, the degree of separation and transparency of 
the different level of activities and the pace of further 
market opening, taking into account the very differ­
ent national situations. In addition, interconnections 
are needed to ensure trade in electricity while 82  CHAPTER 6 
guaranteeing the security and stability of the net-
work. Implementation at national level of effective 
regulatory reforms represents the key for the effects 
of liberalization to translate into lower costs for 
users. 
6. Business services 
In today's business environment, efficiency, special-
ization and flexibility are becoming the key factors 
for gaining competitive advantage. As a conse-
quence, enterprises are increasingly outsourcing non-
core activities. This process of externalization is fos-
tering the creation of a wide range of specialized 
business services, which contributes to a significant 
share of the value-creation chain of enterprises of all 
sizes. While the development of competitive clusters 
of industrial activities largely depends on the pres-
ence of efficient business services, in the European 
Union restrictions from professional governing bod-
ies and a high level of national regulation still restrict 
cross-border development of professional and busi-
ness related services. 
Lack of mobility and integration in the European 
business service sector has resulted in a declining 
external trade surplus in the sector, which fell from 
ECU 4 billion in the 1980s to less than ECU 1 bil-
lion in the 1990s. The legacy of national orientation 
and the small size of European business services is 
reflected in the difficulty of national companies to 
set up cross-border operations. On the contrary, for-
eign companies especially from the United States 
have established themselves on European Union 
markets thanks to their ability to operate cross-
border on the basis of an integrated network of 
national subsidiaries. 
National regulations in business services are dictated 
by safety or consumer protection requirements. 
However, regimes of self-regulation by governing 
bodies may also translate into anti-competitive prac-
tices, such as fixing prices. For example, notaries, a 
professional service highly regulated in many 
Member States, compute their fee as a percentage of 
the value of the case they handle. Similar practices of 
market control apply to other professions. 
Specialized business services cover a wide range of 
heterogeneous activities, including professional ser-
vices (e.g. lawyers, accountants, management consul-
tants), technical services (e.g. consultant engineers, 
architects, quality control), operational services (e.g. 
cleaning, leasing of electronic office equipment and 
computers, linguistic services), marketing services 
(advertising, direct marketing, sales promotion, mar-
ket research, public relations and fairs and exhibi-
tions). For every major function in an enterprise, 
equivalent external business services can be identi-
fied. 
National marker access restrictions, (Table 6.9.), are 
major obstacles for the creation of pan-European 
business services. As a result, a high degree of market 
fragmentation can be observed among European 
business services, which tend to retain a national 
identity. For those professions for which public 
interest protection has led to the requirement that a 
specific qualification be obtained in order to practise, 
mutual recognition (or harmonization) of profes-
sional qualifications is necessary to guarantee market 
access across different national markets. Currently, 
qualifications are still obtained at national level and 
under the control of local corporatist organizations 
and mutual recognition is not fully effective. 
Table 6.9. Restrictions to market access 
for business services 
Area of restriction  Example of the sector 
affected 
Entry barriers for 
professionals though 
national corporatist 
professional orders 
setting capacity and 
fixing prices 
Limitations for 
marketing and market 
research through 
restrictions on media 
promotion and direct 
marketing. 
Professional and 
Technical services 
Advertising, market 
research, sales promotion 
Source: European Commission. 
To analyse the regulatory situation and identify the 
main existing restrictions to market access, it is 
worthwhile focusing on four major subsectors of 
business services which represent key inputs for 
industry: legal, accounting, technical, and marketing 
services. 
Although liberalization of legal services has started 
with two Directives at EU level, in practice mutual 
recognition of legal qualifications is not yet operative CHAPTER 6  83 
in all Member States. The Diploma Directive 
addresses the issue of mutual recognition of diplo-
mas, and provides grounds for cross-border integra-
tion of legal professions. By taking an aptitude test, 
lawyers may qualify to practice in a host country. 
However, the organization of these tests has not yet 
been implemented. 
The delay in liberalization is reflected in the level of 
market share that foreign companies are gaining in 
Europe, due also to significant differences in the pro-
vision of legal services across the European Union. 
While 90% of legal practices are individual in 
Belgium, Greece and Portugal, and over 50% in 
other European Union countries, 25 of the 40 
biggest law firms are American, only 10 British, 4 
Australian and 1 Canadian. 
With increased international competition, legal ser-
vices are becoming a vital export product. Already 
lawyers from Europe and North America are com-
peting to export their system of law to govern com-
mercial contracts in Eastern European countries and 
newly emerging markets. The implementation of a 
simplified regulatory framework for rhe legal profes-
sions at EU level is thus of primary importance, not 
only in itself for rhe integration of legal services, but 
also for the role of efficient pan-European services in 
setting contractual bases for all type of business 
activities world-wide. 
Similarly, barriers to cross-border practices apply to 
accounting services. A high degree of regulation at 
national level has resulted in substantial differences 
in the practices and rules of the profession between 
European Union Member States. For example, 
accountants cannot offer insolvency and tax services 
in France, but can in other EU countries, where 
accounrancy services are extended to a wider range of 
functions than auditing. The high level of differences 
in commercial law and accounting procedures across 
Member States constitutes a major obstacle to har-
monization in the field of accounting services. Only 
sratutory auditing is currently regulated at EU level, 
with a Directive which sets minimum education 
requirements. 
Accounting and auditing services have a significant 
impact on investment and foreign direct investment, 
and could affect the degree of development of finan-
cial and commercial markets. The existence of sim-
ple, more transparent rules in accounting culture has 
given American and UK enterprises a leading edge in 
the market for corporate transactions. Simple and 
harmonized accounting rules at EU level could pro-
mote financial innovation and the internationaliza-
tion of economic activities. 
Likewise, technical services, including architects, 
construction engineering and geodetic surveying, 
are still very fragmented at European level and tend 
to operate within national borders. For example, 
only 3-4% of engineering services are exported 
between Member States, in comparison with 30% 
of such services exported to third countries. This is 
explained by the presence of several barriers to entry 
in national markets, which require the adherence to 
many local rules and membership of national asso-
ciations. 
Three directives affect the degree of market opening 
at European level: the Directive on services, the 
Directive on public procurement, and the Directive 
on minimum safety. The first directive on services is 
aimed at increasing competition at cross-border level 
by pLiblishing calls for tenders for public service con-
tracts which exceed ECU 200 000. 
However this Directive does not cover regulations on 
fees, and national associations can set additional cri-
teria. Similarly the directive on public procurement 
requires public tendering for the award of public 
contracts. The Directive has been incorporated into 
national law only in Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom. The Directive on the mini-
mum safety standard has been enacted only by 
Luxembourg, and there are still many issues open on 
quality assurance. 
As a result, competition in technical services is still 
very limited. One of the most serious implications is 
that markets for infrastructure and major engineer-
ing projects are, in the majority of countries, still 
locked into national boundaries. Both delays in the 
transposition of directives and difficulties in har-
monization of regulatory regimes imply inefficient 
public procurements policies, which translate into 
high costs and poor standards in some countries. A 
high number of pending cases of infringements 
regarding public contract awards, which totalled 184 
in 1994, signals the existence of serious barriers to 
cross-border entry. 84  CHAPTER 6 
Marketing and commercial services are highly regu-
lated at national level. These services are of critical 
importance for the ability of companies to enter 
local markets. They play a fundamental promotional 
function for many industries, signalled by the overall 
expenditure by firms on marketing of more than 
ECU 1 000 billion. 
Regulations on the provision of marketing services 
are still national in nature. As a result economies of 
scale and scope in marketing are very limited. Lack 
of harmonization in the rules governing these ser-
vices reinforces national segmentation of the 
European market for many producrs, preventing 
firms from designing coherent and coordinated mar-
keting of their products Europe-wide and raising 
costs compared with competitors who do not face 
such restrictions in their domestic markets. CHAPTER 7  85 
Chapter 7 
Intangible investment 
The knowledge and skill content of developed 
economies has been rising quite markedly. The 
capacity to generate new knowledge and develop a 
high level of human resources affects industrial per-
formance to an ever greater degree. This chapter 
examines the extent to which Europe is investing in 
intangibles and whether the best use is being made of 
that investment. 
Intangible investment includes a large variety of 
components: research and development (R&D), 
licences, patents, engineering, human resources, 
organization and structuring ofinformation, invest-
ment in software, investment in information systems 
and marketing. 
R&D and human resources are the most important 
components of intangible investment. According to 
OECD estimates, R&D and investment in human 
resources account for more than 70% of the total 
volume of intangible investment. 
1. Problems with intangible investment 
The special nature of intangible investment leads to 
problems with its provision. A lack of appropriabiliry 
of the returns, market failures and information prob-
lems can result in the underprovision of intangible 
investment. General skills or technologies are more 
difficult to appropriate than specific skills or tech-
nologies. 
The widespread dissemination of knowledge and the 
adoption of productivity-enhancing technological 
breakthroughs has a positive effect on economic 
growth. The growth effects that result from the dis-
semination of transferable skills or technologies are 
larger than the growth effects that could result from 
sharing specific skills or technologies. 
Patents and trademarks make the returns to intangi-
ble investment more appropriable. The degree of 
appropriability depends on the scope and duration 
of the patent or trademark protection. The effective-
ness of protection afforded depends on the legal sys-
tem: the average length of a trial, legal fees and the 
expected size of the fines. Hence the degree of appro-
priability is directly influenced by government 
policy. 
Intellectual property rights play a vital role in pro-
viding private incentives to intangible investment. 
However, strong protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights can prevent the widespread use of 
growth generating knowledge. Intellectual proper-
ty rights provide individuals and enrerprises with 
monopoly rights. The owners of a patent can 
decide to limit its use by others and to extract 
monopoly returns to their invention. Knowledge-
sharing rules are crucial for striking a balance 
between rewarding R&D, spreading growth gener-
ating knowledge and preserving competition in 
product and factor markets. 
Increased R&D, foreign direct investment, trans-
fer of technology and international trade require 
international standards of intellectual property 
rights at the highest possible level. The adoption 
of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) 
in the framework of the World Trade 
Organization has been a major achievement in 
this area. The agreement will allow enterprises to 
operate on international markets and exploit mar-86  CHAPTER 7 
ket opportunities while ensuring that protected 
rights enjoy equivalent protection in third coun-
tries. 
The TRIPs agreement might help to give some com-
panies world-wide monopoly power and prevent the 
global implementation of technological advances. 
The parallel development of international licensing 
rules and international agreements on competition 
policy are cmcial for striking the right balance 
between the protection of property rights and the 
widespread diffusion of knowledge. 
Human resource investments are subject to similar 
problems. Employers generally accept that training 
can lead to higher productivity, reductions in costs 
and improvements in quality. This view is reinforced 
by some research into the quantitative effects of train-
ing. The relationship of the rerurn on investment in 
human resotirces with competitiveness remains diffi-
cult to quantify. 
Unlike R&D, investment in training is shared to 
varying degrees by enterprises and employees, in 
terms of direct expenditure and indirect costs (such 
as levels of wages foregone and time spent away 
from the job). However, difficulties remain in cal-
culating who benefits from the investment made. 
In the case of the self-employed it is clear that they 
can appropriate the returns on their own invest-
ment in human capital. However, people and 
Therefore skills are mobile, and a third party can 
appropriate the skills of an employee without 
investing in training. This is a disincentive to 
investment in human resources which can in turn 
lead to a redtiction in the skills available on the 
labour market. 
There is some evidence that fixed investment 
receives a more favourable tax treatment than 
intangible investment. In part, this is due to the 
fact that intangible investment is hard to measure 
and does not usually appear, for example, on com-
pany balance sheets. As a result, intangible invest-
ment does not benefit from depreciation 
allowances and other fiscal measures that benefit 
tangible investment. The returns from fixed 
investment are more predicrable than those from 
intangible investment. Fixed investment can be 
sold off when a firm goes bankrupt and, hence, 
can be used as collateral. 
2. Research and development 
ELirope's spending on R&D is proportionately lower 
rhan in the US or Japan. Toral figures for R&D 
spending include basic research (Fig. 7.1., A). 
Expenditure on research which is conducted in 
industry (Fig. 7.1., B) and research handed and con-
ducred by indiistry (Fig. 7.1., C) is also lower in the 
EUR 12 than in the United States or Japan. 
In Japan, almost all R&D conducted by industry is 
self-financed. In the United States and the European 
Union a part of research in industry is also financed 
from other sources, particularly government. The 
figures suggest that Japan takes a different approach 
to the funding of industry based R&D than the 
United States and the European Union. 
Fig. 7.1. Total expenditure on R&D (A), R&D 
in industry (B) and self-funded R&D 
in industry (C) 
% of GDP 
DA 
DB 
□ C 
Lft 
2.8 
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3.1 
2.2 2.2 
EUR 12 USA  Japan 
Source: European Report on Science and Technology Indicators (1994). 
NB: % of GDP in 1991. 
Wirhin the European Union, rhere are large differ-
ences in performance between the Member States. 
Within the German R&D system, for instance, lev-
els of industrial research spending are of the same 
magnitude as those in the United States, while the 
cohesion countries spend very little on R&D, partic-
ularly R&D in industry. In Greece, for instance, only 
0.12% of GDP was spent on R&D financed by 
industry in 1993, compared to 1.49% in Germany 
and just over 1.1% in the UK and France. 
The nature of R&D expenditure is as important as 
its volume. Relative to its main trading partners, the 
European research base does appear to be less mar-CHAPTER 7  87 
ket-oriented. A breakdown of R&D expenditure by 
objective clearly indicates that Europe devotes fewer 
resources to actual product development. Fig. 7.2 
compares spending in France and Germany with 
that in Japan and the United States. 
Fig. 7.2. Distribution of total expenditure 
by closeness to market (%) 
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Source: European Commission. 
In addition to these low levels of R&D spending, 
within the European Union a lower level of human 
resources are dedicated to R&D. Scientific research 
personnel represents only 0.47% of the labour force, 
compared to 0.74% in the United States and 0.80% 
in Japan. 
R&D spending and human resource indicators are 
input measures. However, what is important from 
the perspective of knowledge creation is innovative 
output. In terms of scientific output, the European 
Union and its Member States fund approximately 
25% of worldwide R&D (public and private), but 
account for almost 30% of world scientific publica-
tions. In addition, the European Union's share has 
continued to increase throughout the 1980s.' 
In terms of patents granted by the European Patent 
Office, EU countries have a lead over the USA and 
Japan (Fig. 7.3a.). However, in terms of patents 
granted in the USA, the EUR 15 lags behind (Fig. 
7.3b.). While the United States has recovered ground 
lost during the 1980s, the European Union, despite 
enlargement, has seen its share of US patenting fall 
each year since 1981. This assessment is valid irre-
spective of the fact that firms tend to patent more 
domestically (which partly explains the much larger 
figure for the US). There are, however, large differ-
ences between European counrries in the level of US 
patenting. Historically, Germany accounted for 
approximately half of the EU's US patents, although 
its share has fallen recenrly in line with a fall in the 
number of German US patents (down from 10% of 
total US patents in 1989 to 7.6% in 1993).
2
 
Fig. 7.3a. Share of EU patents granted 
EUR 15 
USA 
Japan 
Others 
3 
44.4 
47.2 
24.8 
23.1 
23.7 
22.8 
11995 
11994 
3.2 
3.1 
Source: European Patent Office. 
Fig. 7.3b. Share of US patents granted 
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Patent data have some well-known deficiencies. For 
instance, there are wide differences in the tendency 
to patent between industries and between coLintries, 
while not all patents lead to useful commercial out­
puts.' Nevertheless, patents represent an observable 
indicator of innovative outptit, or at least of the 
appropriable component of the knowledge factor. 
The figures reported above relate to inputs (mea­
sured by research personnel and expenditure on 
R&D), and ourputs (proxied by scientific publica­
tions and US patents granted). Combining input 
measures with outputs can give some indication of 
the efficiency of rhe EU's R&D effort. 
Comparing the patent output to the number of 
researchers and industry spending on R&D, it 
appears that the United States and Japan outper­
form the European Union, although a 'home bias' 
undoubtedly inflates the US figures (Fig. 7.4.). 
Japan, however, appears to be more efficient at pro­
ducing patents than the European Union, producing 
almost as many per researcher as the United States, 
in spite of the latters home advantage. 
Fig. 7.4. Patents per researcher and per million ECU 
spent on industrial R&D 
ι EU 
ι USA 
iJapan 
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Source: The European Report on Science and Technology, 1994. 
Both indicators suggest that the extent to which 
resources dedicated to R&D produce patentable 
outputs is lower in the European Union than in the 
United States and Japan. Overall these indicators 
appear to show that the European system is not per­
forming as well as its competitors in terms of the 
provision of commercially relevant OLitputs. 
European scientists are producing a high and grow­
ing percentage of worldwide scientific publications, 
but a low and falling percentage of United States 
patents. The European scientific research base 
appears, therefore, to be more effective at producing 
intellectual output than patentable technologies. 
3. Human resources 
Good basic education is the basis for further skill 
development. Good initial vocational training can 
ensure that latent capacity is used productively. The 
upgrading of skills throughout working life is 
required to improve initial skills and to keep pace 
with change. The extent to which Europe's learning 
systems generate and maintain the levels of skills 
required to sustain high levels of productivity and 
competitiveness is a key issue. In all EU coLintries 
expenditure on education is substantial and as a per­
centage of GDP is broadly comparable to that in the 
United States and higher than in Japan (Table 7.1.). 
As with R&D expenditure, there are large differences 
within the European Union, reflecting the different 
structure of the systems in the Member States and 
different methods of financing vocational education 
and training. 
Table 7.1. Total public expenditure for all levels of 
education as a percentage of GDP 
Β 
D Κ 
D 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
Fl 
S 
UK 
EUR 15 
JP 
USA 
1986 
6.2 
5.9 
4.5 
3.6 
5.8 
4.8 
5.2 
5.8 
4.2 
6.0 
4.8 
5.2 
4.0 
5.0 
1988 
5.5 
6.4 
4.3 
3.9 
5.4 
4.9 
5.7 
5.5 
5.7 
4.7 
5.2 
3.7 
5.0 
1991 
n.a. 
6.1 
4.1 
4.5 
5.5 
5.2 
4.8 
5.6 
5.4 
5.5 
7.3 
G.2 
5. 1 
5.4 
5.7 
1992 
5.2 
5.9 
3.7 
4.3 
5.0 
4.8 
4.5 
5.4 
G.4 
4.6 
5.0 
3.5 
5.2 
3 David, P. and Foray, D., 'Assessing and Expanding the Science 
and Technology Knowledge Base', STI Review, 16, OECD, 1995. 
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However, these figures underestimate the total 
amounts invested in education and training. Lirtle is 
known about public and private expenditure on edu-
cation and training outside the traditional domains 
of schools and universities. The expenditure by 
employers on education and training is substantial, 
for example, when measured by vocational training 
costs as a fraction of total labour cost in manufactur-
ing (see Fig. 7.5.). 
Fig. 7.5. Vocational training cost as a percentage of 
total labour cost in manufacturing 
Fig. 7.6. Participation in job-related training as 
a percentage of the employed population 
in three age groups 
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Inter-country differences in the levels of continuing 
education and training are difficult to identify and 
quantify. Definitions of continuing education and 
training vary and some countries have a strong tradi-
tion of on-the-job-training. However, what does 
emerge is that participation in continuing education 
and training is related to age (Fig. 7.6.). With the 
notable exception of Finland, the updating of skills 
decreases with age. Statistics also indicate that par-
ticipation in continuing education and training is 
related to previous education and training. People 
with a higher educational attainment are much more 
likely to participate in continuing education and 
training. 
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Source: OECD. 
NB: participation in 12-month period preceding the survey. Years vary 
by country (1990-93). 
There is also a clear trend in rising qualification lev-
els, particularly in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal. In these countries, the number of people 
aged between 25-29 who have completed secondary 
education is twice as high as those aged between 50-
59 (Table 7.2.). 
Table 7.2. Population achieving secondary-level studies 
by age group (%) 
B 
DK 
D 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EUR (12) 
25-29 
years 
72 
86 
88 
66 
50 
76 
62 
52 
55 
86 
35 
57 
67 
30-39 
years 
62 
82 
87 
55 
38 
67 
54 
47 
52 
83 
29 
55 
63 
40-49 
years 
52 
79 
84 
41 
22 
58 
40 
36 
48 
78 
20 
53 
54 
50-59 
years 
39 
67 
77 
26 
12 
43 
31 
21 
41 
71 
12 
43 
45 
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Evidently, the quality of skills cannot be measured 
simply by the amount of money spent on education 
and training. Indicators of educational attainment 
also have weaknesses. 
Box 7.1. Measuring literacy 
T
he International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) is a 
joint effort of the OECD, the European Union, 
Unesco and eight governments: Canada, Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United States. The IALS defines literacy as: 
'Using printed and written information to function in 
society, to achieve one's goals, and to develop one's 
knowledge and potential'. Hence, literacy indicators so 
defined should come very close to measuring the sort 
of skills that generate and sustain high levels of pro-
ductivity and competitiveness. 
Fig. 7.7. Share of all respondents below 
Level 2 on quantitative scale 
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CA 
CH(D) 
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s 
Source: OECD 
h. 
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The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) 
argues that traditional measures of human resources 
attainment can be misleading. In the United States, 
47% of the labour force had completed upper sec-
ondary education (41% in the Netherlands and 45% 
in Sweden). By traditional measures, the United 
States should have a high level of educational attain-
ment. The IALS casts doubt on the meaning of this 
figure. It shows that of those who had completed 
upper secondary education in the United States, 
18.4% were unable to interpret a weather chart in a 
newspaper. 
The three EU Member States whose International 
Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) results were published 
scored well. Only 4.1% of high school leavers in 
Germany, 2.7% in the Netherlands and 4.8% in 
Sweden were unable to interpret a weather chart. 
The level of 'quantitative illiteracy' in the population 
as a whole was higher: 6.7% in Germany, 10.3% in 
the Netherlands and 6.6% in Sweden. 
In the United States, high school leavers barely per-
form better than for the population as a whole. The 
results of the IALS survey, based on a representative 
sample, suggest that 21% of US citizens are unable 
to interpret a weather chart in a newspaper 
(Fig. 7.7.). 
However, the good performance of EU participants 
in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) 
does not imply that the average level of literacy in the 
European Union is satisfactory. The Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Germany are considered to have three 
of the best learning systems in the European Union. 
The other EU Member States were not covered in 
the IALS report. It will be important to obtain com-
prehensive data of this kind for all Member States. 
Internationally comparable achievement data is also 
available for numeracy. However, in the light of the 
IALS findings, the results of the Second International 
Mathematics Study (SIMS) are surprising. Sweden, 
which had the top score in the IALS, scored lowest in 
mathematics and algebra, whilst the overall perfor-
mance of the participating countries is in line with 
the other indicators presented in this section. 
Box 7.2. Measuring numeracy 
I
nternational comparisons of numeracy rely on stan-
dardized tests that are administered to pupils in a 
particular age group. As the World Bank (1993) and 
Unesco (1993) point out, the scores are influenced by 
what a national syllabus is meant to teach and at what 
age. CHAPTER 7  91 
Despite the increase in general levels of educational 
attainment, skill shorrages are a common problem 
for business in many European Union countries. 
Skill shortages can arise because of restrictions in 
mobility. This points to inflexibility in education 
and training systems and an inability to supply spe-
cific skills to meet labour demand. Furthermore, 
although qualifications are a measure of skills 
acquired, very often they are also the key to access to 
certain restricted product markets, particularly in 
services. 
In certain cases, the need to restrict market access to 
certain qualifications is justified. For example, pub-
lic safety requires restrictions on the type of person 
who can practise as a doctor. In these professions, 
there will always be a link between tightly regulated 
training standards and restrictions on market access. 
However, a common practice in Europe has been for 
areas requiring these qualifications to extend market 
access restrictions well beyond those required by the 
public interest. For instance, it may be justified for 
prescription medicines to be dispensed by a qualified 
pharmacist, but it does not follow that the sale of 
non-prescription medicines should be restricted to 
pharmacies, or that there should be a limit on the 
number of pharmacies per head of population. 
However, such restrictions are prevalent in Europe. 
They demonstrate how rigidities on factor markets 
interact with those in product markets. 
A second case arises when market access restrictions 
that are based on qualifications are not justified on 
general interest grounds. Reducing the number of 
restricted professions at the national level would 
make it easier to complete the internal market in ser-
vices. It would also make it easier to make the mu-
tual recognition directives work where they are real-
ly needed — in those cases where restrictions are jus-
tified on public interest grounds. 
All educarion and training systems in the European 
Union, despite their variety, are based upon a formal 
block of concentrated learning at the beginning of 
working life. The qualifications system — which as 
an indicator of skill levels improves the operation of 
the labour market by making it more transparent — 
is structured around formal initial education and 
training systems. This makes access to qualifications, 
which might improve employment prospects for 
workers and respond to employers' needs, more dif-
ficult at later stages of working life. 
Education and training systems can only contribute 
towards providing a highly-skilled and adaptable 
workforce. The key for productivity and comperi-
tiveness lies in how those skills are used and this is 
beyond the scope of the systems themselves. 
Given the importance, but limitations, of education 
and training systems, the focus must lie with 
Member States making their systems as effective as 
possible. There is substantial difficulty in evaluating 
the effectiveness of education and training systems 
and the return made on the investment in — the 
most important of resources — people. 
Validating skills irrespective of how they were 
acquired would also contribute towards an open EU 
skills area and support mobility. Many Member 
States are reluctant to recognize qualifications gained 
in other Member States, arguing that the standards 
are different and not equivalent. The opportunity to 
validate skills acquired in another Member State 
would enable Member States to maintain standards, 
but also provide an access route to those trained else-
where. 
It should also be noted that although training 
arrangements are not harmonized, the setting of 
common standards in other areas, such as health and 
safety and product or service standards, introduces 
common elements into the education and training of 
a wide range of occupations. These changes are grad-
ually bringing content and standards closer together. 
However, it is also increasingly important that 
employers are able to understand more readily and 
easily the content of different qualifications. Systems 
to improve rhe transparency of qualifications should 
also be examined, to contribute to greater mobility 
and flexibility. 
Europe could aim for 300 to 400 certified, general 
qualifications. A huge number of narrow qualifica-
tions would be counterproductive. Germany, France 
and the Netherlands already have just under 400 
general vocational qualifications. There is ample evi-
dence that these qualification standards are one of 
the fundamental reasons why the workforce in these 
Member States has aquired high skill levels. 
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a high level enables employers to evaluate objectively 
the skills of their employees and Member States their 
progress in achieving appropriate skill levels. They 
could be analogous to the idea of open product stan-
dards. 
appropriate vocational training. Process type stan-
dards such as the ISO 9000 series can help ro assess 
the capacity of national systems to deliver a given 
level of skill and to find ways of improving their effi-
ciency. 
However, in order to achieve the high levels of skill 
required, national systems must be able to deliver CHAPTER 8  93 
Chapter 8 
Organizational and product innovation 
In view of the link between innovation and perfor-
mance at enterprise level (Chaprer 2), the efficiency 
with which enterprises manage innovation is an 
important issue. Such an issue is not susceptible to 
detailed quantitative analysis, but organizational 
forms and diffusion mechanisms can affect the degree 
of innovation in an economy. The extent to which 
European firms have difficulty in raising finance for 
innovation is also examined in this chapter. 
1. Innovation and organization 
By its nature industrial innovation requires change, 
in management practices and in production pro-
cesses as well as in producrs. Adaptive organizations 
have become a prerequisite for innovation. Indeed, 
the absence of adequate structures for organizational 
change may be central to Europe's difficulties in 
innovative performance. The establishment of fluid 
departmental structures enabling mutual exchange 
ofinformation and cooperation within and between 
companies is generally seen to be an effective means 
of fostering innovation. 
At the basis of innovative organizations lie multi-
skilled employees, decentralization of responsibility, 
considerable recourse to team work and the integra-
tion of differenr functions within the firm from 
research, engineering, production to marketing and 
distribution around joint projects. Cutting across 
traditional hierarchical and functional boundaries, 
flexible organizations are also harder to manage. 
A viable organization is one for which change and 
flexibility are fundamental. Organizations need to 
acquire the ability to evaluate and embrace improve-
ments in the organizational field as they have already 
been attempting to do in the areas of new technolo-
gies and products. 
Changes in management practices are central to 
process innovation, which in turn is central to prod-
uct innovation. The development of lean production 
systems including total quality management, 
continuous incremental improvement (kaizen) and 
just-in-time production systems are dependent upon 
internal changes in rhe organization of firms. 
Benefirs from changing organizational and work 
practices can be substantial (Fig. 8.1.).' 
Fig. 8.1. Benefits of organizational innovation 
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Source: Kidd. 
In order to respond to new competitive challenges, 
the adoption of new forms of production based on 
Japanese models has been proceeding at an 
1 Paul Kidd, Organization, people and technology in European 
manufacturing, FAST, November 1990. 94  CHAPTER 8 
accelerating pace over the last decade. However, 
Europe still lags behind the United States in this 
field, in part because Japan invested earlier and more 
substantially in the United States than in Europe and 
the demonstration effect was stronger there. Many 
small firms are either wedded to traditional practices 
or reorganizing production systems piecemeal, when 
the benefits from new production models can only 
be reaped from coordinated implementation. 
Crucially, adoption of Japanese models has not been 
matched by innovation in production processes ro 
provide a further competitive stimulus. The need to 
match technology, including the application of 
information technology throughout the prodtictive 
cycle and the introducrion of numerically controlled 
machine tools and robots, with organizational 
change is now well understood. However, specific 
aspects of Europe's industrial tradition are not being 
used to modify or improve on imported models.-
Historically, organizational innovation has lagged 
behind product and process innovation. However, 
product market developments require complemen-
tary developments in the internal srructure of organ-
izations. Advances in micro-electronics were instru-
mental in quality checks becoming inherent to the 
production process (for example through total qual-
ity management), rather than only in final product 
quality control. 
With the increasingly intangible nature of value 
added, the growing importance of services and the 
rise in the application of information technology, 
organizational flexibility has become a necessary pre-
condition for companies to offer new products and 
services. Advanced information technologies acceler-
ate the rate at which service providers are able to 
offer new products. Equally, changes in internal 
structures may result in new services being created. 
Unfortunately accounting practices in Europe have 
not kept pace with these changes in the nature of 
investment. This has resulted in intangible invest-
ment remaining a more expensive option for compa-
nies. 
The indicators discussed in the last chapter give us 
some idea of the efficiency with which new knowl-
edge and technologies are being produced in Europe. 
However, innovation is not just about developing 
new ideas, or even ensuring their transposition into 
new products. Its impact on comperitiveness is 
mainly related to bringing successful new products 
to market, and this is an area where good indicators 
are rare. 
The limited data that does exist indicate that differ-
ent innovation systems foster quite different levels of 
new product development. In the consumer electron-
ics industry, for instance, a survey carried out by 
McKinsey found that the percentage of sales from 
products introduced in the last year was 64% in 
Japan compared to 33% in Germany. German indus-
try showed higher levels of new product introduction 
than the US, however, where rhe figure was 22%.' 
In a recent survey of companies in Europe, the 
United States and Japan, managers were asked on 
which aspects of innovation they concentrated their 
efforts (Fig. 8.2.). The chart indicates the percentage 
of positive replies for each aspect (NPD represents 
New Product Development and NP New Products). 
It is clear that Japanese managers put a higher prior-
ity on cost effecriveness of new product development 
and introduction, as well as focusing on the appeal of 
their producrs. ' 
Fig. 8.2. Priorities for product innovation 
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Source: Arthur D. Little. 
Organization, people and technology in European manufactur-
ing, Paul Kidd, FAST 1990. 
Employment Performance, McKinsey Global Institute, 
Washington, 1994. 
' Deschamps, J-P., Ranganath Nayak, P., Product Juggernauts, 
Arthur D. Little, 1995. CHAPTER 8  95 
There are, however, large differences in innovative 
behaviour within Europe. Figure 8.3., derived from 
the Community Innovation Survey,
5 reveals that 
German companies have a greater tendency to intro-
duce successful new products than other European 
countries. In addition, their innovations have a 
greater tendency to be significant, rather than incre-
mental. Thus certain European innovation systems 
appear to be more successful than others in bringing 
profitable new products to the market. 
Fig. 8.3. Sales by type of product 
59.3  23.6  17.1 
DK  55.7  25.6  18.7 
46.6  28.7  24.7 
48.2  37.7  14.2 
70.8  16.7  12.5 
NL  64.2  24.4  11.5 
I unchanged □incremental □ significant 
Source: Eurostat. 
The complex nature of the product development 
process is illustrated by research into the pharmaceu-
tical industry which found that the number of suc-
cessful products introduced by a country's industry 
appears to be unrelated to the proportion of new 
chemical entities discovered domestically. Rather, rhe 
success of national industries is related to key 
choices in the development process which result in 
bringing the best innovations to market.
6
 
In this example, the United Kingdom industry per-
formed particularly well. Having produced only 4% 
' The Community Innovation Survey is a survey of 40 000 EU 
companies conducted jointly by Eurostat and the European 
Commission in 1991-92. 
5 Freeman, C, Technology and the Future of Europe, London, 
Pinter, 1992. 
of new chemical entities in the period 1981-85, they 
produced 12 of the world's 50 top selling drugs in 
1990. This was considered to be a result of UK firms' 
apparent ability to identify potentially successful 
drugs at an early stage, and terminate research pro-
jects that offer poor prospects. 
The importance of these strategic choices is sup-
ported by a close analysis of plant level data which 
reveals that the internal organization of businesses is 
probably the most potent factor explaining the dif-
ferent ability of firms to introduce new products in a 
timely manner.
7 For instance, the creation of multi-
functional teams that group R&D scientists, pro-
duction engineers and markering personnel has con-
tributed to reduce time to market by up to 50% in 
certain industries (e.g. photocopying machines). 
2. Sources of innovation 
Innovative activity is often the resulr of dynamic 
relations between actors rather than the simple trans-
fer of information or technology. Feedback loops 
between different actors are very important in the 
innovation process. This should be kept in mind 
when considering the sources of innovation. 
There have been several surveys on the key sources of 
innovarion for companies. One of the most recent 
and extensive is the Community innovation survey. 
This found that, irrespective of size, external sources 
(made up of suppliers, customers, competitors and 
business services) were found to be more important 
drivers of innovation than internal sources or univer-
sities and research establishments. For SMEs, exter-
nal sources are proportionally more important, since 
internal development and academic research repre-
sent less of a stimulus relative to larger firms.
8
 
Cooperative activities with external firms or institu-
tions enhance the transfer of tacit knowledge and 
other intangible assets. This is particularly relevant in 
the context of inter-regional cooperation, since 
knowledge is often locally generated. Fig. 8.4. con-
tains information on the international distribution 
of strategic technology alliances. Over half of such 
alliances take place within the geographic area from 
Voss et al., The Competitiveness of European Manufacturing - A 
Four Country Case Study, Business strategy review, 6(1), spring 
1995. 
' Green Paper on innovation, CEC, 1995. 96  CHAPTER 8 
which firms originate. Strategic alliances between 
firms originating in different areas nevertheless 
account for 40% of such alliances, with a particular 
emphasis on European-US alliances followed by US-
Japanese alliances. In terms of the numbers of strate-
gic technology alliances in which they engage, US 
firms are the most active participating in 60% of the 
total, followed by rhe European Union with 48% 
and Japan with 24%. 
Fig. 8.4. International strategic technology alliances 
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The importance of external sources for successful 
innovation is supported by evidence on the role of 
technical cooperation in innovative activity. Figure 
8.5 depicts the average share of new or improved 
products in total sales of innovative firms surveyed 
by the CIS. Firms are classified in two groups: those 
that have cooperated with other external partners, 
and those which have not. 
Firms which had engaged in some technical cooper-
ation with an external partner usually have a larger 
proportion of new or improved products in their 
total sales. The European Commission seeks to 
encourage such cooperation, on a cross-border level, 
through the fourth Framework Programme, which 
will provide funding of ECU 12.3 billion for coop-
erarle research projects over the period 1994-98. 
In terms of cross-border cooperarion, EU enterprises 
tend to cooperate less with enterprises outside Europe. 
However, including intra-EU, firm cooperation 
woLild probably significantly increase the figure for the 
EU (Fig. 8.6.). It should be noted that regulations on 
such inter-firm cooperation differ between regions 
and could account for some of the differences. 
Source: Duysters & Hageddord, Research policy, 1996.  Fig. 8.6. Research cooperation with firms 
in other regions 
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3. Diffusion mechanisms 
The mechanisms to diffuse new ideas or technologies 
are an important aspect of the innovation system. 
There are significant differences in national systems 
that foster innovation diffusion. Studies of innova-
tion sources and stimulants conclude that linkages 
outside the firm are important (see above). Some of CHAPTER 8  97 
Box 8.1. Regulation and innovation 
D
epending on how they are conceived and applied, 
regulations can help promote innovation, or stifle it. 
The following general principles help to evaluate whether 
a regulation is likely to support innovation or not. 
Focus on outcomes and not technologies. Forcing 
firms to adopt specific technical solutions, rather than 
leaving them the flexibility to develop the solutions 
that best suit them, discourages innovation. 
Aim for a stable, predictable regulatory process that 
minimizes time delays and administrative costs for 
firms. Uncertainty about the regulatory process can 
stall innovation because of a fear of going down the 
wrong path. 
Employ phase-in periods which take account of invest-
ment cycles, economic conditions, etc. 
Ensure industry participation in setting standards from 
an early stage to help ensure appropriate phase-in 
periods, realistic standards and the least-cost 
approaches to achieving them are adopted. 
Develop strong technical capabilities among regulators 
to ensure a better understanding of industry's con-
straints and opportunities, both technically and eco-
nomically, and to provide a better basis for cooperation 
in meeting environmental objectives. 
Table 8.2. Diffusion instruments for selected 
EU countries 
Β 
DK 
D 
1 
NL 
UK 
Affiliates 
74.2 
35.7 
39.0 
36.3 
46.3 
48.4 
Joint 
ventures 
41.7 
14.6 
30.4 
33.8 
51.3 
42.0 
Suppliers 
47.8 
33.3 
42.4 
39.1 
51.2 
40.2 
Clients 
50.0 
47.6 
41.1 
36.8 
42.5 
40.2 
Res. 
institute 
41.6 
45.2 
43.5 
26.0 
39.1 
29.7 
Tech. 
analy. 
47.8 
26.1 
51.4 
57.9 
46.3 
39.1 
Source: Confindustria. 
these channels are formal and institutionalized, while 
others are not. Table 8.1 provides a taxonomy of 
these diffusion mechanisms and reveals information 
as to their relative importance for a sample of EU 
countries. The figures relare to the percentage of 
companies that considered the sources mentioned to 
be important. 
Differences exist however in the importance of for-
mal linkages between industry and the research sys-
tem. The German infrastructure is often considered 
to be exemplary in respect of fostering innovation 
diffusion. In particular, the Fraunhofer centres, 
which bridge the gap between university-based 
research and industry, represent an important chan-
nel for the diffusion of innovation. This is reflected 
in the figures reported in Table 8.2. Along with 
Danish companies, which also benefit from an orga-
nized diffusion infrastructure, German firms interact 
more with public and university research institutions 
than their European counterparts. 
However, case study evidence suggests that there are 
strong complementarities in national institutional 
designs.'' This effectively means that institutions are 
reliant upon one another and are thus difficult to 
transpose across borders. Although this means that 
the solution to the problem of encouraging more 
effective diffusion remains primarily national, cross-
border cooperarion can, nevertheless, contribute to 
mutually beneficial interaction and exchange. While 
innovation systems are rooted within a specific insti-
tutional context, there is a certain degree of infr-
action between national innovation systems. 
The extent to which technologies and innovations 
developed in other systems are effectively utilized is 
also an important factor contributing to perfor-
mance. Darà on cross-border purchases and sales of 
patents is regularly collected by the OECD in the 
form of 'technology balance of payments' statistics 
(Fig. 8.7.). 
Data on technology sales abroad, standardized by 
domestic industrial expenditure on R&D, give an 
indication of the attracriveness of technology and 
innovations developed at home. In parallel, the level 
of purchases of Technology developed abroad reflects 
the ability of domestic firms to absorb and exploit 
innovations produced elsewhere. 
Nelson, R. (ed.), National Innovation Systems. 98  CHAPTER 8 
Fig. 8.7. Technology exports and imports as a 
percentage of industrial R&D 
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Export data indicate that Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States export proportionate-
ly more technology than the other selected countries. 
France and Italy export relatively high levels, especial-
ly in comparison to Japan. This is at odds with the 
view that European innovation systems are not suffi-
ciently creative and outward oriented. However, high 
technology export levels are not necessarily a positive 
indicator. The low level of exports from Japan may 
reflect unwillingness to sell their technological devel-
opments to competitors. 
In the case of technology import figures, Germany 
again shows high levels, indicating a high overall inter-
action with the outside technological environment. It 
is noteworthy that both the United States and Japan 
have low levels, indicating a high level of self-reliance. 
The low level of both indicators in the latter could also 
be related to the fact that Japanese innovation is less 
reliant on formal R&D. It is also a reflection of the 
relative size of the economies, which means that much 
technology is available domestically. 
These figures do not provide information on the ori-
gin and direction of flows for individual countries. 
Data on bilateral flows between EU Member States, 
and between EU countries and other developed 
nations, could provide a proxy of the inter-action 
between innovation systems across Europe. In addi-
tion it would be useful to have more precise indica-
tors of the extent and speed of diffusion of key tech-
nologies to industry. In spire of work by OECD and 
Eurostat, data in this area is limited. 
4. Financing innovation 
As the Commission's Green Paper on innovation has 
noted, access to adequate finance is one of the key 
factors influencing successful innovation. Financial 
requirements vary across sectors, but most innovative 
activity requires large amounts of, often intangible, 
investment. The extent to which access to such 
finance can be secured is therefore an important 
aspect of the innovation system. 
Generally innovation expenditure varies through the 
lifetime of a project. Thus, innovation projects 
require a large proportion of their total financing at 
a time when the potential returns are mosr remote 
and market and technological uncertainties are high. 
This applies particularly to R&D, which is the stage 
where returns are least appropriable. Public interven-
tion to reduce the inherent risk of such spending can 
help to promote innovation. Table 8.2 shows the 
percentage distribution of innovation expenditure by 
type for three EU countries. In all cases, start-up 
investment was the largest single expenditure item. 
Debt finance often requires collateral. The typical 
research and development project does not involve 
many assets that could be put up as collateral. In sec-
tors like software development, R&D mostly con-
sists of hours worked. Debt-financing such innova-
tion projecrs can therefore be difficult. Banks lacking 
Table 8.2. Innovation expenditures 
R&D 
Design & engineering 
Patents & licences 
Start-up investment 
Marketing 
Germany 
26 
22 
2 
46 
4 
Italy 
17.9 
25.2 
-
51.5 
5.4 
Finland 
39 
6.3 
4 
46.2 
4.5 
Source: OECD. 
NB: Germany and Italy 1988; Finland, 1981-85. CHAPTER 8  99 
specialized knowledge can also find the evaluation of 
such projects problematic. 
Equity finance poses similar problems. Purchasing 
equity means that an investor takes a direct stake in 
the innovation project. In return, investors are given 
a say in the running of the company that is under-
taking the project. Founders are often unwilling to 
surrender such control. 
'Business angels', wealrhy individuals who take a per-
sonal stake in a project, are one example of a classic 
source of risk capital. In the United States they play 
an important role in innovation start-ups. 
More recently, special financial instruments have 
been developed that aim to channel savings from 
those who want to invest in high-risk, high-return 
projects into such projects. Very often these financial 
instruments are provided by specialized institutions. 
Venture capital and the venture capital industry are 
one example. In the United States, venture capital 
plays a significant role in financing innovarion. In 
Europe it does not. The explanation lies in part in 
the different structure of their financial systems. 
However, it is also due to administrative and regula-
tory barriers that have hindered the growth of the 
European venture capital industry. 
Venture capital financing is usually undertaken via 
independent venture capital funds. In practice, many 
of these funds are not independent, but associated 
with large corporations, pension funds, banks or 
insurance companies. Banks are the largesr source of 
funds for the European venture capital industry. 
Pension funds are relatively imporrant as well. In the 
United States, pension funds 'are estimated to 
account for 53% of total private venture capital 
funding in 1990, endowments and foundations 
another 13% and individuals and families 11%'.
1
0 
In Europe, the scale of markets and investment vol-
umes is also an important factor. Although there may 
be sufficient investors willing to back a particular 
innovation project in the European Union as a 
whole, they may not reside in the country where the 
project is being undertaken. Nationally, there may 
not be enough projects to make it profitable to set up 
a market for innovation financing. 
The investment services Directive and the creation 
of pan-European equity markets that seek to attract 
high-technology companies, like the Nouveau 
Marche and EASDAQ, might help to resolve the 
problem of the geographical mismatch between 
investors and investment opportunities. 
The European venture capital industry has pointed 
out that it faces important legislative gaps. In the 
United States venture capitalists can pool capital in 
special fund structures. They are available to 
investors throughout the United States, regardless of 
their State of residence. In Europe, the equivalent 
fund structures do nor exisr, even at the level of the 
Member States. Many Member States do not have 
fund structures that suit local and foreign investors. 
A pan-European fund structure is not available. 
5. Innovation as a system 
Case studies of innovation systems have identified 
three important characteristics." Firstly, innovation 
systems are rooted within a given set of national and 
sub-national institutions. Secondly, Europe's innova-
tion systems are characterized by a high degree of 
diversity. Thirdly, the role of supporting institutions, 
both private and public, formal and informal, is of 
crucial importance. 
Successful innovation requires more than basic 
research and R&D expenditure. Case studies have 
stressed the importance of factors internal to firms, 
such as business organization, or industry specific 
characteristics, such as distribution networks, con-
tacts with clients, and supplier-producer relation-
ships. 
From a broader perspective, the access to finance for 
innovation and the regulatory environment, as well 
as access to relevant information, local research-
industry links and the availability of supporting 
business services, all impact on innovative perfor-
COM(93) 528 final. On the financial problems experienced 
by small to medium-sized companies. 
" Nelson, R., National Innovation Systems — A Comparative 
Analysis, OUP New York, 1993. 100  CHAPTER 8 
mance. The role of these supporting services and 
institutions increases as innovation moves towards 
commercialization. They are also particularly rele-
vant for SMEs, which do not have the necessary 
resources to develop these services in-house. 
This chapter has considered the above aspects of the 
European innovation system in order to identify 
some key difficulties, in relation to competitiveness. 
It appears that European companies suffer from sev-
eral disadvantages relative to their main competitors. 
Apart from a generally low level of intangible invest-
ment, as discussed in the last chapter, there are other 
factors which have a negative influence on the inno-
vative potential of European industry. The financial 
environment in ELirope does not appear to be suffi-
ciently open to the financing of the sort of intangi-
ble investments that innovation requires. Several 
European coLintries also lack a broader supporting 
infrastructure to ensure access to information and 
technology. 
In particular, however, rhere appear to be disadvan-
tages in the internal structure of European industry 
which are inhibiting innovation. Open, flexible 
organizational stmctures are vital to effecrive man-
agement and incorporation of change. Rigidities in 
Etiropean company structures appear ro work to 
resist change and impede development of new prod-
ucts and processes. CHAPTER 9  101 
Chapter 9 
Environment 
Environmental quality is an important factor of our 
standard of living. As such, meeting high environ­
mental requirements has become an integral part of 
doing business and an intrinsic condition for the 
long-term competitiveness of industry. Meering this 
challenge will depend on the ability of industry and 
the policy-maker to identify and encourage opportu­
nities for efficiency improvements, new product and 
service innovations and changing consumer behav­
iour. 
There is, however, much debate on how and to what 
extent the requirement to meet strict environmental 
standards is actually affecting the competitive perfor­
mance of EU industry. This chapter examines this 
issue as well as assessing the opportunities it presents 
for improved business efficiency and innovation. 
1. Impact of environmental require­
ments on competitiveness 
Although environmental regulations tend to impose 
costs on industry, there is little empirical evidence, at 
the aggregare level, rhar existing requirements have 
had significant negative or positive competitive 
impacts, but in specific sectors these can be impor­
tant. 
For example, the available, if somewhat limited, evi­
dence at the aggregate level indicates that the relative 
stringency of environmental requirements in differ­
ent countries does not appear to have had a signifi­
cant effect on the export performance of Europe's 
pollution-intensive industries as a whole. It must be 
added, however, that exports are a very general indi­
cator which incorporates the impact not only of 
environmental costs but also a wide number of other 
unrelated factors such as market access, demand, raw 
material supplies, etc. As such, it is difficult to iso­
late the precise role and impact that environmental 
compliance costs have had on the export perfor­
mance of the EU 's pollution-intensive industries. 
However, case study evidence at the firm and sectoral 
levels suggests that certain European industries and 
companies have suffered adjustment costs following 
the introduction of high environmental standards. 
Nevertheless, a preliminary analysis made recently by 
the World Bank (Fig. 9.1) found that the industries 
most affected by higher environmental standards 
have performed relatively well in international trade 
over a period in which regulatory compliance costs 
have been rising (period assessed was 1970-90). 
Industries covered by the analysis included pulp and 
paper, petroleum products, chemicals, coal mining, 
fertilizer, cement, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
metal manufactures and wood manufactures such as 
veneers and plywood. 
Fig. 9.1. Percentage share in total world exports of 
manufactures and of environmentally sensitive goods, 
industrial countries 1970-90 
Π1970 
D1990 
74,3 
72,7 
91,3 
81,3  81,3 81,1 
Total exports  All manufact.  Environ. 
sensitive 
goods 
Source: Piritta Sorsa, World Bank. 102  CHAPTER 9 
In fact, it would seem that industrial countries (with 
strict environmental standards) have had more 
export success in these environmentally sensitive 
industries than they have had in their manufacturing 
industry as a whole. 
While their share of total world exports decreased 
from 74.3 to 72.7% between 1970 and 1990 and 
their share of all manufactures declined from 91.3 to 
81.3%, their share of exports in environmentally 
sensitive industries was almost stable, displaying only 
a marginal decline from 81.3 to 81.1%. The trend 
is similar for the individual countries analysed. 
To date, there has been little analysis of the effects of 
environmental measures on company profitability in 
the European Union, but this issue is currently inves-
tigated by the European Commission in several 
research projects within the 'Human dimension of 
environmental change' programme.
1 However, 
recent analysis of thousands of US-based companies 
and plants (Fig. 9.2) suggests that the link between 
lower environmental expenditure and increased 
profitability appears to be a weak one. 
Fig. 9.2. Correlation factors of toxic emissions and 
plant profitability for selected pollution-intensive 
industry sectors 
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NOM/BVC = Net operating margin as a proportion of book value 
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GOM/^VS = Gross operating margin as a proportion of total value 
shipments. 
Source: World Resources Institute, 1995 
For example, the research projects 'Environmental regulation, 
globalization of production and technological change' and 
'Measuring the competitiveness effects of environmental com-
pliance: the importance of regulation and market pressures'. 
Indeed, it appears eqtially likely, and perhaps some-
what more likely, for planrs with lower emissions 
(relative to production) to achieve higher operating 
margins and returns on invested capital. 
Concerning foreign direct investment (FDI), most 
analyses on the possible links between industrial 
flight and FDI suggest that location and physical 
investment decisions are not significantly influenced 
by the cost differentials of complying with environ-
mental regulations in developed and developing 
countries. These cost differentials appear small 
enough not to offset other more important decision 
drivers, such as access to markets, labour skills and 
costs, raw material supplies, political stability, avail-
ability of supporting infrastructure, and transport 
costs. Derealization to 'pollution havens' does not 
appear to be happening at any significant level. 
FDI data appears to show that of the FDI flowing 
from developed countries to developing countries, 
only a small proportion of the investment is made in 
the pollution-intensive industries when compared to 
the levels of investment directed towards other 
developed countries. In other words, to the extent 
that developed countries are 'exporting' their pollu-
tion-intensive industries via FDI, they predominant-
ly seem to be sending them to each other and not to 
'lower-environment standard' counrries. 
Costs 
The lack of apparent significant effects on competi-
tiveness at the aggregate level could arise for a num-
ber of reasons, including data and methodological 
limitations, relatively small differences in standards 
between the European Union and its major com-
petitors, and the fact that compliance costs may have 
been largely offset by benefits. 
It is also likely that until now the marginal costs of 
abatement have been relatively low. Enterprises have 
been able ro significantly reduce their emission levels 
for relatively low investment levels. This is consis-
tent with the available data on compliance costs in 
the European Union. For the business sector as a 
whole pollution control and abatement expenditures 
are relatively low compared to other cost factors rep-
resenting only 0.2 to 1.1% of GDP. However, since 
most of these costs are incurred by indLisrry, which 
accounts for approximately one-third of GDP, this CHAPTER 9  103 
means environmental compliance costs amount to 
0.6-3.3% of industrial value added. 
Impacts at the sectoral level 
Analysis at the firm level points to a more heteroge-
neous scenario regarding the competitiveness effects 
of environmental requirements in Europe. Case 
study analysis shows clear evidence of some sectors 
and firms suffering adjustment costs following the 
introduction of strict environmental standards. 
There are, however, a number of well-documented 
case studies of sectors and firms which have been 
able to turn the imposition of strict standards into 
first-mover advantages through innovation, efficien-
cy and productivity gains. The innovations resulted 
in cost reductions, yield improvements, market share 
increases or the development of new products and 
markets. 
Recent case study analysis undertaken for the 
European Commission's Forward Studies Unit 
demonstrates that meeting high environmental 
requirements can have positive competitive effects. 
One example focused on an enterprise in the leather 
tanning industry; an industry that has generally 
found strier environmental requiremenrs to be an 
increasingly negative pressure on their ability to 
compete in world markets. 
Driven by a forward-thinking management philoso-
phy, the enterprise invested more than ECU 2.4 mil-
lion in environmental protection (compared to an 
annual turnover of ECU 20 million) between 1985 
and 1995. This sum included ECU 710 000 invest-
ed in the development and implementation of a new 
epilation (hair removing) technology aimed specifi-
cally at reducing the company's solid waste and 
wastewater emission levels. 
It was estimated that the new technique added about 
ECU 280 000 to the company's gross profit between 
1989 and 1993 for a net operating income of 
ECU 390 000 in 1993. The increase in profits was 
due mainly to lower chemical, water treatment, 
waste disposal and labour costs. The internal rate of 
return was estimated to be 40%. It was calculated 
that without the investment in the company's envi-
ronmental management programme, its total envi-
ronmental costs would have risen significantly (Fig. 
9.3) in the coming years as wastewater and solid 
waste disposal charges and standards increase. 
Fig. 9 .3. Total environmental costs with and without 
environmental programme 
1986-96 
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
with programme 
without programme 
Source: Arthur D. Little Inc. 
In addition, the investments were made by the enter-
prise during an economic downturn in the European 
and national leather tanning industries which saw a 
number of competitors go bankrupt partly because 
they had failed to invest in efficiency-oriented envi-
ronmental protection measures. 
On the other hand, an analysis by the Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber highlighted a number 
of specific cases where recently introduced, strict 
environmental standards (relative to those faced by 
their competitors) seem to have contributed to the 
difficult competitive position of some firms. 
One example is that of a cement manufacturer which 
competes with imports from neighbouring Central 
and East European countries. The cement industry 
in Austria is subject to much stricter air emission 
limits than competing installations located in these 
neighbouring countries. 104  CHAPTER 9 
Fig. 9.4. Cement industry case study: cost differences 
between Austria and the Czech Republic, 1995 
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Source: Austrian Federal Economic Chamber. 
It is estimated that the environmental cost differen-
tial of meeting the higher standards is ATS 100 per 
tonne of finished product (Fig. 9.4). This cost dif-
ferential may contribute to the competitive disad-
vantages already faced by the enterprise with regard 
to the other factor inputs such as labour and energy. 
2. Environment and efficiency 
Well-designed environmental protection measures 
can help promote efficiency improvements. Until 
now, much of industry's efforts to meet environmen-
tal requirements have focused on implementing end-
of-pipe (EOP) solutions such as wastewater treat-
menr, du.st filters, solid waste treatment, etc. This is 
partly because many of the required EOP technolo-
gies already existed and where they did not, research 
and development times for new ones have been typ-
ically only two to four years. EOP solutions, how-
ever, do not usually result in efficiency or productiv-
ity gains, therefore representing a pure cost to the 
firm. 
Clean technology, on the other hand, reduces the 
actual level of emissions produced in the first place 
thus improving the process efficiency. Although ini-
tial investment costs are typically higher than those 
for EOP solutions, there is often a short pay-back 
period. Furthermore, clean technology usually 
reduces polluting emissions to all media instead of 
shunting them from one to the other; something 
that often occurs when applying EOP technologies 
(e.g. dust emission scrubbers shift the environmental 
burden from the atmosphere to the solid waste envi-
ronment). 
Box 9.1. Small and medium sized enterprises 
S
mall and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can 
be disproportionately burdened by regulations if 
account of their size and scarce resources is not 
taken. 
Environmental regulations designed for large compa-
nies or plants, and applied without due account to 
the specific characteristics of SMEs, can impose sig-
nificant, and perhaps excessively high, costs on the 
latter. These costs can take various forms: adminis-
trative and legal burden of interpreting requirements, 
obtaining permits, supplying monitoring data, etc. 
Regulations and standards are also often media spe-
cific. This lack of integrated approach can be partic-
ularly burdensome for small-scale production process-
es where it can be difficult to separate the emissions 
to the various media. 
Because of limited resources (finance and manage-
ment), SMEs find it harder to access the relevant 
information concerning pollution abatement options 
and their financing. They also lack the R&D capabili-
ties enjoyed by larger firms. There are, however, a 
number of Community and national schemes aimed 
at facilitating the access to environment-relevant 
information and preferential financing conditions by 
SMEs, thereby encouraging them to adopt a more 
proactive attitude towards the environment. 
Many pollution abatement technologies have been 
designed for large plants with large wastewater, 
atmospheric pollution and solid waste flows and may 
not be suitable for much smaller operations. CHAPTER 9  105 
One well-studied example that demonstrates the 
benefits of investing in resource efficiency measures 
is that of the Swedish pulp and paper industry. In 
the United States, water discharge regulations were 
imposed on the pulp and paper sector during the 
1970s without adequate phase-in periods, forcing 
companies ro adopt best available technologies 
quickly. At that time the requirements usually 
meanr installing costly end-of-pipe water effluent 
treatment systems. 
In Scandinavia, a more flexible regulatory approach 
was adopted involving the initial use of loose stan-
dards and adequate phase-in times coupled, howev-
er, with a clear signal that tighter standards would 
follow. This enabled Scandinavian companies to 
focus on the production process itself, and not just 
on the secondary treatmenr of wastes. 
Scandinavian companies developed innovative pulp-
ing and bleaching technologies that not only met 
emission requirements but also lowered production 
costs. Spurred by Scandinavian demand for sophis-
ticated process improvements, local equipment sup-
pliers ultimately made major international gains in 
selling innovative pulping and bleaching technolo-
gies. 
In addition, the Scandinavian pulp and paper indus-
try reaped spill-over advantages as they were able to 
meet the growing niche market of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s for totally chlorine-free paper, whilst its 
competitors lagged behind, and thus were able to 
charge premium prices. 
Investment cycles for clean technologies are typically 
six to ten years. New product research and develop-
ment times are generally anywhere between three to 
eight years. To maximize the potential benefits, 
companies must combine the two elements together. 
Total combined product and production investment 
cycles could, therefore be up to 18 years for certain 
industry sectors, although this is an extreme case. 
new regulations is critical in this respect. Such phase-
in periods are generally foreseen in EU legislation. 
A lack of appropriate data means there are currently 
few reliable indicators available for assessing the 
environmental efficiency performance of EU indus-
try vis-à-vis its competitors. However, preliminary 
analysis suggests the performance of EU industry 
varies considerably. 
Water is one area which will become of critical 
importance for industry over the coming years. The 
supply of clean water is becoming increasingly prob-
lematic even though water is not yet perceived as a 
scarce resource. The efficiency wirh which industry 
uses water will therefore become an important ele-
ment for the overall environment performance of 
European industry. One measure of efficiency is that 
of industrial water recycling rates (for example how 
many times each cubic metre of water is used before 
being discharged). Unfortunately, existing data on 
recyling rates is very weak and no conclusive evalua-
tion of current levels of efficiency can be made. 
Table 9.1. Energy intensity 
1992 
Country 
USA 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Ireland 
EUR 15 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Germany 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
Austria 
Denmark 
Japan 
kJ/$GDP 
13.33 
12.41 
9.87 
9.28 
8.68 
8.52 
7.97 
7.67 
7.24 
7.10 
7.03 
6.87 
6.81 
5.58 
5.10 
4.92 
4.72 
Source: WCR 1995. 
The implications for policy and regulatory design are 
important. Well-designed measures need to include 
predictable targets that take account of related 
investment cycles and to send clear messages about 
likely future requirements so industry can anticipate 
these in its innovation programmes and investment 
decisions. The importance of phase-in periods for 
Another measure of environment/resource efficiency 
is energy intensity (Table 9.1). The average level of 
European industrial energy intensity compares well 
with that of the United States. The European Union 
is almost twice as efficient but there is wide variation 
between individual Member States and even 106  CHAPTER 9 
Denmark, the most efficient EU energy user, lags 
behind Japan's performance. It suggests there is 
room for increasing energy efficiency in Europe 
which would not only meet environmental concerns 
but also improve industrial competitiveness. 
3. Environment and innovation 
Used in the right way, environmental requirements 
can lead to the development of new products and 
new markets. Europe has witnessed significant 
growth of its 'eco-industry' which includes, amongst 
others, the wastewater treatment, waste manage-
ment, air quality control, environmental consultan-
cy and monitoring sectors. Because of a lack of com-
mon definitions and methodologies, most data con-
cerning the size and growth of the industry are esti-
mates and need to recognized as such. 
Fig. 9.5. Estimated market size (1990) and 
annual growth (1990-2000) of eco-industry. 
thus its growth is not necessarily a good indicator of 
improved industrial competitiveness. Indeed, much 
of the eco-industry's growth probably reflects a tran-
sitory stage during which industry as a whole is com-
ing to grips with meeting environmental require-
ments imposed on them. 
The next stage is likely to see industry internalizing 
the management of these requirements and shifting 
to resource efficient clean technology solutions. 
There is already some evidence that this is happen-
ing. For example, the quantities of industrial haz-
ardous waste generated in the United Kingdom have 
decreased by 29% between 1990 and 1994 (Fig 9.6.). 
Thus the demand, in Europe, for the goods and ser-
vices of the specific industry supplying end-of-pipe 
solutions is likely to decline in the long run; its 
future prosperity will increasingly rely on sales to 
newly industrialized and developing countries. 
Increasingly integrated solutions will be found in 
investment goods and will be a significant driver of 
their competitiveness. 
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Fig. 9.6. Generation of industrial hazardous waste 
in the United Kingdom 
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The OECD estimates that the market size of the 
Western European eco-industry in 1990 was approx-
imately ECU 43 billion (Fig. 9.5.) with an expected 
growth rate of 4.9% per annum between 1990 and 
2000. This compares to ECU 62 billion and 5% for 
the United States and ECU 19 billion and 6.7% for 
Japan. 
However, the provision of end-of-pipe technology 
accounts for a large proportion of this industry and 
NB: Data for 1993 are provisional. 
Source: OECD. 
The development of environment-friendly goods 
and services is a significant potential source of 
improved competitiveness for EU industry. There is 
currently little data concerning the size and growth 
of these markets in Europe but there is little doubt 
that demand for goods and services that meet strin-
gent environmenral requirements is growing. The 
growth and success of, for example, the Blue Angel CHAPTER 9  107 
eco-labelling scheme in Germany reflects this trend 
(Fig. 9.7.). Environmental criteria are rapidly 
becoming part of a product's overall quality specifi­
cation. 
The successful development of these markets is 
strongly dependent on consumer confidence. This 
requires effective regulations to ensure the reliability 
of environmental quality information. One example 
is the development of eco-Iabel schemes. Credibility 
with the consumer is vital. Schemes that are not 
bureaucratic, set the criteria in a transparent and vis­
ible way and are quick to adapt to changing techni­
cal standards are more likely to promote the demand 
for environment-friendly goods and services. 
Fig. 9.7. Number of different products awarded Blue 
Angel eco-Iabel in Germany 
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